

# Post-quantum WireGuard

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**Abstract**—In this paper we present PQ-WireGuard, a post-quantum variant of the handshake in the WireGuard VPN protocol (NDSS 2017). Unlike most previous work on post-quantum security for real-world protocols, this variant does not only consider post-quantum confidentiality (or forward secrecy) but also post-quantum authentication. To achieve this, we replace the Diffie-Hellman-based handshake by a more generic approach only using key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). We establish security of PQ-WireGuard, adapting the security proofs for WireGuard in the symbolic model and in the standard model to our construction. We then instantiate this generic construction with concrete post-quantum secure KEMs, which we carefully select to achieve high security and speed. We demonstrate competitiveness of PQ-WireGuard presenting extensive benchmarking results comparing to widely deployed VPN solutions.

## I. INTRODUCTION

WireGuard is a VPN protocol presented by Donenfeld in [1]. It combines modern cryptographic primitives with a simple design derived from the Noise framework [2], a very small codebase, and very high performance.

These properties are achieved partially because WireGuard is “cryptographically opinionated” [1]: instead of supporting multiple cipher suites, WireGuard fixes X25519 [3]<sup>1</sup> for elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange, Blake2 [4] for hashing, and ChaCha20-Poly1305 [5], [6], [7] for authenticated encryption. Not only are those primitives known for their outstanding software performance, fixing those primitives eliminates the need for an algorithm-negotiation phase, which keeps the protocol simple and its codebase small, and avoids any potential negotiation attacks. Also, high performance is achieved by implementing the protocol in the Linux kernel space, which eliminates the need for moving data between user and kernel space.

In addition to its superior performance and small codebase, WireGuard was designed to provide security properties that are

not supported by other VPN software, e.g., identity hiding, and DoS-attack mitigation. The security considerations that lead to the design of WireGuard are laid out in [1]. Donenfeld and Milner give a computer-verified proof of the protocol in the symbolic model in [8]. In [9] Dowling and Paterson present a computational proof of the WireGuard handshake with an additional key-confirmation message.

Given its properties it is thus not surprising to see that WireGuard is becoming increasingly popular. For example, CloudFlare is working on “BoringTun”, a WireGuard-based userspace VPN solution written in Rust [10]. Torvalds called WireGuard’s codebase a “work of art” compared to OpenVPN and IPsec and advocated for its inclusion in Linux [11]. WireGuard is scheduled to become part of the next mainline Linux kernel (version 5.6).

As WireGuard aims to be the next-generation VPN protocol, it is natural to see that security against quantum attackers played a role in its design as well, albeit a small one. Specifically, it allows users to include a symmetric shared key into the handshake, which protects against an attacker who records handshake transcripts now and attacks them in the future with a quantum computer [1, Sec. V.B]. Post-quantum asymmetric schemes are explicitly declared as “*not practical for use here*” by Donenfeld and are thus not included in the handshake. Recently, Appelbaum, Martindale, and Wu took another look at post-quantum security of WireGuard and proposed a small tweak to the protocol that aims at protecting against pretty much the same future quantum attacker with recorded transcripts [12], but without requiring a long-term secure pre-shared key. The tweak assumes that public keys are typically not actually known to the attacker. If this is the case, then transmitting the hash of the public key instead of the public key itself prevents a future quantum attacker from ever learning the public key and thus from computing the corresponding secret key.

Author list in alphabetical order; see <https://www.ams.org/profession/leaders/culture/CultureStatement04.pdf>.

<sup>1</sup>For naming of X25519, see [https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/-9LEdnzVrE5RORux3Oo\\_oDDRksU](https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/-9LEdnzVrE5RORux3Oo_oDDRksU).

### A. Contributions of this paper.

In this paper we present PQ-WireGuard, a post-quantum variant of the WireGuard handshake protocol. Unlike the mitigation techniques described above and unlike various earlier works aiming at transitioning protocols to post-quantum security, we do not only aim for *confidentiality* against quantum attackers, but target full post-quantum security *including authentication*. The main design goal of PQ-WireGuard is to stay as close as possible to the original WireGuard protocol in terms of security and performance characteristics, i.e., PQ-WireGuard should

- achieve all the security properties of WireGuard, but now also resist attacks using a large-scale quantum computer;
- make a concrete choice of high-security, efficient cryptographic primitives instead of including an algorithm negotiation phase;
- finish the handshake in just one round trip;
- fit each of the two handshake messages into just one unfragmented IPv6 packet of at most 1280 bytes; and
- achieve much higher computational performance than other VPN solutions such as IPsec or OpenVPN.

PQ-WireGuard manages to tick all these boxes and thus shows that the assessment from the original WireGuard paper stating that post-quantum security is “not practical for use here” is no longer correct.

*From Diffie-Hellman to KEMs.* The original WireGuard protocol is heavily based on (non-interactive) Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which is not easy to replace straight-forwardly with post-quantum primitives. The only somewhat practical post-quantum non-interactive key exchange is CSIDH [13], which is both very young and rather inefficient. Furthermore, the security of concrete CSIDH parameters is still heavily debated [14], [15], [16], [17]. We therefore take a different approach and first transform the WireGuard protocol to a version using only interactive key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). This approach is based on the KEM-based authenticated key exchange described in [18].

*Security.* Security of WireGuard is supported by the symbolic proof of Donenfeld and Milner [8] and the computational proof by Dowling and Paterson [9]. The symbolic proof covers more security properties than the computational proof and is computer verified. However, a correct computational proof gives stronger security guarantees as the proof makes less idealizing assumptions. We adapt both proofs to the case of PQ-WireGuard and thereby establish the same level of security guarantees as WireGuard. On the way, we point out (and fix) a few small mistakes in the computational proof. In order to allow for a standalone proof of the handshake we add an explicit key confirmation message to the PQ-WireGuard handshake as suggested in [9].

*A concrete instantiation.* The generic KEM-based approach allows us in principle to use any post-quantum KEM submitted to the NIST post-quantum project as a proposal for future

standardization<sup>2</sup>. Now the main challenge becomes one of public-key and ciphertext sizes: WireGuard operates over UDP and the existing codebase assumes that all handshake messages fit into one unfragmented IPv6 packet. The reason for this requirement is that increasing the number of packets in a handshake would make the state machine of the protocol more complex and contradict WireGuard’s aim for simplicity in both protocol design and codebase. Fragmenting and reassembling IPv6 packets comes with various issues. For example a denial-of-service (DoS) attack can fill up the reassembly buffer with fragments of packets that are never completed. This is just one example of IP fragmentation attacks [19]. To prevent such attacks, some firewalls drop fragmented IPv6 packets, so avoiding fragmentation ensures that the protocol remains robust against such firewall configurations.

IPv6 packets are guaranteed not to be fragmented as long as they do not exceed 1280 bytes [20]. With the IPv6 header occupying 40 bytes and the UDP header occupying 8 bytes, there are 1232 bytes left for the content of handshake messages. In both, initiation message and response, those 1232 bytes need to fit several MACs and protocol-specific fields alongside a public key and a ciphertext (for the initiator’s packet) respectively two ciphertexts (for the responder’s packet). For some of the schemes proposed to NIST, this is not much of a problem. For example, compressed SIKE [21] uses only 331 bytes for the public key and 363 bytes for the ciphertext, even at the highest security level. However, SIKE is not exactly known for its high computational performance; for example, it is more than an order of magnitude slower than most lattice-based KEMs.

PQ-WireGuard uses a combination of two KEMs, namely Classic McEliece [22] and a passively secure variant of Saber [23], [24]. One advantage of this solution for actual applications is that most security properties are guaranteed by the Classic McEliece scheme, considered by many as the most conservative choice among all NIST candidates. Another advantage is the computational efficiency (see below). Finally, our approach allows us to give a concrete example of an application that

- 1) works extremely efficiently with Classic McEliece, a cryptosystem that is often discarded as “impractical” because of its large public keys; and
- 2) heavily benefits from the savings in public-key and ciphertext size that lattice-based KEMs can achieve if they do not aim for active security.

The second point may be seen as new insight into the question whether or not KEMs which only provide passive security really offer any benefits for real-world applications, which was repeatedly raised by Bernstein on the NIST pqc-forum mailing list [25], [26]. The parameters our proposal uses achieve the “AES-192-equivalent” security level (NIST level 3).

*Performance evaluation.* To evaluate the performance of PQ-WireGuard, we compare the handshake efficiency of

<sup>2</sup>See <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography>.

PQ-WireGuard with that of WireGuard, the strongSwan implementation of IPsec, and OpenVPN. We show that a PQ-WireGuard handshake is less than 60% slower than a WireGuard handshake, is more than 5 times faster than an IPsec handshake using Curve25519, and more than 1000 times faster than an OpenVPN handshake.

### B. Related Work.

Related work can be grouped in four categories.

First, there is ongoing effort for post-quantum security in the Noise framework [2] that the WireGuard handshake is based on. Currently this effort only covers “transitional post-quantum security” (i.e., no post-quantum authentication), which is achieved by combining ephemeral-ephemeral ECDH with a post-quantum KEM (currently NewHope-Simple [27]). Noise calls this approach hybrid forward secrecy (HFS); the details are described in [28]. As the WireGuard handshake is one of the more complex Noise key-exchange patterns, our work may also be seen as a first step towards fully post-quantum Noise.

Second, there is a large body of work on authenticated key exchange including works on generic KEM-based constructions. Most important for this work is the generic KEM-based approach by Fujioka, Suzuki, Xagawa, Yoneyama [18] (which can be seen as a generalization of “Efficient one-round key exchange in the standard model” [29]). All currently considered actively secure post-quantum KEMs start in their construction from a passively secure encryption scheme and obtain active security through variants of the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform [30]. In [31], Hövelmanns, Kiltz, Schäge, and Unruh present a generic AKE construction that starts directly from passively secure encryption schemes and moves some of the FO machinery into the AKE construction. A somewhat similar idea of reconsidering the FO transform in the context of authenticated key exchange is presented by Xue, Lu, Li, Liang, and He in [32]. However, the primitive they start from in their generic construction is what they call a “2-key KEM”. Also more specialized, non-generic, constructions of post-quantum AKEs have been described in the literature. In [33], Zhang, Zhang, Ding, Snook, and Dagdelen describe a lattice-based AKE (which, however, was later outperformed by instantiating a generic construction with the lattice-based KEM Kyber in [34, Sec. 5]). Isogeny-based constructions were presented by Longa in [35], by Xu, Xue, Wang, Au, Liang, and Tian in [36], and by Fujioka, Takashima, Terada, and Yoneyama in [37].

Third, there have been additional efforts on proving security properties of WireGuard and more generally Noise. Most notably, in [38], Lipp, Blanchet, and Bhargavan present a computer-verified proof of security of the WireGuard handshake in the computational model. The proof is in the ROM; a meaningful translation to PQ-WireGuard would require first moving this proof to the QROM or the standard model. In [39], Dowling, Rösler, and Schwenk introduce a generalization of the ACCE model from [40] and prove 8 out of the fundamental 15 Noise AKE patterns secure in this generalized ACCE

model; the IK pattern used by WireGuard is not one of those 8 patterns. In [41], Kobeissi, Nicolas, and Bhargavan present “Noise Explorer”, a tool that fully automatically proves certain security properties of Noise AKE patterns in the symbolic model using ProVerif [42]. Adapting Noise Explorer to support KEM-based AKE such as the one we use in this paper would certainly be interesting, but for the concrete case of PQ-WireGuard would not provide any more insight than our adaptation of the Tamarin [43] proof.

Finally, there are proposals to upgrade other VPN solutions to post-quantum security. Specifically, we are aware of two independent efforts to migrate OpenVPN [44] to post-quantum cryptography. One of these efforts is described in the Master’s thesis by de Vries, which adds transitional security to OpenVPN through the use of McEliece as additional key exchange [45]. The other effort is PQCrypto-VPN by Easterbrook, Kane, LaMacchia, Shumow, and Zaverucha at Microsoft Research [46]. We give a performance comparison between our proposal and PQCrypto-VPN in Section VI.

### C. Availability of Software.

Just like the Linux kernel module implementing the original WireGuard protocol, we make all software described in this paper available under the GPLv2 license. The software is available online from <https://cryptojedi.org/crypto/#pqwireguard>. Note that the optimized Classic-McEliece and the Saber software we make use of has been placed into the public-domain.

### D. Organization of this paper.

Section II gives a brief summary of the cryptographic primitives involved in the WireGuard handshake and then reviews the full handshake. Section III introduces the abstract, KEM-based construction of the PQ-WireGuard handshake and Section IV analyzes its security. Section V describes the instantiation of PQ-WireGuard using McEliece and a passively secure version of Saber. Finally, Section VI presents benchmark results for PQ-WireGuard.

## II. PRELIMINARIES

In the following we briefly discuss the security notion under which we analyze PQ-WireGuard. We then recall some cryptographic primitives used by WireGuard and PQ-WireGuard, and eventually provide a brief description of the WireGuard handshake protocol. We start the discussion of security notions with a brief discussion of post-quantum security.

### A. A Note on Post-Quantum Security

Our proofs in the computational model analyze the post-quantum security of PQ-WireGuard. This requires definitions of post-quantum security. In our case, the security notions for pre- and post-quantum security only differ with regard to the computational model of the attackers. More precisely, pre-quantum security assumes adversaries to be conventional probabilistic algorithms. For post-quantum security we assume adversaries to be quantum algorithms (which are probabilistic by nature). All honest parties are assumed to be conventional

probabilistic algorithms. Consequently, all communication in our models is classical. We provide all definitions below with respect to probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversaries. We then obtain the post-quantum version by allowing the adversaries to be quantum polynomial time (QPT) algorithms.

This treatment is possible as our computational proofs are in the so-called standard model, i.e., the proofs do not make use of idealized primitives, like random oracles or ideal ciphers which would require quantum-access to oracles.

Looking at the symbolic model, we are not aware of research that analyzes the implications of considering quantum adversaries against conventional cryptography. Consequently, for now our proofs in the symbolic model are only known to apply to the pre-quantum setting.

### B. Security Properties and Corruption Patterns

Before discussing formal models, we give some intuition on the security that WireGuard was designed to achieve. WireGuard considers a setting where an *initiator*  $I$  initiates a secure connection with a *responder*  $R$ . The WireGuard handshake aims to achieve the following security goals:

- *Session-Key Secrecy*: The established session key is pseudorandom, i.e., indistinguishable from a random bit string for everyone except the initiator and the responder.
- *Session-Key Uniqueness*: The established session key is, with overwhelming probability, never repeated.
- *Entity authentication*: Both, initiator and responder, know who they are talking to. Specifically, it is practically infeasible for a party to impersonate another party.
- *Identity Hiding*: The identities of initiator and responder are only revealed to each other.
- *DoS Mitigation*: By DoS mitigation we refer to the first message by the initiator being authenticated. This allows a responder to reject forged messages before performing any costly public-key operations.

These security goals should even be preserved under corruption of secrets. All parties have a static long-term secret (usually the secret key of a key-pair). Identity is defined as knowledge of a certain long-term secret. In addition, parties have ephemeral secrets (think of ephemeral keys but also the randomness used during the execution of the protocol<sup>3</sup>) which are only used in a single execution of the protocol and are erased afterwards. We consider these a party's secrets and assume that they may be corrupted independently by an adversary. In addition, every pair of parties may or may not have a pre-shared secret that can be corrupted by the adversary as well. This allows to define different corruption patterns. In general we consider *maximal exposure (MEX) attacks* [47, Sec. 3.3],[48],[18] allowing adversaries to corrupt arbitrary combinations of static and ephemeral secrets.

However, certain corruption patterns allow for trivial, unpreventable attacks against certain security goals. For example, if

<sup>3</sup>Some definitions limit the meaning of ephemeral secrets to ephemeral key pairs. We use it to refer to all temporary secret data in a party's state, especially all used randomness. This turns out to be important when using KEMs.

all long-term secret data is compromised, there is no way to protect against active adversaries. In the following we discuss under which corruption patterns which security goals should still be achieved, explicitly excluding such trivial attacks.

- *Session-Key Secrecy*. The session key remains pseudorandom if either the parties share an uncorrupted pre-shared key or if each party has at least one uncorrupted secret. This notion implies *perfect forward secrecy (PFS)* (also known as pre-compromise security) where an adversary learns the victim's secrets at some point in time and tries to learn the session key of previous sessions. In the case of weak-PFS the adversary is limited to sessions in which it did not actively interfere before.
- *Session-Key Uniqueness*. Session-key uniqueness holds against passive adversaries that only observe secrets of corrupted parties but do not actively change them.
- *Entity Authentication*. The handshake provides entity authentication under arbitrary corruption except for two cases. Assume Eve wants to impersonate Alice towards Bob then there exist two trivial corruption patterns. If Eve corrupts Alice's long-term secrets and all pre-shared secrets between Alice and Bob, authentication cannot be achieved. In addition to that, the impersonation may succeed if all of Bob's secrets are compromised, that is if Eve knows Bob's long-term and ephemeral secrets as well as the pre-shared secret between Alice and Bob. While this is no trivial attack in the sense that it cannot be prevented, it is often excluded as it describes a setting where Eve has essentially full control over Bob's system. In this case there are more direct ways than breaking cryptography to convince Bob that he is talking to Alice. All other attacks against entity authentication are mitigated, including *key-compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks*, where Eve tries to impersonate Alice towards Bob, while knowing all of Bob's long-term secrets. It also covers *unknown-key-share (UKS) attacks* in which Eve tricks an honest party into believing that they are communicating with someone else than they actually do.
- *Identity Hiding*. The identity of the initiator and the responder are hidden as long as both long-term secrets and the initiator's ephemeral secrets are uncompromised. Note that a compromise of a party's long-term secret is by definition also a reveal of its identity.
- *DoS Mitigation*. DoS mitigation can be achieved against adversaries that do not corrupt a pair of long-term key and pre-shared secret.

### C. Formal Security Models

We formally analyze the security of the PQ-WireGuard handshake in two models.

*The symbolic model*. In the symbolic model, security is proven by ruling out the possibility of certain attacks, one by one. The original symbolic analysis by Donenfeld and Milner [8] covered all of the above security goals except DoS mitigation.

The analysis of forward secrecy was limited to weak-PFS. We extend their model by DoS mitigation and full PFS. We detail our formalization of this model in Section IV-B.

*The computational model.* For the analysis of WireGuard in the computational model, Dowling and Paterson introduced the notion of eCK-PFS-PSK security [9]. It extends the eCK-PFS notion of Cremers and Feltz [49] by the treatment of pre-shared keys. The notion of eCK-PFS security in turn is a strengthening of the eCK security notion [50] that integrates perfect forward secrecy. In terms of the informal description above, eCK-PFS-PSK covers session-key secrecy, including PFS, and all the authentication-related security goals. What is not covered are session-key uniqueness, identity hiding, and DoS mitigation.

As Dowling and Paterson did for WireGuard, we prove security of PQ-WireGuard in the computational model with respect to eCK-PFS-PSK. The only difference is that we allow adversaries to be quantum algorithms as discussed above. For a formal description of eCK-PFS-PSK see Appendix E.

#### D. Cryptographic building blocks

In the following we discuss cryptographic building blocks used in (PQ-)WireGuard.

*Diffie-Hellman key exchange.* Strictly speaking Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DH) is not a generic cryptographic building block in the sense of the other building blocks below. Instead it is an actual scheme. However, authenticated key-exchange protocols built using the Noise framework are explicitly based on DH instead of some generic building block. This is what lead to complicated security arguments for such protocols, requiring the introduction of non-standard security assumptions like the PRFODH-assumption discussed below. Nevertheless we describe DH as it is a core ingredient of WireGuard.

We use the multiplicative notation for the group  $G$  with generator  $g$  in which the DH is carried out. To highlight similarities to the KEM-based approach, we write DH.Gen for DH key generation which returns a keypair  $(a, g^a)$ . DH shared-key computation is denoted DH.Shared and outputs  $g^{ab}$  on input a secret key  $a$  and a public key  $g^b$ . WireGuard instantiates the DH key exchange with X25519 [3].

DH is vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm [51], [52] and thus what makes the WireGuard handshake vulnerable to quantum attacks. Consequently, this is what we have to replace for post-quantum security. Note that from a more abstract point of view, DH supports (and is, in fact, the most common example of) non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) [53].

The way that the Diffie-Hellman key exchange is used in WireGuard seems to prevent a security proof that only uses the (standard) Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption ( $(g^x, g^y, g^{xy})$  being indistinguishable from  $(g^x, g^y, g^z)$  for random  $x, y, z$ ). Known proofs require assumptions from the family of PRFODH-assumptions. These combine the DDH-assumption with a prf assumption described below. Roughly they state that for some prf  $f$  and message  $m$ ,  $f(g^{xy}, m)$  is indistinguishable from a random value even if the adversary

has (limited) oracle access to  $f(a^x, b)$  and  $f(a^y, b)$ , where it is allowed to choose  $a$  and  $b$ . Different versions of the PRFODH-assumption are distinguished by the limitations on the oracle-access. For more details on the PRFODH family and its use in the context of WireGuard we refer to [54] and [9] respectively.

*Key-encapsulation mechanisms.* A key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) is a triple of algorithms (KEM.Gen, KEM.Enc, KEM.Dec). The probabilistic key-generation KEM.Gen generates a keypair  $(sk, pk)$ . Encapsulation KEM.Enc is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a public key  $pk$  and computes a ciphertext  $c$  and a shared key  $k$ . We make the probabilistic behavior explicit, treating KEM.Enc as deterministic algorithm which takes as additional input random coins  $r$ . This is necessary to deal with situations where the local randomness source is compromised. The decapsulation algorithm KEM.Dec takes as input a ciphertext  $c$  and a secret key  $sk$  and returns a shared key  $k$  or a failure symbol  $\perp$ . A KEM is  $(1 - \delta)$ -correct if  $\mathbb{E}[k = k' \mid (sk, pk) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Gen}(), (c, k) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Enc}(pk, r), k' \leftarrow \text{KEM.Dec}(c, sk)] = 1 - \delta$ , where the expectation is taken over the internal coins of KEM.Gen and KEM.Enc. We call  $\delta$  the failure probability.

The security notions we need from a KEM in this paper are indistinguishable ciphertexts under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) and under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). For the formal definitions of these notions in the context of KEMs, see e.g., the seminal work by Dent [55]. Intuitively, an IND-CPA-secure KEM allows two parties to agree on a shared key  $k$  without any *passive* attacker being able to learn any non-trivial information about that key. An IND-CCA-secure KEM then provides essentially the same notion, but this time for *active* attackers.

Like DH, a KEM can be used to establish a shared key between two parties over an untrusted channel in a confidential way. However, unlike DH, the communication scenario assumes interaction. When using DH, two parties that each know their own secret-key and their peer’s public key can derive a shared secret without any further interaction. In contrast, when using KEMs, this does not work generically, since it is not generally possible to combine two keypairs to acquire a shared secret. Instead one party has to encapsulate a key using their peers public key and send the encapsulation to their peer, requiring one interaction.

In many applications, DH is also used in a KEM-like interactive setting; those are the cases where DH can easily be replaced by a KEM. However, many protocols also involve non-interactive applications of DH that are not trivial to replace and WireGuard is no exception in that regard.

*Pseudorandom Functions.* For the definitions of pseudorandom functions (PRF) and authenticated encryption (see below) we use the definitions given in [9] to keep the computational proof for PQ-WireGuard as close to that of WireGuard as possible. The definitions are verbatim copies and refer to pre-quantum security. For post-quantum security, one has to replace “PPT” (probabilistic polynomial time) by “QPT”

(quantum polynomial time) algorithm when talking about the adversary.

*Definition 1 (prf Security [9]):* A pseudo-random function family is a collection of deterministic functions  $\text{PRF} = \{\text{PRF}_\lambda : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{O} : \lambda \in \mathbb{N}\}$ , one function for each value of  $\lambda$ . Here,  $\mathcal{K}$ ,  $\mathcal{M}$ ,  $\mathcal{O}$  all depend on  $\lambda$ , but we suppress this for ease of notation. Given a key  $k$  in the keyspace  $\mathcal{K}$  and a bit string  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $\text{PRF}_\lambda$  outputs a value  $y$  in the output space  $\mathcal{O} = \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ . We define the security of a pseudo-random function family in the following game between a challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  and an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , with  $\lambda$  as an implicit input to both algorithms:

- 1)  $\mathcal{C}$  samples a key  $k \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$  and a bit  $b$  uniformly at random.
- 2)  $\mathcal{A}$  can now query  $\mathcal{C}$  with polynomially-many distinct  $m_i$  values, and receives either the output  $y_i \leftarrow \text{PRF}_\lambda(k, m_i)$  (when  $b = 0$ ) or  $y_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\lambda$  (when  $b = 1$ ).
- 3)  $\mathcal{A}$  terminates and outputs a bit  $b'$ .

We say that  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the PRF security game if  $b' = b$  and define the advantage of an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  in breaking the *pseudo-random function security* of a PRF family  $\text{PRF}$  as  $\text{Adv}_{\text{PRF}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) = |2 \cdot \Pr(b' = b) - 1|$ . We say that PRF is secure if for all PPT algorithms  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{\text{PRF}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda)$  is negligible in the security parameter  $\lambda$ .

Traditionally most authors require that  $m$  can have (almost) arbitrary length. We consider a setting where  $m$  and  $k$  both have the same fixed length. In case a function  $f$  becomes a PRF when its arguments are swapped (that is  $f(m, k)$  satisfies the prf-assumption), we say that  $f$  satisfies the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$ -assumption introduced in [56].

A function that satisfies the prf- and the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$ -assumption is called dual-PRF and satisfies the dual-prf-assumption. Intuitively this means that if at least one input is random and unknown to the adversary, the resulting bit string is still indistinguishable from a random value.

In PQ-WireGuard a dual-PRF appears in the form of a *key-derivation function*  $\text{KDF}(X, Y) = Z$  that takes two inputs,  $X$  and  $Y$ , and outputs a bit string  $Z$  consisting of three blocks  $Z = Z_1 \| Z_2 \| Z_3$ . We write  $\text{KDF}_i(X, Y)$  for the  $i$ -th block of output of  $\text{KDF}(X, Y)$ , i.e.,  $Z_i$ . The reason why KDF has to be a dual-PRF is discussed in Section IV-A.

*Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data.* The analysis of the PQ-WireGuard (and WireGuard) handshake only makes use of the authentication security of the used AEAD scheme. Hence, we limit our presentation to this. A discussion of secrecy related properties can e.g. be found in [57]. As discussed above, the following is a definition of pre-quantum security, the definition of post-quantum security is obtained replacing PPT by QPT in the text below.

*Definition 2 (aead-auth Security [9]):* An AEAD scheme  $\text{AEAD}$  is a tuple of algorithms  $\text{AEAD} = \{\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}\}$  associated with spaces for keys  $\mathcal{K}$ , nonces  $\mathcal{N} \in \{0, 1\}^l$ , messages  $\mathcal{M} \in \{0, 1\}^*$  and headers  $\mathcal{H} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ . These sets all depend on the security parameter  $\lambda$ . We denote by  $\text{AEAD.KeyGen}(\lambda) \rightarrow k$  a key generation algorithm that takes as input  $\lambda$  and outputs a key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ . We denote by

$\text{AEAD.Enc}(k, N, H, M)$  the AEAD encryption algorithm that takes as input a key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ , a nonce  $N \in \mathcal{N}$ , a header  $H \in \mathcal{H}$  and a message  $M \in \mathcal{M}$  and outputs a ciphertext  $C \in \{0, 1\}^*$ . We denote by  $\text{AEAD.Dec}(k, N, H, C)$  the AEAD decryption algorithm that takes as input a key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ , a nonce  $N \in \mathcal{N}$ , a header  $H \in \mathcal{H}$  and a ciphertext  $C$  and returns a string  $M'$ , which is either in the message space  $\mathcal{M}$  or a distinguished failure symbol  $\perp$ . Correctness of an AEAD scheme requires that  $\text{AEAD.Dec}(k, N, H, \text{AEAD.Enc}(k, N, H, M)) = M$  for all  $k, N, H, M$  in the appropriate spaces.

Let AEAD be an AEAD scheme, and  $\mathcal{A}$  a PPT algorithm with input  $\lambda$  and access to an oracle  $\text{Enc}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ . This oracle, given input  $(N, H, M)$ , outputs  $\text{Enc}(k, N, H, M)$  for a randomly selected key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ . We say that  $\mathcal{A}$  *forges* a ciphertext if  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs  $(N, H, C)$  such that  $\text{Dec}(k, N, H, C) \rightarrow M \neq \perp$  and  $(N, H, M)$  was not queried to the oracle. We define the advantage of a PPT algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  in forging a ciphertext as  $\text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{aead-auth}}(\lambda)$ . We say that an AEAD scheme  $\text{AEAD}$  is *aead-auth-secure* if for all PPT algorithms  $\mathcal{A}$   $\text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{aead-auth}}(\lambda)$  is negligible in the security parameter  $\lambda$ .

(PQ-)WireGuard assumes that the keys of the AEAD scheme used are random bit strings. This is the case for all practical AEAD schemes we are aware of. Also in theory this is no limitation as one can always replace the secret key by the coins of  $\text{AEAD.Gen}$ .

### E. The WireGuard handshake

We are now ready to review the handshake protocol of WireGuard. In Algorithm 1 we first give a high-level view of the handshake, largely following the description in [9]. The initiator and responder are identified by their long-term, *static* public keys  $\text{spk}_i$  and  $\text{spk}_r$  (with corresponding secret keys  $\text{ssk}_i$  and  $\text{ssk}_r$ , respectively). Those key pairs are generated before the first handshake between two parties and WireGuard assumes that the public keys are exchanged in a secure way (guaranteeing at least authenticity) before the first handshake.

From a cryptographic point of view, and in particular for the context of this paper, what is most interesting is how the values  $H_k$ ,  $\kappa_k$ , and  $C_k$  in Algorithm 1 are computed. This is laid out in Table I, again largely following the description in [9]. The values  $\text{lbl}_1$ ,  $\text{lbl}_2$ , and  $\text{lbl}_3$  are fixed strings (see [1, Sec. V.D]). The value *cookie* is most of the time just 16 zero bytes, except when the server is under load and is sending out so-called “cookie replies” as denial-of-service countermeasure; for details, see [1, Sec. V.D7]. Note that Algorithm 1 includes the first application-data packet from the initiator. The reason is that this packet also serves as key confirmation of the handshake. This dual purpose of the first data packet is the reason that WireGuard cannot be proven secure in a modular way (separating handshake from data transport) without modification. For details see [9].

## III. FROM WIREGUARD TO PQ-WIREGUARD

As outlined in Sections I and II, the WireGuard handshake is heavily based on DH, which does not have an efficient and well established post-quantum equivalent. Hence, in this

TABLE I

COMPUTATION OF SEED VALUES, KEYS, AND HASHES THROUGH THE WIREGUARD HANDSHAKE. FOR VALUES OF  $k$  WITH TWO ROWS, THE FIRST ROW DENOTES COMPUTATION ON THE INITIATOR SIDE AND THE SECOND ROW THE CORRESPONDING COMPUTATION ON THE RESPONDER SIDE.

$k$	seed $C_k$	key $\kappa_k$	hash $H_k$
1	$H(1b1_1)$	—	$H(C_1 \parallel 1b1_2)$
2	$KDF_1(C_1, \text{epk}_i)$	—	$H(H_1 \parallel \text{spk}_r)$
3	$KDF_1(C_2, \text{DH.Shared}(\text{esk}_i, \text{spk}_r))$ $KDF_1(C_2, \text{DH.Shared}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{epk}_i))$	$KDF_2(C_2, \text{DH.Shared}(\text{esk}_i, \text{spk}_r))$ $KDF_2(C_2, \text{DH.Shared}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{epk}_i))$	$H(H_2 \parallel \text{epk}_i)$ $H(H_2 \parallel \text{epk}_i)$
4	$KDF_1(C_3, \text{DH.Shared}(\text{ssk}_i, \text{spk}_r))$ $KDF_1(C_3, \text{DH.Shared}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{spk}_i))$	$KDF_2(C_2, \text{DH.Shared}(\text{ssk}_i, \text{spk}_r))$ $KDF_2(C_2, \text{DH.Shared}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{spk}_i))$	$H(H_3 \parallel \text{ltk})$ $H(H_3 \parallel \text{ltk})$
5	—	—	$H(H_4 \parallel \text{time})$
6	$KDF_1(C_4, \text{epk}_r)$	—	$H(H_5 \parallel \text{epk}_r)$
7	$KDF_1(C_6, \text{DH.Shared}(\text{esk}_i, \text{epk}_r))$ $KDF_1(C_6, \text{DH.Shared}(\text{esk}_r, \text{epk}_i))$	—	—
8	$KDF_1(C_7, \text{DH.Shared}(\text{ssk}_i, \text{epk}_r))$ $KDF_1(C_7, \text{DH.Shared}(\text{esk}_r, \text{spk}_i))$	—	—
9	$KDF_1(C_8, \text{psk})$	$KDF_3(C_8, \text{psk})$	$H(H_6 \parallel KDF_2(C_8, \text{psk}))$
10	—	—	$H(H_9 \parallel \text{zero})$

### Algorithm 1 High-level view on the WireGuard handshake

Initiator	Responder
1: $(\text{esk}_i, \text{epk}_i) \leftarrow \text{DH.Gen}()$	
2: $\text{sid}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{32}$	
3: $\text{ltk} \leftarrow \text{AEAD.Enc}(\kappa_3, 0, \text{spk}_i, H_3)$	
4: $\text{now} \leftarrow \text{Timestamp}()$	
5: $\text{time} \leftarrow \text{AEAD.Enc}(\kappa_4, 0, H_4, \text{now})$	
6: $\text{m1} \leftarrow \text{MAC}(H(1b1_3 \parallel \text{spk}_r), \text{type} \parallel 0^3 \parallel \text{sid}_i \parallel \text{epk}_i \parallel \text{ltk} \parallel \text{time})$	
7: $\text{m2} \leftarrow \text{MAC}(\text{cookie}, \text{type} \parallel 0^3 \parallel \text{sid}_i \parallel \text{epk}_i \parallel \text{ltk} \parallel \text{time} \parallel \text{m1})$	
8: $\text{InitHello} \leftarrow \text{type} \parallel 0^3 \parallel \text{sid}_i \parallel \text{epk}_i \parallel \text{ltk} \parallel \text{time} \parallel \text{m1} \parallel \text{m2}$	
	$\xrightarrow{\text{InitHello}}$
9: $(\text{esk}_r, \text{epk}_r) \leftarrow \text{DH.Gen}()$	
10: $\text{sid}_r \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{32}$	
11: $\text{zero} \leftarrow \text{AEAD.Enc}(\kappa_9, 0, H_9, \emptyset)$	
12: $\text{m1} \leftarrow \text{MAC}(H(1b1_3 \parallel \text{spk}_i), \text{type} \parallel 0^3 \parallel \text{sid}_r \parallel \text{sid}_i \parallel \text{epk}_r \parallel \text{zero})$	
13: $\text{m2} \leftarrow \text{MAC}(\text{cookie}, \text{type} \parallel 0^3 \parallel \text{sid}_r \parallel \text{sid}_i \parallel \text{epk}_r \parallel \text{zero} \parallel \text{m1})$	
14: $\text{RespHello} \leftarrow \text{type} \parallel 0^3 \parallel \text{sid}_r \parallel \text{sid}_i \parallel \text{epk}_r \parallel \text{zero} \parallel \text{m1} \parallel \text{m2}$	
	$\xleftarrow{\text{RespHello}}$
15: $\text{tk}_i \leftarrow \text{KDF}_1(C_9, \emptyset)$	
16: $\text{tk}_r \leftarrow \text{KDF}_2(C_9, \emptyset)$	
	$\xrightarrow{\text{AEAD.Enc}(\text{tk}_i, \cdot, \emptyset, \text{application data})}$

section we describe how we replace DH by KEMs, for which well-established, efficient post-quantum instantiations exist. We start by considering a simplified view on the core of the DH-based WireGuard handshake.

In this simplified view, the initiator has a long-term static DH key pair  $(\text{ssk}_i, \text{spk}_i)$  and the responder has a long-term static DH key pair  $(\text{ssk}_r, \text{spk}_r)$ . The handshake proceeds as follows:

Initiator	Responder
$(\text{esk}_i, \text{epk}_i) \leftarrow \text{DH.Gen}()$	
	$\xrightarrow{\text{epk}_i}$

$(\text{esk}_r, \text{epk}_r) \leftarrow \text{DH.Gen}()$

Initiator	Responder
	$\xleftarrow{\text{epk}_r}$
$k_1 \leftarrow \text{DH.Shared}(\text{ssk}_i, \text{spk}_r)$	$k_1 \leftarrow \text{DH.Shared}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{spk}_i)$
$k_2 \leftarrow \text{DH.Shared}(\text{esk}_i, \text{spk}_r)$	$k_2 \leftarrow \text{DH.Shared}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{epk}_i)$
$k_3 \leftarrow \text{DH.Shared}(\text{ssk}_i, \text{epk}_r)$	$k_3 \leftarrow \text{DH.Shared}(\text{esk}_r, \text{spk}_i)$
$k_4 \leftarrow \text{DH.Shared}(\text{esk}_i, \text{epk}_r)$	$k_4 \leftarrow \text{DH.Shared}(\text{esk}_r, \text{epk}_i)$

The final session key is computed using the keys  $k_1, k_2, k_3$ , and  $k_4$ .

#### A. Moving from DH to KEMs

In [18], Fujioka, Suzuki, Xagawa, and Yoneyama describe an approach to authenticated key exchange using only KEMs; we largely follow their approach in our design. Towards our final proposal, let us first try to straight-forwardly translate the DH-based approach to a KEM-based approach. The problem is, as described in Subsection II-D, that we cannot perform a non-interactive key exchange, i.e., we cannot build an equivalent to the static-static DH computation of  $k_1$ . Let us for the moment ignore the static-static DH and start by translating the remainder of the handshake to a KEM-based handshake. For this, we will use an IND-CCA-secure KEM  $\text{CCAKEM} = (\text{CCAKEM.Gen}, \text{CCAKEM.Enc}, \text{CCAKEM.Dec})$  and an IND-CPA-secure KEM  $\text{CPAKEM} = (\text{CPAKEM.Gen}, \text{CPAKEM.Enc}, \text{CPAKEM.Dec})$ . The initiator has a long-term static CCAKEM key pair  $(\text{ssk}_i, \text{spk}_i)$  and the responder has a long-term static CCAKEM key pair  $(\text{ssk}_r, \text{spk}_r)$ . Now, the handshake proceeds as follows:

Initiator	Responder
$(\text{esk}_i, \text{epk}_i) \leftarrow \text{CPAKEM.Gen}()$	
$r_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\lambda, (c_1, k_1) \leftarrow \text{CCAKEM.Enc}(\text{spk}_r, r_1)$	
	$\xrightarrow{\text{epk}_i, c_1}$
	$r_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\lambda, (c_2, k_2) \leftarrow \text{CCAKEM.Enc}(\text{spk}_i, r_2)$
	$r_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\lambda, (c_3, k_3) \leftarrow \text{CPAKEM.Enc}(\text{epk}_i, r_3)$
	$\xleftarrow{c_2, c_3}$
	$k_1 \leftarrow \text{CCAKEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_r, c_1)$


$k_2 \leftarrow \text{CCAKEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_i, c_2)$   
 $k_3 \leftarrow \text{CPAKEM.Dec}(\text{esk}_i, c_3)$

*The role of static-static DH.* This naive approach already has lots of the security properties of the WireGuard handshake, but it is lacking three properties that are achieved through the inclusion of the static-static DH.

- 1) *Security under MEX attacks.* One corruption pattern in MEX attacks reveals all ephemeral secrets to the adversary, including the used randomness. The motivation for this pattern is a situation in which the protocol is executed on a device with a subverted, or simply broken RNG – in this case security can only be derived from the long-term secrets that have (ideally) been generated in a secure environment. In the above naive approach we do not obtain any security in this scenario. The reason is that the randomness used by CCAKEM.Enc is corrupted and consequently, an adversary can recompute the shared secret simply running CCAKEM.Enc. The general approach to address this issue is to securely combine ephemeral randomness  $r$  with some long-term secret  $\sigma$  before using it as protocol input. In [58] this is done using  $\text{PRF}(r, \sigma) \oplus \text{PRF}(\sigma', r')$  for two independent ephemeral values  $r$  and  $r'$  and two independent long-term secret values  $\sigma$  and  $\sigma'$ , where  $\oplus$  denotes exclusive or. This “twisted PRF” trick ensures that nothing beyond PRF security is required to prove this approach secure in the standard model. In the case of WireGuard we will see that we require a dual-prf assumption on  $\text{KDF}_1$  anyway, so we can use this assumption here as well and simplify the construction to  $\text{KDF}_1(\sigma, r)$ .
- 2) *Resistance to unknown-keyshare attacks.* The static-static DH is also the only line of defense in WireGuard against unknown-keyshare attacks. This is because the IDs (or public keys) of the two parties are not hashed into the final session key. As briefly discussed in Section I, WireGuard has the option to hash a pre-shared key  $psk$  into the final session key; by default  $psk$  is set to the all-zero string. In PQ-WireGuard we instead set  $psk$  to  $\text{H}(\text{spk}_i \oplus \text{spk}_r)$ . This ensures that session keys are linked to the static public keys of the communicating parties and thus prevents unknown-keyshare attacks.
- 3) *Authenticated initiation.* Finally, the static-static DH ensures that the first message from the initiator is already authenticated. This allows the server to detect illegitimate messages at this very early stage and consequently abort the handshake. This is not a security property in the cryptographic sense, but helps mitigate easy DoS attacks. If we follow the argumentation of [12] stating that static public keys of WireGuard users are typically not public and hence not known to attackers, the same level of DoS protection is achieved by the default value of  $psk = \text{H}(\text{spk}_i \oplus \text{spk}_r)$ . Users who do not want to rely on this assumption need to set  $psk$  to a secret shared key that is agreed on out-of-band to achieve the same level of DoS protection as in WireGuard.

*Adding key confirmation.* As mentioned above, WireGuard uses the first application-data packet from the initiator for implicit key confirmation, which makes it impossible to prove the WireGuard handshake secure in the eCK-PFS-PSK model. The proof in [9], just like our computational proof, requires an explicit and separate InitConf key-confirmation message from the initiator at the end of the handshake. In PQ-WireGuard we add this explicit key-confirmation.

**Algorithm 2** High-level view on our PQ-WireGuard handshake. Highlighted in blue are differences to Alg. 1.



*Putting it together.* Our full proposal for the KEM-based PQ-WireGuard handshake is given in Algorithm 2 and Table II. Aside from translating all DH key exchanges, except for the static-static one, to corresponding KEM operations, we introduce the following changes to the WireGuard handshake:

- We use calls to  $\text{KDF}_1(\sigma_i, r_i)$  and  $\text{KDF}_1(\sigma_r, r_r)$  in steps 4 and 13 of Alg. 2 to securely mix ephemeral randomness with long-term randomness. This is precisely the countermeasure against MEX attacks discussed above.
- We use  $\text{H}(\text{spk}_i \oplus \text{spk}_r)$  as default value for  $psk$ .
- Instead of feeding  $\text{spk}_i$  into  $\text{AEAD.Enc}$  in step 5, we use  $\text{H}(\text{spk}_i)$ . This is essentially the same trick proposed in [12], except that we need it for a very different reason. In [12] the reason is to add some protection against future quantum attackers who are recording handshakes today. For us the reason is simply a size reduction from the



TABLE II  
 COMPUTATION OF SEED VALUES, KEYS, AND HASHES THROUGH THE PQ-WIREGUARD HANDSHAKE. FOR VALUES OF  $k$  WITH TWO ROWS, THE FIRST ROW DENOTES COMPUTATION ON THE INITIATOR SIDE AND THE SECOND ROW THE CORRESPONDING COMPUTATION ON THE RESPONDER SIDE. HIGHLIGHTED IN BLUE ARE DIFFERENCES TO TABLE I.

$k$	seed $C_k$	key $\kappa_k$	hash $H_k$
1	$H(1b1_1)$	—	$H(C_1 \parallel 1b1_2)$
2	$KDF_1(C_1, \text{epk}_i)$	—	$H(H_1 \parallel \text{spk}_r)$
3	$KDF_1(C_2, \text{shk1})$ $KDF_1(C_2, \text{CCAKEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{ct1}))$	$KDF_2(C_2, \text{shk1})$ $KDF_2(C_2, \text{CCAKEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{ct1}))$	$H(H_2 \parallel \text{epk}_i)$ $H(H_2 \parallel \text{epk}_i)$
4	$KDF_1(C_3, \text{psk})$	$KDF_2(C_2, \text{psk})$	$H(H_3 \parallel \text{ltk})$
5	—	—	$H(H_4 \parallel \text{time})$
6	$KDF_1(C_4, \text{ct2})$	—	$H(H_5 \parallel \text{ct2})$
7	$KDF_1(C_6, \text{CPAKEM.Dec}(\text{esk}_i, \text{ct2}))$ $KDF_1(C_6, \text{shk2})$	—	—
8	$KDF_1(C_7, \text{CCAKEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_i, \text{ct3}))$ $KDF_1(C_7, \text{shk3})$	—	—
9	$KDF_1(C_8, \text{psk})$	$KDF_3(C_8, \text{psk})$	$H(H_6 \parallel KDF_2(C_8, \text{psk}))$
10	$KDF_1(C_9, \emptyset)$	$KDF_2(C_9, \emptyset)$	$H(H_9 \parallel \text{zero})$

potentially large public key of CCAKEM to a 32-byte hash of this public key.

- We add the explicit key-confirmation message `InitConf`.

#### IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS

We provide two proofs of security for PQ-WireGuard: one in the computational and one in the symbolic model. Thereby we provide the same level of security guarantees as for WireGuard. Below we outline both proofs. In the computational model we prove that the PQ-WireGuard handshake, like the WireGuard handshake (with added key confirmation), achieves eCK-PFS-PSK-security. While certainly on the stronger end of security notions for authenticated key-exchange, eCK-PFS-PSK only proves session-key secrecy and authenticity properties. Further notions that PQ-WireGuard also targets, like identity hiding and DoS-mitigation, are not covered by it. These additional notions are covered by the symbolic proof. The symbolic proof not only covers additional security properties but also has the advantage of being computer-verified. However, this comes at the cost of being done in the symbolic model which treats all building blocks as ideal and consequently can only provide a heuristic argument.

##### A. The Computational Proof

To prove that the PQ-WireGuard handshake achieves eCK-PFS-PSK-security, we adapt the computational proof for WireGuard [9] by Dowling and Paterson (who kindly provided us with their  $\text{\LaTeX}$ -sources) to PQ-WireGuard. The core of this adaptation is to replace proof steps (i.e., game-hops) making use of either the PRFODH- or the DDH-assumptions by generic KEM-security- and prf-assumptions. Most of these changes are straightforward and readers who are familiar with the original proof should find the result familiar.

On a high level both proofs consist of the same case-distinction between whether the adversary tries to impersonate a party or learn information about the established key and the ways in which the adversary is allowed to corrupt parties. For each case the proof uses a sequence of games to show that the adversary has to either directly break the authenticity of

the AEAD-scheme for a successful impersonation attack or distinguish two information-theoretically indistinguishable bit strings to learn any non-trivial information about the key.

The majority of game hops are ones where the prf or the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  assumptions are used. In these game-hops the output of KDF, used to combine two intermediate values, at least one of which is random (which one depends on the adversarial corruption), gets replaced by a random value. These "symmetric game hops" are essentially the same in the WireGuard and the PQ-WireGuard proof.

The other major category of game hops are those where the output of some asymmetric primitive is replaced by a random value. For WireGuard, these are the cases where two DH shares get combined and hashed afterwards. In this case, different versions of the PRFODH assumption are used to argue indistinguishability of the games before and after the hop. For PQ-WireGuard, these steps use KEM encapsulations and decapsulations. In these cases, indistinguishability can be argued using the IND-CPA security of CPAKEM and the IND-CCA security of CCAKEM.

The differences between the proofs for WireGuard and PQ-WireGuard are not just limited to these asymmetric game hops: The ways values are combined in some cases in PQ-WireGuard differ substantially from WireGuard. This is necessary to deal with the more limited abilities of KEMs when compared to Diffie-Hellman. As a consequence we had to add multiple new symmetric game hops, particularly around most asymmetric game hops.

In addition to that we noticed one minor mistake in the WireGuard proof that also directly affects our proof. The WireGuard proof claims that it is sufficient for KDF to be a prf. This turns out to be too weak. KDF is used to combine two inputs. While in different corruption settings there is always one input that is indistinguishable from random for the attacker, but it is not always the same input. Consequently, the function actually has to be a dual-PRF (which can be keyed on either input). For the most part this occurs in asymmetric game hops where the prf-assumption is "hidden" in the PRFODH

assumption but it also occurs in one symmetric hop. We notified the authors of the WireGuard proof who acknowledged the issue.

Given these changes, we are able to show that there is no efficient adversary against the eCK-PFS-PSK security of PQ-WireGuard under the assumptions that the used KDF is a secure dual-PRF, that the used KEMs are respectively IND-CCA and IND-CPA secure, and that the used AEAD scheme is secure in terms of authenticity. More specifically, we show that for every (possibly quantum) adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  we can construct a set  $\mathcal{R}$  of (possibly quantum) reduction algorithms  $\mathcal{R}_i$  that use oracle access to  $\mathcal{A}$  to break one of the security assumptions running in about the same time as  $\mathcal{A}$  so that:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG, clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, n_P, n_S}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}} \leq n_P^2 n_S \left( \begin{array}{l} (7n_S + 9) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + (2n_S + 4) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \\ + (n_S + 2) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{IND-CCA}, \text{CCA-KEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \\ + n_S \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{IND-CPA}, \text{CPA-KEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) \\ + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{auth-aead}}(\lambda) \\ + (n_S + 2) \cdot \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} \end{array} \right)$$

where  $n_P$  is the number of parties and  $n_S$  is the number of sessions. Here we use  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prop}}(\lambda)$  for the maximum success probability over all  $\mathcal{R}_i \in \mathcal{R}$  against property prop of building block F. Our security proof, including a slightly tighter and more precise bound is available in Appendix B.

Finally we would like to point out a pleasant side-result of the strong security-notion and the use of two different KEMs that correspond to static and ephemeral keys: If we model the break of a KEM as the reveal of all secret keys (and therefore also encapsulated secrets) then a break of either KEM does not break the confidentiality of PQ-WireGuard as long as there is no further corruption:

A break of our CCA-KEM would be equivalent to a corruption of all static secrets, but notably not the ephemeral keys used with the CPA-KEM. As long as no ephemeral secrets are compromised, eCK-PFS-PSK-security still promises that the established key remains confidential. (However, authenticity is trivially broken.)

A break of our CPA-KEM on the other hand would be equivalent to a corruption of all ephemeral secrets, but not of the static secrets that are used with the CCA-KEM. As long as no static secrets are compromised eCK-PFS-PSK-security still promises authenticity and confidentiality, losing PFS though.

The consequence of this is an increased robustness of the scheme which is relevant to us as most post-quantum primitives (in case of our proposed instantiation particularly Dagger) are rather new and therefore more likely to break than more traditional schemes. The practical impact is that PQ-WireGuard already provides some of the properties of hybrid protocols that aim at redundancy of security assumptions by combining cryptographic schemes that use different security assumptions (e.g., ECC and lattice-based schemes).

## B. The Symbolic Proof

The symbolic proof of PQ-WireGuard uses the Tamarin prover [43], building on the symbolic proof for WireGuard [8]. Tamarin is a formal verification tool for cryptographic protocols. It supports stateful protocols, falsification, and unbounded verification. Those features as well as its built-in support of Diffie-Hellman exponentiation motivated the use of Tamarin to analyze several cryptographic protocols, including TLS 1.3 [59] and the 5G protocol [60]. In Appendix C we give a brief introduction to Tamarin. A full description can be found in the Tamarin manual [61].

*Our Symbolic Model.* The symbolic model of PQ-WireGuard is based on the Tamarin model of WireGuard [8] but extends it. The Tamarin model of WireGuard does not cover replay resistance and DoS mitigation, both claimed by WireGuard. We add proofs of these properties. Furthermore, the WireGuard model did not allow an adversary to compromise the random-number generator of an honest party, which is allowed in our extended model, e.g. when corrupting the ephemeral state of a party. Moreover, the WireGuard model only covered weak-PFS while our extended model covers full PFS. In the proof of identity hiding, we observe an issue with the applicability of the symbolic model. In the case of KEMs, it turns out that the assumptions implicitly made by the symbolic model for the the proof of identity hiding are not implied by the standard security assumptions. In summary, our Tamarin model shows that the security properties of WireGuard are also satisfied by PQ-WireGuard, although with an additional requirement on the CCAKEM for the case of identity hiding.

We modified the original model to reflect PQ-WireGuard and extended the ability of the adversary. In particular, we analyze the PQ-WireGuard protocol for an unbounded number of concurrent handshakes under MEX attacks.

The DH-based key exchange of WireGuard was modeled as

```
rule Handshake_Init:
  let pkI = 'g'~ltkI
  pekI = 'g'~ekI
  eISR = pkR~ekI
  cii = h('noise')
  hii = h(<cii, 'id', pkR, pekI>)
  ci0 = h(<cii, pekI, '1'>)
  ci1 = h(<ci0, eISR, '1'>)
  ki1 = h(<ci0, eISR, '2'>)
  astat = aead(ki1, <pkI, -pkISurrogate>, hii)
  hi0 = h(<hii, astat>)
  ci2 = h(<ci1, sISR, '1'>)
  ki2 = h(<ci1, sISR, '2'>)
  ats = aead(ki2, $ts, hi0)
  hi1 = h(<hi0, ats>)
  m1 = <'1', -sidI, pekI, astat, ats, $mac1, $mac2> in
  [ ...
```

For PQ-WireGuard this key exchange is replaced by the KEM-based construction described in Algorithm 2. We model this approach with the following rule:

```
rule Handshake_Init:
  let pkI = pk(-ltkI)
  kb = prf(-tpk, -r3)
  pekI = pk(-ekI)
  cii = h('noise')
  hii = h(<cii, 'id', pkR, pekI>)
  ci0 = h(<cii, pekI, '1'>)
  sct = aenc(kb)pkR
  ci1 = h(<ci0, kb, '1'>)
```

```

ki1 = h(<ci0, kb, '2'>)
astat = aead(ki1, <h(pkI), ~pkISurrogate>, hii)
hi0 = h(<hii, astat>)
ci2 = h(<ci1, ~psk, '1'>)
ki2 = h(<ci1, ~psk, '2'>)
ats = aead(ki2, <$ts, 'TAI64N'>, hi0)
hi1 = h(<hi0, ats>)
m1 = <'1', ~sidI, sct, pekI, astat, ats, $mac1, $mac2> in
[ ...

```

This way we modified both the model and the proofs of the existing security properties to match PQ-WireGuard. In addition, we analyzed the aforementioned missing security properties that were not included in the original model. For each of those security properties, we identify the exact conditions under which the security property holds. The results for the added security proofs are presented in the rest of this section. Appendix D provides the results for the remaining properties. The full Tamarin proof is part of the supplementary material of this paper.

*Replay Attacks.* We model the replay-attack protection on the responder as a restriction that only allows a responder to accept an initiation message with a particular timestamp once.

```

restriction OnlyOnce:
  "All i r t #i #j. OnlyOnce(i, r, t) @ i
  & OnlyOnce(i, r, t) @ j ==> #i = #j"

```

This timestamp value is public, which reflects the fact that an adversary can easily infer the timestamp. A responder records the timestamp of all incoming initiation messages and will not accept an initiation message whose timestamp has been recorded.

Note that in the actual implementation, initiation messages whose timestamp has never been recorded, but is older than the timestamp in the latest accepted initiation message will also be rejected. We do not model this, however, since this case is not a replay attack.

This restriction already prevents an adversary from replaying an initiation message as a whole. We further allow an adversary to tamper with arbitrary fields in an initiation message before it is replayed. An initiation message contains the fields  $(sid_i, epk_i, ct1, ltk, time)$ .  $sid_i$  is purely a handshake session identifier and plays no role in the actual handshake.  $ct1$  encapsulates  $shk1$ . The ephemeral public key  $epk_i$  is mixed together with  $shk1$  to generate the symmetric keys  $\kappa_3$  and  $\kappa_4$  used to encrypt  $ltk$  and  $time$ . Therefore, the adversary must compromise  $shk1$  in order to tamper the timestamp value encrypted in  $time$ .

With this notion in mind, the replay-attack protection seems to rely on the secrecy of  $shk1$  alone, and we prove with lemma *replay\_attack\_resistance* that this is indeed the case.

```

lemma replay_attack_resistance:
  "All pki pkr peki peki2 psk psk2 cr cr2 kb ka k2 k2
  ts ts2 tpk r #i #i1 #j.
  // if R receives an init msg containing secret kb
  RKeys(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, cr, kb, ka, k>) @ i
  & OnlyOnce(pki, pkr, ts) @ i
  // and the init msg indeed comes from I
  & ISend(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, kb>) @ i1 & #i1 < #i
  & PRFGenI_static(tpk, r, kb) @ i1
  // and R receives later another init msg containing kb
  & RKeys(<pki, pkr, peki2, psk2, cr2, kb, ka2, k2>) @ j
  // but with a different timestamp
  & #i < #j & OnlyOnce(pki, pkr, ts2) @ j & not(ts = ts2)
  ==> // then the attacker crafted the second init msg

```

```

not(Ex #j1. ISend(<pki, pkr, peki2, psk2, kb>) @ j1
  & #j1 < #j & #i < #j1) & (
  // by compromising the static key of R
  (Ex #j1. Reveal_AK(pkr) @ j1 & #j1 < #j)
  // or by compromising both I's RNG and I's PRF key
  | ((Ex #j1. Reveal_rnd_I_static(r) @ j1)
    & (Ex #j1. Reveal_prfk(tpk) @ j1)))"

```

In particular, we prove that an adversary cannot trick a responder into accepting an initiation message with an encapsulated secret  $shk1$  that the responder has seen before, without compromising

- the responder's static private key, or
- the initiator's random number generator and PRF secret.

*DoS Mitigation.* In WireGuard, the result of the static-static DH is used to authenticate the initiation message. In PQ-WireGuard, there is no static-static DH to use anymore; instead, the pre-shared key is used for this purpose. Without the pre-shared key, the authenticity of an initiation message cannot be established, and the initiation message will be accepted. With lemma *dos\_mitigation* we prove that an adversary must compromise the pre-shared key in order to have its victim carry out expensive public key operations. Such a DoS attack is considered successful when a responder R accepts an initiation message and generates a response message for it, while the initiation message:

- claims to be from honest initiator I but was in fact crafted by the attacker completely
- claims to be intended for R, but was in fact generated by honest initiator I for another honest peer R'

We prove that in those two cases the responder R will not accept the initiation message unless the pre-shared key between R and the claimed initiator I has been compromised.

```

lemma dos_mitigation:
  "(All pki pkr peki psk cr kb ka k #i.
  // if R accepts an init msg (claimed to be) from I with kb
  RKeys(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, cr, kb, ka, k>) @ i
  // and no honest peer has ever sent an init msg with kb
  & not(Ex pki1 pkr1 peki1 psk1 #j.
    ISend(<pki1, pkr1, peki1, psk1, kb>) @ #j & #j < #i)
  ==> // then PSK between R and I was compromised (or not in use)
  Ex #j. Reveal_PSK(psk) @ j & #j < #i
  )
  & (All pki pkr peki psk cr kb ka k #i.
  // if R accepts an init msg (claimed to be) from I
  RKeys(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, cr, kb, ka, k>) @ i
  // and the init msg was generated by honest peer I
  // for another peer R' and is replayed or intercepted
  // by the attacker (fields tampered)
  & (Ex pki pkr1 peki1 psk1 #j.
    ISend(<pki, pkr1, peki1, psk1, kb>) @ j
    & #j < #i & not(pkr = pkr1))
  ==> // then PSK between R and I was compromised (or not in use)
  (Ex #j. Reveal_PSK(psk) @ #j & #j < #i)
  )"

```

*Identity Hiding.* Identity hiding is a property that was proven in the symbolic proof for WireGuard. When adapting the proof to the KEM setting of PQ-WireGuard Tamarin successfully proves the property. However, it turns out the model in this case makes an idealizing assumption that is not necessarily true in the KEM setting: The Tamarin model assumes a key hiding property, i.e., that a key encapsulation (in case of DH a key exchange message) does not allow to learn under

which public key it was produced. For DH key exchange this can be derived from the DDH assumption (against passive adversaries) or the PRFODH assumption (against active adversaries).

For KEMs this assumption is not implied by the standard security assumptions of IND-CPA and IND-CCA security. For a counter example consider a KEM that makes the public key part of a key encapsulation. This does not invalidate IND-CPA or IND-CCA security. What is formally required to justify the applicability of the model is a KEM version of the notion of indistinguishability of keys (IK) [62]. For active adversaries IK-CCA is required, for passive adversaries IK-CPA is sufficient. In [63] it is shown that the public key encryption scheme underlying Classic McEliece achieves IK-CPA security. Based on this we conjecture that the Classic McEliece KEM achieves IK-CCA security but we do not formally prove it.

## V. INSTANTIATION WITH McELIECE AND SABER

The generic approach for a purely KEM-based variant of WireGuard allows us in principle to instantiate the protocol with any post-quantum KEM(s) with the required security properties. In this section we describe the concrete instantiation we chose. We selected the Classic McEliece [22] IND-CCA KEM and an IND-CPA secure variant of Saber [24], [23]. One could say that this choice—just like the choices of primitives in WireGuard—is “cryptographically opinionated”. The criteria by which we made this choice are the following:

- stick to primitives that are in the second round of the NIST PQC project and thus have potential to become a future standard;
- choose parameters that reach NIST security level 3 (see [64, Sec. 4.A.5]);
- do not increase the number of required unfragmented IPv6 packets for the handshake compared to WireGuard (one sent by the initiator and one by the responder, plus the key-confirmation by the initiator that is implicit through application-data transmission in WireGuard and explicit in PQ-WireGuard).
- pick primitives that have high-performance timing-attack protected implementations;
- pick “conservative” primitives, i.e. primitives building on a history of cryptanalytic results;
- stay away from primitives that the submitters declare to be encumbered by patents; and
- do not modify or tweak primitives in any way that would invalidate security reductions.

The most limiting of these criteria is to fit the initiator’s and the responder’s handshake messages into one IPv6 packet each. IPv6 mandates every link in the internet to support an MTU of at least 1280 bytes [20, Sec. 5]. Out of those 1280 bytes, 40 are required for the IPv6 header and another 8 are required for the UDP header. This leaves 1232 bytes for the WireGuard handshake payloads. In the initiator’s message, the fields `type`, `03`, `sidi`, `ltk`, `time`, `m1`, and `m2` together occupy 116 bytes, which leaves 1116 bytes for a CPAKEM public

key and a CCAKEM ciphertext. In the responder’s message, the fields `type`, `03`, `sidi`, `sidr`, `zero`, `m1`, and `m2` together occupy 60 bytes, which leaves 1172 bytes for a CPAKEM ciphertext and a CCAKEM ciphertext.

*Classic McEliece as CCAKEM.* Note in Alg. 2 that the handshake never sends public keys of CCAKEM; also the computation does not involve any CCAKEM.Gen operations. This means that for the instantiation of CCAKEM we are mainly concerned about ciphertext size with secondary criteria being encapsulation and decapsulation speed. Out of all round-2 NIST PQC candidate KEMs<sup>4</sup>, Classic McEliece has the smallest ciphertext by far, weighing in at only 188 bytes for the level-3 parameter set `mceliece460896`. Also, Classic McEliece comes with very fast timing-attack-protected software for encapsulation and decapsulation, which makes it the ideal choice of primitive for our use case. Note that McEliece is often regarded as a conservative, but rather inefficient choice, because of its slow key generation and large public keys – however, these disadvantages are precisely the aspects that do not matter for us here.

*Tweaked Saber as CPAKEM.* With the rather straightforward choice of Classic McEliece as instantiation of CCAKEM fixed, we need to find an IND-CPA KEM among the NIST candidates that has public keys of at most 928 bytes and ciphertexts of at most 984 bytes for parameters that reach the NIST security level 3. The only KEMs that meet these criteria are Round5 [65], SIKE [66], and ROLLO-I [67]. Unfortunately, none of these three meets our other criteria. Round-5 is covered by patents held by the submitters; SIKE is rather slow, for example more than an order of magnitude slower than most lattice-based KEMs, and ROLLO-I cannot be seen as a particularly conservative choice. Specifically, in the document explaining the choice of round-2 candidates [68], NIST writes about the rank-based candidate ROLLO-I:

*“Nonetheless rank-based cryptography is quite new and not as well studied as lattice-based cryptography or code-based cryptography using the Hamming metric. More cryptanalysis on rank-based primitives would be valuable.”*

However, among the remaining candidates, there are multiple lattice-based KEMs with public keys and ciphertext that are only slightly larger than what we need. Also, most of them aim for IND-CCA security (which we do *not* need to instantiate CPAKEM) and some of them allow to reduce the size of public keys and ciphertexts at the expense of achieving only IND-CPA security and increasing failure probability.

Concretely, Saber already includes public-key and ciphertext compression, and, in order to achieve IND-CCA security, carefully chooses parameters to minimize sizes while keeping the failure probability  $\delta$  cryptographically negligible. We decided to propose an IND-CPA version of Saber, which compresses public keys and ciphertexts even further. This comes at the additional advantage that the underlying hard lattice problem

<sup>4</sup>For an overview, see <https://pqc-wiki.fau.edu/>

becomes harder, but at the expense of significantly increased failure probability. Specifically, the Saber specification states that “a higher choice for parameters  $p$  and  $T$ , will result in lower security, but higher correctness” [24, Sec. 2.2]; the parameters  $p$  and  $T$  are precisely what controls public-key and ciphertext sizes.

The original parameters for the level-3 parameters of Saber use  $p = 2^{10}$  and  $T = 2^4$ ; we propose to use  $p = 2^9$  and  $T = 2^3$  for an IND-CPA variant of Saber. In the following we will refer to this variant of Saber as “Dagger”. Compared to Saber, the modifications in Dagger reduce the public-key size from 992 bytes to 896 bytes and the ciphertext size from 1088 bytes to 960 bytes, which is well within our limits. To analyze the failure rate and bit security of Dagger, we adapt the Python script that comes with the Saber submission package to run on the new parameters. This adapted Python script is included with the software package at <https://cryptojedi.org/crypto/#pqwireguard>. Compared to Saber, the post-quantum bit security of Dagger increases from 180 to 198 bits; the failure probability increases from  $2^{-136.14}$  to  $2^{-25.25}$ . Note that on the protocol level such a failure has a similar effect to a failed UDP packet transmission. Essentially it means that about one out of every 40 million handshakes will need to be repeated. In addition to the modified values of  $p$  and  $T$ , Dagger does not use the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [30], i.e., the construction that Saber uses to build an IND-CCA KEM from an IND-CPA public-key encryption scheme. For a pseudocode description of Dagger see Appendix A.

## VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

In this Section, we present performance benchmarks of our proposal of PQ-WireGuard and compare to original WireGuard (version 0.0.20191206), IPsec (strongSwan in version U5.6.2/K4.15.0-72-generic), OpenVPN (version 2.4.4, linked against OpenSSL 1.1.1), OpenVPN-NL (version 2.4.7, linked against mbed TLS 2.16.2), and PQCrypto-VPN (OpenVPN 2.4.4, linked against OQS-OpenSSL 1.0.2 [69]). OpenVPN-NL is a branch of OpenVPN, which is mandated for critical infrastructure in the Netherlands by the Dutch government, while PQCrypto-VPN is the aforementioned VPN software from Microsoft [46] based on OpenVPN and the Open Quantum Safe (OQS) framework [69]. Note that PQCrypto-VPN has optional post-quantum authentication using the Picnic signature scheme [70], [71]; in our experiments we do not use this option, but benchmark PQCrypto-VPN only with post-quantum confidentiality. To achieve this post-quantum confidentiality, PQCrypto-VPN has two options, both provided through OQS: either SIDH-503 as described in [72] or Frodo-752 as described in [73]. For WireGuard we report resources including the first application-data packet, which also serves as key confirmation. In this packet we use zero-length application data. In other words, we consider the handshake finished on the responder (server) side only at the point when the server is ready to send application data.

Our implementation of the PQ-WireGuard software is based on the original WireGuard implementation. For Classic

McEliece we use the “avx2” software targeting recent 64-bit Intel processors, which has been submitted to SUPER-COP [74] by the Classic McEliece team. For the implementation of Dagger we start from the Saber reference implementation and adapt the files `kem.c` (to remove the CCA transform) and `SABER_params.h` (to change the values of  $p$  and  $T$ ).

We carried out the experiments between two virtual machines managed by VMware’s “vSphere” in version 6.7 and connected through a virtual Ethernet link (VMware “vSwitch”) with a bandwidth limit of 10Gbit/s. Both virtual machines are running Linux kernel 4.15.0. The underlying physical machine is powered by Intel Xeon Gold 6130 (Skylake) CPUs running at 2.1 GHz.

We compare the handshake efficiency by the following metrics: the amount of traffic, the number of packets exchanged, and the time span of the handshake. The client time span is the elapsed time between when the client starts any computation for a handshake and when session keys are derived from the handshake on the client side. Similarly, the server time span is the elapsed time between the server receiving an initiation packet from the client and the server being ready to send application data to the client.

The handshake protocol of each VPN software was invoked for 1000 times to compute the average and standard deviation (enclosed by parentheses) of those metrics. The results with IPv4 and IPv6 are presented in Table III and Table IV, respectively. In both tables, the amount of traffic includes the 14-byte Ethernet frame headers.

TABLE III  
RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FOR VPN HANDSHAKE PROTOCOLS OVER IPV4, NUMBERS IN PARENTHESES ARE STANDARD DEVIATION

VPN Software	Packet Number	Traffic (bytes)	Client Time (milliseconds)	Server Time (milliseconds)
WireGuard	3 (0)	398 (0)	0.584 (0.508)	0.494 (0.507)
<b>PQ-WireGuard (this paper)</b>	3 (0)	2594 (0)	0.975 (0.442)	0.745 (0.245)
IPsec (RSA-2048)	6 (0)	4123 (0)	17.046 (0.826)	11.823 (0.726)
IPsec (Curve25519)	4 (0)	2145 (0)	5.127 (0.375)	2.807 (0.431)
OpenVPN (RSA-2048)	21.005 (0.071)	7535.507 (7.940)	1150.872 (244.288)	1144.994 (251.304)
OpenVPN (NIST P-256)	19.005 (0.007)	5408.572 (7.997)	1152.238 (242.014)	1150.310 (253.582)
OpenVPN-NL (RSA-2048)	19.005 (0.007)	5685.585 (8.155)	1157.732 (244.015)	1151.446 (246.534)
OpenVPN-NL (NIST P-256)	19.006 (0.078)	5681.711 (8.979)	1159.099 (241.534)	1156.482 (235.703)
PQ-OpenVPN (Frodo-752)	63.001 (0.032)	34348.114 (3.569)	1151.529 (235.234)	1143.337 (238.465)
PQ-OpenVPN (SIDHp503)	23.003 (0.055)	8536.345 (6.188)	1266.838 (258.101)	1265.332 (264.271)

We see that both WireGuard and PQ-WireGuard only require 3 packets. We also see that in PQ-WireGuard, the total time required for the handshake on the client side increases by less than 70% compared to WireGuard, at least when it is run over a high-speed network link as in our experiments. The time required for server-side computations increases by just over 50% compared to WireGuard. The computational effort for both WireGuard and PQ-WireGuard are dominated by public-

TABLE IV

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FOR VPN HANDSHAKE PROTOCOLS OVER IPV6, NUMBERS IN PARENTHESES ARE STANDARD DEVIATION

VPN Software	Packet Number	Traffic (bytes)	Client Time (milliseconds)	Server Time (milliseconds)
WireGuard	3 (0)	458 (0)	0.592 (0.399)	0.480 (0.389)
<b>PQ-WireGuard (this paper)</b>	3 (0)	2654 (0)	1.015 (0.618)	0.786 (0.621)
IPsec (RSA-2048)	6 (0)	4299 (0)	17.188 (0.712)	11.912 (0.535)
IPsec (Curve25519)	4 (0)	2281 (0)	5.226 (0.575)	2.822 (0.436)
OpenVPN (RSA-2048)	21.003 (0.055)	7955.409 (7.319)	1148.733 (250.513)	1142.650 (243.184)
OpenVPN (NIST P-256)	19.005 (0.007)	5788.610 (9.423)	1139.140 (247.659)	1133.944 (240.691)
OpenVPN-NL (RSA-2048)	19.005 (0.072)	6065.700 (9.665)	1162.649 (261.078)	1151.790 (246.363)
OpenVPN-NL (NIST P-256)	19.001 (0.003)	6061.138 (4.304)	1159.627 (252.989)	1153.949 (247.470)
PQ-OpenVPN (Frodo-752 [73])	63.006 (0.078)	35608.817 (10.324)	1160.922 (259.246)	1155.713 (245.614)
PQ-OpenVPN (SIDHp503)	23.005 (0.072)	8996.684 (9.449)	1277.172 (251.461)	1269.074 (257.427)

key cryptography; we would expect that future improvements to the McEliece or Dagger software will bring PQ-WireGuard even closer to the performance of WireGuard.

Just as the original WireGuard software, PQ-WireGuard outperforms the main competitors IPsec and OpenVPN in terms of handshake time, computation time on the server, number of transmitted packets, and amount of transmitted data. Specifically, the PQ-WireGuard handshake is about 5 times faster than the handshake of IPsec and more than three orders of magnitude faster than the handshake of OpenVPN, all while offering full protection against future attackers equipped with large quantum computers.

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## APPENDIX

### A. The Dagger IND-CPA-secure KEM

A description of the Dagger KEM is given in Algorithms 3, 4, and 5. These algorithms use as underlying routines Saber.PKE routines and related notation defined in [24, Sec. 2.4]. The parameters Dagger uses to instantiate Saber.PKE are  $l = 3$ ,  $n = 256$ ,  $q = 2^{13}$ ,  $p = 2^9$ ,  $T = 2^3$ ,  $\mu = 8$ . These are the same parameters as listed for Saber-PKE in [24, Table 1], except that we decrease  $p$  and  $T$  for smaller public key and ciphertext and higher security of the underlying lattice problem at the cost of increased failure probability.

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#### Algorithm 3 Dagger .KEM.KeyGen()

---

$(seed_A, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{s}) = \text{Saber.PKE.KeyGen}()$   
**Return**  $(pk := (seed_A, \mathbf{b}), sk := \mathbf{s})$

---



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#### Algorithm 4 Dagger .KEM.Encaps()

---

$m \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\{0, 1\}^{256})$   
 $(\hat{K}, r) = \mathcal{G}(m)$   
 $c = \text{Saber.PKE.Enc}(pk, \hat{K}; r)$   
 $K = \mathcal{H}(\hat{K})$   
**Return**  $(c, K)$

---



---

#### Algorithm 5 Dagger .KEM.Decaps()

---

$\hat{K}' = \text{Saber.PKE.Dec}(s, c)$   
**Return**  $K' = \mathcal{H}(\hat{K}')$

---

### B. Computational Proof

We prove that the PQ-WireGuard handshake protocol (from now on abbreviated pqWG) is eCK-PFS-PSK-secure with cleanness predicate  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  (capturing perfect forward secrecy and resilience to KCI attacks). That is, for any QPT algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  against the eCK-PFS-PSK key-indistinguishability game  $\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG, clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}, n_S, n_P, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}(\lambda)$  is negligible under the dual-prf, auth-aead, IND-CPA and IND-CCA assumptions.

Our proof largely follows the proof by Dowling and Paterson [9] with as little modification as necessary. The only game hops that are really affected are those that are based on the different PRFODH-assumptions and the DDH-assumption. This concerns **Game 5 of Case 1**, **Game 5 of Case 2**, **Game 3 of Case 3.2**, **Game 3 of Case 3.3**, **Game 3 of Case 3.4** and **Game 3 of Case 3.5**. Of these **Game 3 of Case 3.5** is the only one relying on the sym-mm-PRFODH assumption and **Game 3 of Case 3.2** is the only one relying on the DDH-assumption. All others rely on sym-ms-PRFODH assumption.

This distinction has its correspondence in our proof as well: **Case 3.2** which only relied on the DDH assumption is now based on the IND-CPA-security of CPAKEM, whereas the PRFODH cases are now based on the IND-CCA-security of CCAKEM. The case in which the original protocol relied on the stronger sym-mm-PRFODH assumption is special in our case as well and will be discussed later.



Finally we had to modify **Game 3** of **Case 3.1** to fix a bug that we discovered in the original proof.

Given the similarity between the cases that relied on the sym-ms-PRFODH assumption in the original proof we will start by providing a detailed proof for **Game 5** of **Case 1** and discuss the changes necessary for the other cases afterwards.

We perform the following changes: First we rename all occurrences of HKDF to KDF in order to stay consistent with our protocol descriptions. Then we separate between the eCK-PFS-PSK-adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  and the adversaries  $\mathcal{R}_i$  against the security assumptions. For this we define  $\mathcal{R}$  as the set of all Algorithms that are defined by a game-hop to possibly break a property prop of a building block F. With this we furthermore define  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prop}}(\lambda)$  to mean the maximum success probability over all  $\mathcal{R}_i \in \mathcal{R}$  against the property prop of the building block F.

In practice both of these changes are essentially just syntactical. We will now go on to describe more substantial changes to the actual game-hops.

**Game 5.** In this game we replace the computation of  $C_3, \kappa_3$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3$ . We note that the replacement of the sym-ms-PRFODH assumptions with the more standard IND-CCA assumption for KEMs forces us to split the original game hop into three hops. This is necessary because of the more convoluted combination of the static keys with both the other party's static and ephemeral keys and because the application of the KDF to the shared-secret is not part of the IND-CCA game while it was part of the PRFODH game. As such we first replace the pseudo-random value used for key-encapsulation with CCAKEM with a truly random value (**Game 5a**) and then replace  $\text{shk1}$  with a random value  $k^*$  (**Game 5b**). After that we replace the output of the KDF that this value is passed to with a random one (**Game 5c**). The reason for why we split the game hop instead of inserting new ones is that we want to preserve consistency with the numbering in the original proof.

The one case where we will deviate from the original numbering-scheme is in the labels for the “break”-events in **Case 1**: The original proof numbers these such that  $\Pr(\text{break}_4)$  is the probability that the fifth hybrid is broken; in all other cases the numbers coincide however. Because we believe that skipping  $\text{break}_4$  and increasing all following indices by one is more readable and since this is what we do in the full version, the indices in our proof don't match the ones from the original proof here.

In **Game 5a** we replace the value  $\hat{r} := \text{KDF}(\sigma_i, r_i)$  passed to  $\text{CCAEM.Enc}$  for the computation of  $\text{ct1}$  and  $\text{shk1}$  with a random bitstring  $\hat{r}'$ .

By the definition of this case, we know that at least one of  $r_i$  and  $\sigma_i$  is random and uncorrupted.

In the first case ( $r_i$  is unknown to the adversary), we initialize a  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger, query  $\sigma_i$ , and use the output  $\tilde{r}$  from the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger to replace the computation of  $\hat{r}$ . By the definition of this case  $r_i$  is a uniformly random and independent value, therefore this replacement is sound.

If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 0, then  $\hat{r} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\sigma_i, r_i)$  and we are in **Game 4**. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 1, then  $\hat{r} \leftarrow^{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is a truly random value and we are in **Game 5a**.

For the second case we first establish that  $r_i$ , while being (potentially) known to the adversary is still fresh in the sense that  $\text{KDF}(\sigma_i, r_i)$  has never been evaluated: Since  $r_i$  is a random value, there is a chance that it could be sampled in another session. This probability can be upper-bounded by the total number of sessions divided by the number of possible values, namely  $\frac{n_S}{2^{|r_i|}}$  (which when multiplied by the number of sessions results in the famous approximation of the birthday-bound  $\frac{n_S^2}{2^{|r_i|}}$ ).

Given that, we initialize a  $\text{prf}$  challenger and replace all computations of  $\text{KDF}(\sigma_i, \cdot)$  with queries to the challenger. By the definition of this case  $\sigma_i$  is a uniformly random and independent value, therefore this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 0, then  $\hat{r} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\sigma_i, r_i)$  and we are in **Game 4**. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 1, then  $\hat{r} \leftarrow^{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is a truly random value. Since we established furthermore that  $r_i$  is not used with  $\sigma_i$  in any other session,  $\hat{r}$  is furthermore independent of all other  $\hat{r}$  in other sessions, therefore we are in **Game 5a**.

Thus any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the  $\text{prf}$  security or the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  security of KDF, and we find:

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr(\text{abort}_{\text{accept}}) \\ & \leq \frac{n_S}{2^{|r_i|}} + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{5a}) \end{aligned}$$

In **Game 5b** we replace the computation of  $\text{shk1}$  by sampling the value uniformly at random from the space of shared secrets of the KEM and ignoring the second output of  $\text{CCAEM.Enc}(\text{spk}_r)$ . To show that this is undetectable under the IND-CCA-assumption of the used KEM, we interact with an IND-CCA challenger in the following way: Note that by **Game 1**, we know at the beginning of the experiment the index of session  $\pi_i^s$  such that  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  is issued by the adversary. Similarly, by **Game 2**, we know at the beginning of the experiment the index of the intended partner  $P_j$  of the session  $\pi_i^s$ . Thus, we initialize an IND-CCA challenger and use the received public-key  $\text{pk}^*$  as long-term public-key of party  $P_j$  and give it with all other (honestly generated) public keys to the adversary. Note that by **Game 4** and the definition of this case,  $\mathcal{A}$  is not able to issue a  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$  query, as we abort if  $\pi_i^s \cdot \alpha \leftarrow \text{reject}$  and abort if  $\pi_i^s \cdot \alpha \leftarrow \text{accept}$ . Thus we will not need to reveal the private key  $\text{sk}^*$  of the challenge public-key to  $\mathcal{A}$ . However we must account for all sessions  $t$  such that  $\pi_j^t$  must use the private key for computations. In PQ-WireGuard, the long-term private keys are used to compute the following:

- In sessions where  $P_j$  acts as the initiator:  
 $C_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_6, \text{CCAEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_i, \text{ct3}))$
- In sessions where  $P_j$  acts as the responder:  
 $C_3, \kappa_3 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_2, \text{CCAEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{ct1}))$

(Note that these are fewer cases than in the original proof because we don't combine static and ephemeral keys directly.) Dealing with the challenger's computation of these values will be done in two ways:

- The encapsulation was created by another honest party. The challenger can then use its own internal knowledge of the encapsulated value to complete the computations.
- The encapsulation was not created by another honest party, but by the adversary and the challenger is therefore unaware of the encapsulated value.

In the second case, the challenger can instead use the decapsulation-oracle provided by the CCA-challenger, specifically querying  $\text{CCAKEY.Dec}(\text{ct}X)$ , (where  $\text{ct}X$  is the relevant encapsulation) which will output  $\text{shk}X$  using the CCA challenger's internal knowledge of  $\text{sk}^*$ .

During session  $i$  we request a challenge consisting of a ciphertext and a candidate shared secret  $(c^*, k^*)$  from the IND-CCA challenger and use those values in place of  $\text{ct}1$  and  $\text{shk}1$ . Given the definition of the IND-CCA game, there are two cases:

- If the test bit sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 0, then  $k^*$  is indeed the shared secret encapsulated in  $c^*$  and we are in **Game 5a**.
- If the test bit sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 1, then  $k^*$  is not the shared secret encapsulated in  $c^*$  but sampled uniformly at random from the space of shared secrets and we are in **Game 5b**.

Thus, any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the IND-CCA security of the used KEM and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{5a}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEY}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{5b})$$

In **Game 5c** we replace the values of  $C_3, \kappa_3$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  (where  $\{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is the output space of the KDF) used in the protocol execution of the test session. Specifically, we initialize a  $\text{pr}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger and query  $\text{shk}1$ , and use the output  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3$  from the  $\text{pr}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger to replace the computation of  $C_3, \kappa_3$ . Since by **Game 5b**,  $\text{shk}1$  is a uniformly random and independent value, this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{pr}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_2, \text{shk}1)$  and we are in **Game 5b**. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{pr}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 5c**.

Thus any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the  $\text{pr}^{\text{swap}}$  security of KDF, and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{5b}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{pr}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{5c})$$

Regarding the other games that need to be replaced: **Game 3** of **Case 3.3** is very similar to **Game 5** of **Case 1**. The biggest difference is that the case-distinction in the first sub-game is no longer necessary since the definition of the case ensures

that the ephemeral key of the initiator is uncorrupted. As such the first case can be removed. Furthermore the references to the surrounding games have to be updated as listed below.

**Game 5** of **Case 2** and **Game 3** of **Case 3.4**, which are again (except for the first sub-game, their number and the references) almost identical to each other, only differ slightly from **Game 5** of **Case 1**. In order to refit the proof to them perform the following changes, except for leaving the listing after the first paragraph in the second sub-game that lists the uses of the uncorrupted static key alone:

- In the first sub-game replace all occurrences of  $X_i$  with  $X_7$  for all identifiers  $X$ .
- In **Game 3** of **Case 3.4** remove the first case of the first sub-game (as in **Case 3.3**).
- Replace all occurrences of  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3$  with  $\widetilde{C}_8$ .
- Replace all occurrences of  $C_3, \kappa_3$  with  $C_8$ .
- Replace all occurrences of  $\text{ct}1$  with  $\text{ct}3$ .
- Replace all occurrences of  $\text{shk}1$  with  $\text{shk}3$ .
- In the third subhybrid replace  $C_2$  with  $C_7$ .

**Game 3** of **Case 3.5** is special in that it can be proven secure in two slightly different ways by slightly modifying either the proof for **Case 1** or the proof for **Case 2**. For the sake of brevity we will only explain the first way: Take the proof for **Game 5** of **Case 1** and only modify **Game 5a** by removing the second case. After that, the entire argument works analogously.

Other than that only the following inconsequential changes are required:

- Replace the phrase “by **Game 4** and the definition” by “by the definition” in all subcases of **Case 3**.
- The reference to **Game 1** in **Case 1** must be replaced by a reference to **Game 2** in all other games.
- The reference to **Game 2** in **Case 1** must be replaced by a reference to **Game 1** in **Case 3.4** and by a reference to **Game 3** in all other games.
- The references to  $\Pr(\text{abort}_{\text{accept}})$  must be replaced with  $\Pr(\text{break}_2)$  in all sub-cases of case 3.
- The probabilities  $\Pr(\text{break}_{5a})$ ,  $\Pr(\text{break}_{5b})$  and  $\Pr(\text{break}_{5c})$  must be replaced with  $\Pr(\text{break}_{3a})$ ,  $\Pr(\text{break}_{3b})$  and  $\Pr(\text{break}_{3c})$  in all sub-cases of case 3.
- The games that follow our modified games must replace their references to  $\Pr(\text{break}_5)/\Pr(\text{break}_3)$  by  $\Pr(\text{break}_{5c})/\Pr(\text{break}_{3c})$ , respectively.
- Replace all uses of  $g^{uv}$  with  $\text{psk}$ ,  $g^y$  with  $\text{ct}2$ ,  $g^{xy}$  with  $\text{shk}2$ ,  $g^{uy}$  with  $\text{shk}3$  and  $g^z$  with  $\text{shk}2$ .

**Game 3** is somewhat special in that both ephemeral keys are assumed to be uncorrupted. In the original version this meant that only the DDH-assumption was necessary, whereas our version is fine with an IND-CPA-secure KEM. We again follow the original proof as closely as possible:

In this game, we replace the value  $\text{shk}2$  computed in the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its honest contributive keyshare session with a random element from the same key space. Note that since the initiator session and the responder session both get key confirmation messages that include derivations based on the encapsulated shared key, both know that the key

was received by the other session without modification. We explicitly interact with an IND-CPA challenger, and replace the ephemeral  $\text{epk}_i$  and  $\text{ct}_2$  values sent in the InitiatorHello and ResponderHello messages with the challenge public-key and ciphertext from the IND-CPA challenger. We only require the encapsulated key in one computation (as opposed to three in the original proof):

- $C_7 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(c_2, \text{shk}_2)$

Here we can replace  $\text{shk}_2$  with the supposed shared key  $k^*$  from the IND-CPA-challenger. When the test bit sampled by the IND-CPA challenger is 0, then  $k^*$  is the actually encapsulated shared key and we are in **Game 2**. When the test bit sampled by the IND-CPA challenger is 1, then  $k^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}_{\text{CPAKEM}}$  and we are in **Game 3**. Any adversary that can detect that change can be turned into an adversary against the IND-CPA problem and thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_2) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{CPAKEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_3).$$

Finally, in **Game 3** of **Case 3.1** replace all occurrences of “prf” with “prf<sup>swap</sup>” during the entire hybrid.

After applying all these changes we can compute the complete adversarial advantage  $\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, \text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}(\lambda)$ . As required by the security-definition, it is bounded by a polynomial factor of  $\mathcal{A}$ 's advantage in the dual-prf, IND-CCA, IND-CPA and auth-aead games. Specifically:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, \text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}(\lambda) \\ & \leq n_P^2 n_S \left( \begin{array}{l} 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) + 9 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{auth-aead}}(\lambda) \\ + 2 \cdot \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} \\ + n_S \cdot \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left( \begin{array}{l} \text{Adv}_{\text{CPAKEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) \\ + 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \end{array} \right), \\ \left( \begin{array}{l} \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \\ + 7 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \end{array} \right), \\ \left( \begin{array}{l} \text{Adv}_{\text{CPAKEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) \\ + 7 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \\ + \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} \end{array} \right) \end{array} \right\} \end{array} \right) \\ & \leq n_P^2 n_S \left( \begin{array}{l} (7n_S + 9) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + (2n_S + 4) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \\ + (n_S + 2) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \\ + n_S \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{CPAKEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) \\ + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{auth-aead}}(\lambda) \\ + (n_S + 2) \cdot \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} \end{array} \right) \end{aligned}$$

(The last term is slightly less tight, but we include it here for the sake of simplicity.)

Overall the result is similar to that for WireGuard, except that we have a slight tightness-loss relative to the prf-security

and replaced the pre-quantum assumptions with generic KEM-security assumptions.

### C. The Tamarin Prover.

Tamarin operates based on multiset rewriting. A Tamarin model is in essence a state machine whose state is a multiset of *facts*. The transition between states are defined by *rules*. Rules define the behavior of honest parties as well as the ability of an adversary. A Tamarin rule has a left-hand side (*premise*) and a right-hand side (*conclusion*) separated by the arrow symbol. To apply a rule, facts in its premise must exist in the current state. After the rule is applied, the facts in its premise are *consumed* and the facts in its conclusion are *produced*. For example,

```
rule Reveal_ltk:
  [ !Ltk(A, ltk) ] -- [ LtkReveal(A) ] -> [ Out(ltk) ]
```

defines a rule *Reveal\_ltk* with which an adversary can compromise the long term key of a party A. To apply this rule, the fact !Ltk(A, ltk) must exist in the current state, and after the rule is applied, the fact Out(ltk) is added to the state. A fact can be *linear* or *persistent*, which decides how the fact can be consumed. In this case the fact Ltk(A, ltk) is prepended by an exclamation mark, which marks it as a persistent fact. A persistent fact can be consumed multiple times and will stay in the state, while a linear fact can only be consumed once and will disappear from the state afterwards. A rule may also produce one or more *action facts*, which are facts included between the arrow symbol of its definition. Action facts are not added into the state; instead, they are recorded and used to prove security properties, as we will discuss later. In this example LtkReveal(A) is the action fact.

To model cryptographic protocols, one has to model cryptographic primitives, e.g. hashing and symmetric encryption. In Tamarin, cryptographic primitives are modeled using functions and equations. For example, an AEAD scheme can be modeled with two ternary functions, one binary function and two equations:

```
functions: aead/3, decrypt/2, verify/3, true/0
equations: decrypt(aead(key, text, tag), key) = text
equations: verify(aead(key, text, tag), tag, key) = true
```

Some commonly used primitives are defined as *built-ins* in Tamarin, e.g. Diffie-Hellman group operations, symmetric and asymmetric encryption, digital signatures, and hashing. Since Tamarin is a tool for symbolic analysis, those cryptographic primitives are assumed to be *perfect*. In other words,

- Encryption reveals nothing about the plaintext,
- Signatures are not forgeable,
- Hash functions are random oracles with zero collision probability, and
- Random values are truly random and never repeat.

Tamarin also allows to define *restrictions* to restrict the possible state transitions in the protocol analysis. This can be useful for instance to model the verification of signatures.

E.g.

```
restriction Equality:
```

```
"All x y #i. Eq(x, y) @ #i ==> x = y"
```

```
rule B_receive_message:
```

```
[ !Ltk(B, ltkB), !Pk(A, pkA), In(<m, sig>) ]
--[ Eq(verify(sig, m, pkA), true)]->
[ St_B_1(B, ltkB, pkA, A, m) ]
```

defines a restriction *Equality* which specifies that party B must verify the signature *sig* with the incoming message *m*. With this restriction all the execution flows where the signature is not valid are ignored.

To prove a security property it has to be formalized as a *lemma*, which is a first-order logic formula. The action facts produced by the rules are used as building blocks of lemmas. For example,

```
lemma client_session_key_honest_setup: exists-trace
"Ex S k #i. SessKey(S, k) @ #i &
not(Ex #r. LtkReveal(S) @ #r)"
```

defines a security property which claims that an honest peer *S* can establish a session key *k* at timestamp *i* if the long term key of *S* is never compromised. Tamarin will either prove the lemma to be true or falsify the claim by raising a counterexample.

#### D. Remaining proofs in symbolic model

*Session Key Secrecy.* In PQ-WireGuard, an initiator does not send the first data packet, which is encrypted with the derived session key, until she receives a valid response message from the receiver. The ciphertext of encrypting an empty message (*zero* in Algorithm 2) is used to authenticate the identity of the responder to the initiator.

Similarly, a responder does not send any encrypted data until she received the handshake confirmation packet from the initiator. Consequently, an adversary must wait until a handshake is completed, either by impersonating an honest party or by passively observing a handshake between two honest parties in order to be able to intercept any encrypted packets that contain actual data.

We formally model and prove strong perfect forward secrecy with four Tamarin lemmas.

```
lemma compromised_key_implies_compromised_psk[sources]:
"(All pki pkr peki psk sk ck kb ka k #i #j.
// If I thinks the handshake is done and she can
// send the first data
IKeys(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i
// and adversary knows the session key
& K(sk) @ j
==> // then the PSK is compromised (or not in use)
Ex #j1. Reveal_PSK(psk) @ j1)
&(All pki pkr peki psk sk ck kb ka k #i #j.
// If R thinks the key is confirmed and she can
// accept the first data
RConfirm(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i
// and adversary knows the session key
& K(sk) @ j
==> // then the PSK is compromised (or not in use)
Ex #j1. Reveal_PSK(psk) @ j1)"
```

```
lemma key_init_secrecy[reuse]:
"All pki pkr peki psk sk ck kb ka k tpki tpr1 tpr2 r1 r2 r3
#i #j #i1 #i2 #i3 #i4.
// if I thinks the handshake is done and she can
// send the first data
IKeys(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i
& ISend(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, kb>) @ i1 & #i1 < #i
```

```
& PRFGenI_static(tpki, r1, kb) @ i1 & EphKey(peki) @ i1
// note that ka and k might not be generated by the same peer
& PRFGenR_static(tpkr1, r2, ka) @ i2 & #i2 < #i
& PRFGenR_eph(tpkr2, r3, k) @ i3 & #i3 < #i
// and no honest peer ever used the ephemeral key as her
// static key. Note that using an ephemeral key as static
// key is impossible in our instantiation
& not(Ex #j2. StaticKey(peki) @ j2)
// and adversary knows the session key (as well as the PSK)
& K(sk) @ j & Reveal_PSK(psk) @ i4
// and attacker doesn't impersonate as R by compromising
// R's static key or both I's RNG and PRF key
& not( (Ex #j2. Reveal_AK(pkr) @ j2 & #j2 < #i)
| (Ex #j2. Reveal_rnd_I_static(r1) @ j2 & #j2 < #i)
&(Ex #j2. Reveal_prfk(tpki) @ j2 & #j2 < #i)
)
)
==> // then the attacker must compromise the ephemeral key
((Ex #j1. Reveal_EphK(peki) @ j1)
| (Ex #j1. Reveal_rnd_R_eph(r3) @ j1)
&(Ex #j1. Reveal_prfk(tpkr2) @ j1)
)
)"
```

```
lemma key_resp_secrecy[reuse]:
"All pki pkr peki psk sk ck kb ka k tpki tpr1 r2 r3
#i #i1 #i2 #i3 #j.
// if R thinks the key is confirmed and she can
// accept the first data
RConfirm(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i
& RKeys(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i1 & #i1 < #i
& PRFGenR_static(tpkr, r2, ka) @ i1
& PRFGenR_eph(tpkr, r3, k) @ i1
& PRFGenI_static(tpki, r1, kb) @ i3 & #i3 < #i
// and no honest peer ever used the ephemeral key as
// her static key. Note that using an ephemeral key as
// static key is impossible in our instantiation
& not(Ex #j2. StaticKey(peki) @ j2)
// and adversary knows the session key (as well as the PSK)
& K(sk) @ j & Reveal_PSK(psk) @ i2
// and attacker doesn't impersonate as I by compromising
// I's static key or both R's RNG and PRF key
& not( (Ex #j2. Reveal_AK(pki) @ j2 & #j2 < #i)
| (Ex #j2. Reveal_rnd_R_static(r2) @ j2 & #j2 < #i)
&(Ex #j2. Reveal_prfk(tpkr) @ j2 & #j2 < #i)
)
)
==> // then the attacker must compromise the ephemeral key
( (Ex #j1. Reveal_EphK(peki) @ j1)
// or both R's RNG and PRG key
| (Ex #j1. Reveal_rnd_R_eph(r3) @ j1)
&(Ex #j1. Reveal_prfk(tpkr) @ j1)
)
)"
```

```
// note that in this case both parties agree on the session keys
lemma key_agreement_secrecy:
"All pki pkr peki psk sk ck kb ka k tpk1 tpk2 r1 r2 r3
#i #i1 #i2 #i3 #i4 #i5.
// If I and R agree on keys
IKeys(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i
& PRFGenI_static(tpk1, r1, kb) @ i4 & EphKey(peki) @ i4
& RConfirm(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i1
& PRFGenR_static(tpk2, r2, ka) @ i2
& PRFGenR_eph(tpk2, r3, k) @ i2
// and no honest peer ever used the ephemeral key as
// her static key
& not(Ex #j2. StaticKey(peki) @ j2)
// and adversary knows the session key (as well as the PSK)
& K(sk) @ i3 & Reveal_PSK(psk) @ i5
==> // then all 3 secrets are compromised.
( (Ex #j1. Reveal_AK(pki) @ j1)
| ( (Ex #j1. Reveal_rnd_R_static(r2) @ j1)
&(Ex #j1. Reveal_prfk(tpk2) @ j1)
)
)
& ( (Ex #j1. Reveal_AK(pkr) @ j1)
| ( (Ex #j1. Reveal_rnd_I_static(r1) @ j1)
&(Ex #j1. Reveal_prfk(tpk1) @ j1)
)
)
)
& ( (Ex #j1. Reveal_EphK(peki) @ j1)
| ( (Ex #j1. Reveal_rnd_R_eph(r3) @ j1)
)
)"
```

```

    &(Ex #j1. Reveal_prfk(tpk2) @ j1)
  )
)"

```

The first lemma proves the trivial fact that if an attacker learns a session key under any circumstances, then the pre-shared key must be compromised. This lemma is also used by other three lemmas.

In the case of a passive attack, we prove that if Alice and Bob established a session and the adversary knows the session keys  $(tk_i, tk_r)$ , then the adversary must have compromised all the encapsulated secrets  $(shk1, shk2, shk3)$ . This can be achieved by compromising the static private keys of both Alice and Bob, as well as the ephemeral private key. Alternatively, the adversary can learn the encapsulated secrets by compromising the random number generators of both parties and their PRF secrets. Note that the adversary may not need to compromise the static private keys or the random number generators of both parties at the same time; any combination of the two approaches would be sufficient.

In the case of an active attack, we prove that the adversary must compromise the secret encapsulated with the other party's static public key  $(shk1$  or  $shk3)$  in order to complete the handshake, thereby learning the session keys. For the initiator, either her static private key is compromised, or the random number generator of the responder as well as her PRF secret are compromised. The same applies for the responder.

*Session Key Uniqueness.* For a pair Alice and Bob, we prove with lemma *session\_uniq* that the session keys  $(tk_i, tk_r)$  of any session between them will be unique with uncompromised random number generators, which follows from the fact that both Alice and Bob mix random nonces to derive the final session keys. To violate session key uniqueness between Alice and Bob, the adversary would have to compromise and manipulate the random number generators of both parties and their PRF secrets in order to enforce the same set of  $(epk_i, shk1, ct2, shk2, shk3)$  on two different handshakes.

```

lemma session_uniq[reuse]:
  "(All pki pkr peki psk sk ck kb ka k #i.
    IKeys(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i
  ==>
    not(Ex peki2 #j1.
      IKeys(<pki, pkr, peki2, psk, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ j1
      & not(#j1 = #i)))
  &(All pki pkr peki psk sk ck kb ka k #i.
    RConfirm(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i
  ==>
    not(Ex peki2 psk2 #j1.
      RConfirm(<pki, pkr, peki2, psk2, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ j1
      & not(#j1 = #i)))"

```

*Key Compromise Impersonation Attacks.* For PQ-WireGuard, an adversary cannot impersonate an arbitrary party to a party whose static private key is compromised as in TLS, because Diffie-Hellman key exchange is no longer used. We prove KCI with the following two lemmas, which cover both directions.

```

lemma KCI_on_initiator_resistance[reuse]:
  "All pki pkr peki psk sk ck kb ka k tpk r #i #i1.
  // If I believes she has completed a handshake with R
  IKeys(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i
  & PRFGenI_static(tpk, r, kb) @ i1 & #i1 < #i

```

```

  // but R doesn't have a matching session
  & not(Ex #j. #j < #i
    & RKeys(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ j)
  // and R's static key is not compromised before confirmation
  & not(Ex #j. Reveal_AK(pkr) @ j & #j < #i)
  ==> // then the PSK was compromised before confirmation
  // (or not in use)
  (Ex #j. Reveal_PSK(psk) @ j & #j < #i)
  // and I's RNG and her PRF keys are both compromised
  // before confirmation
  & (Ex #j. Reveal_rnd_I_static(r) @ j & #j < #i)
  & (Ex #j. Reveal_prfk(tpk) @ j & #j < #i)"

```

```

lemma KCI_on_responder_resistance[reuse]:
  "All pki pkr peki psk sk ck kb ka k tpk r2 r3 #i #i1.
  // if R believes she has a confirmed session with I
  RConfirm(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i
  & RKeys(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i1 & #i1 < #i
  & PRFGenR_static(tpkr, r2, ka) @ i1
  & PRFGenR_eph(tpkr, r3, k) @ i1
  // but I doesn't have a matching session
  // not(Ex #j. #j < #i
    & IKeys(<pki, pkr, peki, psk, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ j)
  // and I's static key is not compromised before confirmation
  & not(Ex #j. Reveal_AK(pki) @ j & #j < #i)
  ==> // then psk was compromised before confirmation
  // (or not in use)
  (Ex #j. Reveal_PSK(psk) @ j & #j < #i)
  // and both R's RNG and her PRF key are compromised
  // before confirmation
  & (Ex #j. Reveal_rnd_R_static(r2) @ j & #j < #i)
  & (Ex #j. Reveal_prfk(tpkr) @ j & #j < #i)"

```

The lemmas show that in the case of KCI attacks, the adversary also has to compromise the pre-shared key between the party that she impersonates and the intended victim:

- If an initiator I believes that she has completed a handshake with a responder R, but R does not have a matching session (where the ephemeral public key and the 3 shared secrets are identical), then the pre-shared key between I and R is compromised or not in use. In addition, either the static private key of R has been compromised, or both the RNG and the PRF secret of I are compromised.
- If a responder R believes that she has a confirmed session with an initiator I, but I does not have a matching session (where the ephemeral public key as well as the 3 shared secrets are identical), then the pre-shared key between I and R is compromised or not in use. In addition, either the static private key of I has been compromised, or both the RNG and the PRF secret of R are compromised.

*Unknown Key Share Attacks.* We prove full UKS security in both directions. We prove that unilateral UKS on the responder is not possible with lemma *UKS\_on\_responder\_resistance*.

```

lemma UKS_on_responder_resistance[reuse]:
  "not(Ex pki1 pki2 pkr peki1 peki2 psk1 psk2 sk ck kb ka k #i #j.
    IKeys(<pki1, pkr, peki1, psk1, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i
    & RKeys(<pki2, pkr, peki2, psk2, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ j
    & not(pki1 = pki2))"

```

In other words, we prove that a responder cannot be tricked into believing that she shares the session with another party other than the actual initiator. This is because the responder encapsulates the random secret  $shk3$  in Algorithm 2 with the static public of the (claimed) initiator and mixes the ciphertext into the session key material. Consequently, bilateral UKS is also not possible.

With lemma *UKS\_on\_initiator\_resistance* we prove UKS security for the initiator.

```
lemma UKS_on_initiator_resistance[reuse]:
  "All pki pkr1 pkr2 peki1 peki2 psk1 psk2 sk ck kb ka k tpk1 tpk2
  r1 r2 r3 #i #j #i1.
  // If I and R agree on keys, and it's not the case that
  IKeys(<pki, pkr1, peki1, psk1, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i
  & PRFGen(tpk1, r3, kb) @ i1 & #i1 < #i
  & RKeys(<pki, pkr2, peki2, psk2, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ j
  & PRFGen(tpk2, r1, ka) @ j & PRFGen(tpk2, r2, k) @ j & not(
  // I's intended responder's static key is compromised
  ((Ex #j1. Reveal_AK(pkr1) @ j1)
  // or I's RNG and her PRF key are both compromised
  | ( (Ex #j1. Reveal_rnd(r3) @ j1)
  & (Ex #j1. Reveal_prfk(tpk1) @ j1) ))
  // I's static key is compromised
  & ((Ex #j1. Reveal_AK(pki) @ j1)
  // or R's RNG and her PRF key are both compromised
  | ( (Ex #j1. Reveal_rnd(r1) @ j1)
  & (Ex #j1. Reveal_prfk(tpk2) @ j1) ))
  // and the ephemeral key from I is compromised
  & ((Ex #j1. Reveal_EphK(peki1) @ j1)
  // or R's RNG and her PRF key are both compromised
  | ( (Ex #j1. Reveal_rnd(r2) @ j1)
  & (Ex #j1. Reveal_prfk(tpk2) @ j1) ))
  // and both PSK's are compromised (or not in use)
  & (Ex #j2. Reveal_PSK(psk1) @ j2)
  & (Ex #j2. Reveal_PSK(psk2) @ j2)
  )
  ==> // then UUKS on initiator is not possible
  pkr1 = pkr2 & peki1 = peki2 & psk1 = psk2"
```

UKS security for the initiator holds due to the initialization of the shared secret string *psk* with a default value that – although not necessarily secret – identifies both communicating parties even if no shared secret is established. As the adversary cannot influence this value, a UKS attack will always be detected. We prove this with the following rule and lemma.

```
/* Generate one default PSK */
rule DefaultPSKGen:
  let pkA = pk(-ltkA)
  pkB = pk(-ltkB)
  psk = h(pkA XOR pkB) in
  [ !F_AgentKey(-ltkA)
  , !F_AgentKey(-ltkB) ]--[
  DefaultPSK(pkA, psk)
  , DefaultPSK(pkB, psk)
  , Reveal_PSK(psk)
  ]->
  [
  Out(psk) // the adversary can easily derive the same psk
  , !F_AgenPSK(psk)
  ]
```

```
/* UKS on initiator is not possible with the default PSK */
lemma UKS_on_initiator_with_default_psk[reuse]:
  "not(Ex pki pkr1 pkr2 peki1 peki2 psk1 psk2 sk ck kb ka k
  #i #j #i1.
  IKeys(<pki, pkr1, peki1, psk1, sk, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ i
  & RKeys(<pki, pkr2, peki2, psk2, ck, kb, ka, k>) @ j
  & DefaultPSK(pki, psk1) @ i1 & DefaultPSK(pkr1, psk1) @ i1
  & not(pkr1 = pkr2))"
```

*Identity Hiding.* The identity of an initiator is encrypted in the initiation message as in WireGuard. We prove that under key hiding property (see Section IV-B), the adversary cannot learn the identity of the initiator, i.e. decrypt the identity, without learning the random secret *shk1* encapsulated with the intended responder's static public key. In other words, the adversary must compromise the static private key of the intended responder, or the random number generator and the PRF secret of the initiator.

## E. Security-Model

The following section is essentially copied verbatim from the original paper by Benjamin Dowling and Kenneth G. Paterson with the only change being that our model explicitly considers quantum-adversaries. All our changes are highlighted in the same way as this paragraph.

We propose a modification to the eCK-PFS security model introduced by Cremers and Feltz [75] that incorporates pre-shared keys and strengthens the security definitions accordingly. We explain the framework and give an algorithmic description of the security model in Section E1, and describe the corruption abilities of the adversary in Section E2. We then describe the modifications necessary to capture the exact security guarantees that WireGuard attempts to achieve by explaining the differences between our partnering definitions and traditional notions of partnering in Section E3. We then give our modified cleanness definitions in Section E4. Given that WireGuard uses a mix of long-term identity keys, ephemeral keys and pre-shared secrets in its key exchange protocol, it is appropriate to use an extended-Canetti-Krawczyk model (as introduced in [50]), wherein the adversary is allowed to reveal subsets of these secrets. It is claimed in [76] that WireGuard “achieves the requirements of authenticated key exchange (AKE) security, avoids key-compromise impersonation, avoids replay attacks, provides perfect forward secrecy,” [76]. These are all notions captured by our extended eCK-PFS model, so our subsequent security proof will formally establish that WireGuard meets its goals.

*1) Execution Environment:* Consider an experiment  $\text{Exp}_{\text{PKE}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}(\lambda)$  played between a challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  and an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ .  $\mathcal{C}$  maintains a set of  $n_P$  parties  $P_1, \dots, P_{n_P}$  (representing users interacting with each other via the protocol), each capable of running up to  $n_S$  sessions of a probabilistic key-exchange protocol KE, represented as a tuple of algorithms  $\text{KE} = (f, \text{ASKeyGen}, \text{PSKeyGen}, \text{EPKeyGen})$ . We use  $\pi_i^s$  to refer to both the identifier of the  $s$ -th instance of the KE being run by party  $P_i$  and the collection of per-session variables maintained for the  $s$ -th instance of KE run by  $P_i$ . We describe the algorithms below:

$\text{KE}.f(\lambda, pk_i, sk_i, \pi, m) \xrightarrow{\S} (m', \pi')$  is a (potentially) probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter  $\lambda$ , the long-term asymmetric key pair  $pk_i, sk_i$  of the party  $P_i$ , a collection of per-session variables  $\pi$  and an arbitrary bit string  $m \in \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\emptyset\}$ , and outputs a response  $m' \in \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\emptyset\}$  and an updated per-session state  $\pi'$ , acting in accordance with an honest protocol implementation.

$\text{KE}.ASKeyGen(\lambda) \xrightarrow{\S} (pk, sk)$  is a probabilistic asymmetric-key generation algorithm taking as input a security parameter  $\lambda$  and outputting a public-key/secret-key pair  $(pk, sk)$ .

$\text{KE}.PSKeyGen(\lambda) \xrightarrow{\S} (psk, pskid)$  is a probabilistic symmetric-key generation algorithm that also takes as input a security parameter  $\lambda$  and outputs a symmetric pre-shared secret key  $psk$  and (potentially) a pre-shared secret key identifier  $pskid$ .

$\text{KE.EPKeyGen}(\lambda) \xrightarrow{\$} (ek, epk)$  is a probabilistic ephemeral-key generation algorithm that also takes as input a security parameter  $\lambda$  and outputs an asymmetric public-key/secret-key pair  $(ek, epk)$ .

$\mathcal{C}$  runs  $\text{KE.ASKeyGen}(\lambda)$   $n_P$  times to generate a public-key/secret-key pair  $(pk_i, sk_i)$  for each party  $P_i \in \{P_1, \dots, P_{n_P}\}$  and delivers all public-keys  $pk_i$  for  $i \in \{1, \dots, n_P\}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . The challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  then randomly samples a bit  $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$  and interacts with the adversary via the queries listed in Section E2. Eventually,  $\mathcal{A}$  terminates and outputs a guess  $b'$  of the challenger bit  $b$ . The adversary wins the eCK-PFS-PSK key-indistinguishability experiment if  $b' = b$ , and additionally if the session  $\pi_i^s$  such that  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  was issued satisfies a cleanness predicate  $\text{clean}$ , which we discuss in more detail in Section E4. We give an algorithmic description of this experiment in Figure 1.

Each session maintains the following set of per-session variables:

- $\rho \in \{\text{init}, \text{resp}\}$  – the role of the party in the current session. Note that parties can be directed to act as  $\text{init}$  or  $\text{resp}$  in concurrent or subsequent sessions.
- $\text{pid} \in \{1, \dots, n_P, \star\}$  – the intended communication partner, represented with  $\star$  if unspecified. Note that the identity of the partner session may be set during the protocol execution, in which case  $\text{pid}$  can be updated once.
- $m_s \in \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$  – the concatenation of messages sent by the session, initialized by  $\perp$ .
- $m_r \in \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$  – the concatenation of messages received by the session, initialized by  $\perp$ .
- $\text{kid} \in \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$  – the concatenation of public keyshare information received by the session, initialized by  $\perp$ .
- $\alpha \in \{\text{active}, \text{accept}, \text{reject}, \perp\}$  – the current status of the session, initialized with  $\perp$ .
- $k \in \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$  – the computed session key, or  $\perp$  if no session key has yet been computed.
- $ek \in \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$  – the ephemeral key pair used by the session during protocol execution, initialized as  $\perp$ .
- $\text{psk} \in \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$  – the pre-shared secret and identifier used by the session during protocol execution, initialized as  $\perp$ .
- $st \in \{0, 1\}^*$  – any additional state used by the session during protocol execution.

Finally, the challenger manages the following set of corruption registers, which hold the leakage of secrets that  $\mathcal{A}$  has revealed.

- pre-shared keys  $\{\text{PSK}\vec{\text{flag}}_i, \text{PSK}\vec{\text{flag}}_2, \dots, \text{PSK}\vec{\text{flag}}_{n_P}\}$  where for each element  $\text{PSK}\vec{\text{flag}}_i[j] \in \text{PSK}\vec{\text{flag}}_i$ ,  $\text{PSK}\vec{\text{flag}}_i[j] \in \{\text{corrupt}, \text{clean}, \perp\} \forall i, j \in [n_P]$  and  $\text{PSK}\vec{\text{flag}}_i[j] = \perp$  for  $i = j$
- long-term keys  $\{\text{SK}\text{flag}_1, \dots, \text{SK}\text{flag}_{n_P}\}$ , where  $\text{SK}\text{flag}_i \in \{\text{corrupt}, \text{clean}, \perp\} \forall i \in [n_P]$

- ephemeral keys  $\{\text{EK}\vec{\text{flag}}_1, \dots, \text{EK}\vec{\text{flag}}_{n_P}\}$ , where  $\text{EK}\vec{\text{flag}}_i[s] \in \{\text{corrupt}, \text{clean}, \perp\} \forall i \in [n_P]$  and  $s \in [n_S]$ .

We formalize the advantage of a (potentially quantum) algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  in winning the eCK-PFS-PSK key indistinguishability experiment in the following way:

*Definition 3 (eCK-PFS-PSK Key Indistinguishability):* Let  $\text{KE}$  be a key-exchange protocol, and  $n_P, n_S \in \mathbb{N}$ . For a particular given predicate  $\text{clean}$ , and a (potentially quantum) algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ , we define the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  in the eCK-PFS-PSK key-indistinguishability game to be:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{KE}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, \text{clean}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{KE}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, \text{clean}}(\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|.$$

We say that  $\text{KE}$  is eCK-PFS-PSK-secure if, for all  $\mathcal{A}$  in QPT,  $\text{Adv}_{\text{KE}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, \text{clean}}(\lambda)$  is negligible in the security parameter  $\lambda$ .

2) *Adversarial Interaction:* Our security model is intended to be as generic as possible, in order to capture eCK-like security notions, but to also include long-term pre-shared keys. This would allow our model to be used in analyzing (for example) the Signal protocol, where users exchange both long-term Diffie-Hellman keyshares used in many protocol executions, but also many ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keyshares that are only used within a single session. Another example would be TLS 1.3, where users may have established pre-shared keys to reduce the protocol's computational overheads, or to enable 0-RTT confidential data transmission.

Our attacker is a standard key-exchange model adversary, in complete control of the communication network, able to modify, inject, delete or delay messages. They can also compromise several layers of secrets:

- long-term private keys, modeling the misuse or corruption of long-term secrets in other sessions, and additionally allowing our model to capture forward-secrecy notions.
- ephemeral private keys, modeling the use of bad randomness generators.
- pre-shared symmetric keys, modeling the leakage of shared secrets, potentially due to the misuse of the pre-shared secret by the partner, or the forced later revelation of these keys.
- session keys, modeling the leakage of keys by their use in bad cryptographic algorithms.

The adversary interacts with the challenger via the queries below. An algorithmic description of how the challenger responds is in Figure 1.

- $\text{Create}(i, j, \text{role}) \rightarrow \{(i, s), \perp\}$ : allows the adversary to begin new sessions. The challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  creates a new session  $\pi_i^s$  with  $\pi_i^s.\text{pid} \leftarrow j$ ,  $\pi_i^s.\rho \leftarrow \text{role}$ ,  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{active}$ ,  $\pi_i^s.T \leftarrow \perp$ ,  $\pi_i^s.\text{sid} \leftarrow \perp$ ,  $\pi_i^s.k \leftarrow \perp$ .  $\mathcal{C}$  also computes  $\text{KE.EKeyGen}(\lambda) \xrightarrow{\$} (ek, epk)$  and sets  $\pi_i^s.ek \leftarrow ek$ . If a session  $\pi_i^s$  has already been created,  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $\perp$ . Otherwise,  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $(i, s)$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- $\text{CreatePSK}(i, j) \rightarrow \{\text{pskid}, \top, \perp\}$ : allows the adversary to direct parties to generate a pre-shared key for use

$\text{Exp}_{\text{KE}, \text{clean}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK-ind}}(\lambda)$ :

```

1:  $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ 
2:  $\text{tested} \leftarrow \text{false}$ 
3: for  $i = 1$  to  $n_P$  do
4:    $(pk_i, sk_i) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{ASKeyGen}(\lambda)$ 
5:    $\text{ASKflag}_i \leftarrow \text{clean}$ 
6:    $\text{PSK}_i[1], \dots, \text{PSK}_i[n_P] \leftarrow \perp$ 
7:    $\text{PSKflag}_i[1], \dots, \text{PSKflag}_i[n_P] \leftarrow \perp$ 
8:    $\text{EPKflag}_i[1], \dots, \text{EPKflag}_i[n_S] \leftarrow \perp$ 
9:    $\text{RSKflag}_i[1], \dots, \text{RSKflag}_i[n_S] \leftarrow \perp$ 
10:   $\text{ctr}_i \leftarrow 0$ 
11: end for
12:  $b' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{Send, Create*}, \text{Corrupt*}, \text{Reveal}, \text{Test}}(pk_1, \dots, pk_{n_P})$ 
13: if  $\text{clean}(\pi_i^s) \wedge (b = b')$  then
14:   return 1
15: else
16:    $b' \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ 
17:   return  $b'$ 
18: end if

```

$\text{Create}(i, j, \text{role})$ :

```

1:  $\text{ctr}_i \leftarrow \text{ctr}_i + 1$ 
2:  $s \leftarrow \text{ctr}_i$ 
3:  $\pi_i^s.\text{pid} \leftarrow j$ 
4:  $\pi_i^s.\rho \leftarrow \text{role}$ 
5:  $\pi_i^s.\text{ek} \leftarrow \text{KE.EPKeyGen}(\lambda)$ 
6:  $\pi_i^s.\text{psk} \leftarrow \text{PSK}_i[j] (i, s)$ 

```

$\text{Send}(i, s, m)$ :

```

1: if  $\pi_i^s = \perp$  then  $\perp$ 
2: else
3:    $\pi_i^s.m_r \leftarrow \pi_i^s.m_r \| m$ 
4:    $(\pi_i^s, m') \leftarrow \text{KE.f}(\lambda, pk_i, sk_i, \pi_i^s, m)$ 
5:    $\pi_i^s.m_s \leftarrow \pi_i^s.m_s \| m'$ 
6:    $\pi_i^s.T \leftarrow \pi_i^s.T \| m \| m'$ 
7: end if

```

$\text{CreatePSK}(i, j)$ :

```

1: if  $(i = j) \vee (\text{PSKflag}_i[j] \neq \perp)$  then  $\perp$ 
2: end if
3:  $(psk, pskid) \leftarrow \text{KE.PSKeyGen}(\lambda)$ 
4:  $\text{PSK}_i[j] \leftarrow (psk, pskid)$ 
5:  $\text{PSK}_j[i] \leftarrow (psk, pskid)$ 
6:  $\text{PSKflag}_i[j], \text{PSKflag}_j[i] \leftarrow \text{clean}$ 
7: if  $\text{pskid} \neq \emptyset$  then  $\text{pskid}$ 
8: else  $\top$ 
9: end if

```

$\text{Reveal}(i, s)$ :

```

1: if  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \neq \text{accept}$  then  $\perp$ 
2: else
3:    $\text{RSKflag}_i[s] \leftarrow \text{corrupt}$ 
4:    $\pi_i^s.k$ 
5: end if

```

$\text{CorruptASK}(i)$ :

```

1:  $\text{ASKflag}_i \leftarrow \text{corrupt } sk_i$ 

```

$\text{CorruptEPK}(i, s)$ :

```

1:  $\text{EKflag}_i[s] \leftarrow \text{corrupt}$ 
2:    $\pi_i^s.\text{ek}$ 

```

$\text{Test}(i, s)$ :

```

1: if  $(\text{tested} = \text{true}) \vee (\pi_i^s.\alpha \neq \text{accept})$  then  $\perp$ 
2: end if
3:  $\text{tested} \leftarrow \text{true}$ 
4: if  $b = 0$  then  $\pi_i^s.k$ 
5: else
6:    $k \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K} k$ 
7: end if

```

$\text{CorruptPSK}(i, j)$ :

```

1: if  $\text{PSK}_i[j] = \perp$  then  $\perp$ 
2: end if
3: if  $\text{PSKflag}_i[j] \neq \text{clean}$  then
4:    $\perp$ 
5: else
6:    $\text{PSKflag}_i[j] \leftarrow \text{corrupt}$ 
7:    $\text{PSKflag}_j[i] \leftarrow \text{corrupt}$ 
8:    $\text{PSK}_i[j]$ 
9: end if

```

Fig. 1. eCK-PFS-PSK experiment for adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  against the key-indistinguishability security of protocol KE.

in future protocol executions. The challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  checks that  $i \neq j$  and that  $\text{PSK}_i[j] = \text{PSK}_j[i] = \perp$ .  $\mathcal{C}$  then computes  $\text{KE.PSKeyGen}(\lambda) \xrightarrow{\$} psk$  and sets  $\text{PSK}_i[j] = \text{PSK}_j[i] \leftarrow psk$ , and the PSK register  $\text{PSKflag}_i[j] = \text{PSKflag}_j[i] \leftarrow \text{clean}$ . If  $\text{pskid} \neq \emptyset$ , then  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $\text{pskid}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , otherwise  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $\top$  (where  $\top$  is a generic success flag) to  $\mathcal{A}$ . If  $\text{PSK}_i[j] \neq \perp$  or  $\text{PSK}_j[i] \neq \perp$  (i.e. if  $\mathcal{A}$  has previously issued a  $\text{CreatePSK}(i, j)$  or  $\text{CreatePSK}(j, i)$  query), then  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $\perp$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

- $\text{Reveal}(i, s)$ : allows the adversary access to the secret session key computed by a session during protocol execution. The challenger checks whether the cleanness of the session  $\pi_i^s$  has been upheld and  $\pi_i^s.\alpha = \text{accept}$  and if so, returns  $\pi_i^s.k$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Otherwise,  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $\perp$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- $\text{CorruptPSK}(i) \rightarrow \{psk, \perp\}$ : allows the adversary access to the secret pre-shared key jointly shared by parties prior to protocol execution. The challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  checks that  $\text{PSK}_i[j] = \text{PSK}_j[i] \neq \perp$ , and that  $\text{PSKflag}_i[j] = \text{PSKflag}_j[i] = \text{clean}$ . If so,  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $\text{PSK} \leftarrow \text{PSK}_i[j]$

to  $\mathcal{A}$  and sets  $\text{PSKflag}_i[j] = \text{PSKflag}_j[i] \leftarrow \text{corrupt}$ . If  $\text{PSK}_i[j] = \text{PSK}_j[i] = \perp$  or  $\text{PSKflag}_i[j] = \text{PSKflag}_j[i] \neq \text{clean}$ , (i.e. that the adversary has either not previously created a  $\text{psk}$  between the two parties  $P_i$  and  $P_j$ , or has previously issued a  $\text{CorruptPSK}(i, j)/\text{CorruptPSK}(j, i)$  query), then  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $\perp$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

- $\text{CorruptASK}(i) \rightarrow \{sk_i, \perp\}$ : allows the adversary access to the secret long-term key generated by a party prior to protocol execution. The challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  checks that  $\text{ASKflag}_i \neq \text{corrupt}$ . If so,  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $sk_i$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . If  $\text{ASKflag}_i = \text{corrupt}$  (i.e.  $\mathcal{A}$  has previously issued a  $\text{CorruptASK}(i)$  query), then  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $\perp$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- $\text{CorruptEPK}(i, s) \rightarrow \{ek, \perp\}$ : allows the adversary access to the secret ephemeral key generated by a session during protocol execution. The challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  checks that  $\text{EPKflag}_{i,s} = \text{clean}$ . If so,  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $\pi_i^s.\text{ek}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , and sets  $\text{EPKflag}_{i,s} \leftarrow \text{corrupt}$ . If  $\text{EPKflag}_{i,s} = \text{corrupt}$ , (i.e.  $\mathcal{A}$  has previously issued a  $\text{CorruptEPK}(i, s)$  query), then  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $\perp$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- $\text{Send}(i, s, m) \rightarrow \{m', \perp\}$ : allows the adversary to send



messages to sessions for protocol execution and receive their output. If a session  $\pi_i^s$  has not been previously created, or  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \neq \text{active}$ , then  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $\perp$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Otherwise,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $\text{KE.f}(\lambda, m, \pi_i^s) \rightarrow (m', \pi_i^s)$ , sets  $\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_i^{s'}$ , and returns  $m'$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

- $\text{Test}(i, s) \rightarrow \{k, \perp\}$ : sends the adversary a real-or-random session key used in determining the success of  $\mathcal{A}$  in the key-indistinguishability game. If a session  $\pi_i^s$  exists and  $\pi_i^s.\alpha = \text{accept}$ , then the challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  samples a key  $k_0 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}$  where  $\mathcal{D}$  is the distribution of the session key, and sets  $k_1 \leftarrow \pi_i^s.k$ .  $\mathcal{C}$  then returns  $k_b$  (where  $b$  is the random bit sampled during set-up) to  $\mathcal{A}$ . If a session  $\pi_i^s$  does not exist, or  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \neq \text{accept}$ , then  $\mathcal{C}$  returns  $\perp$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

3) *Partnering Definitions*: In order to evaluate which secrets the adversary is able to reveal without trivially breaking the security of the protocol, key-exchange models must define how sessions are *partnered*. Otherwise, an adversary would simply run a protocol between two sessions, faithfully delivering all messages, Test the first session to receive the real-or-random key, and Reveal the session partner’s key. If the keys are equal, then the Test key is real, and otherwise the session key has been sampled randomly. BR-style key-exchange models traditionally use *matching conversations* in order to do this. When introducing the eCK-PFS model, Cremers and Feltz [75] used the relaxed notion of *origin sessions*. However, both of these are still too restrictive for analyzing WireGuard, because this protocol does not explicitly authenticate the full transcript. Instead, for WireGuard, we are concerned matching only on a subset of the transcript information – the honest contributions of the keyshare and key-derivation materials. We introduce the notion of *contributive keyshares* to capture this intuition.

*Definition 4 (Contributive keyshares)*: Recall that  $\pi_i^s.kid$  is the concatenation of all keyshare material sent by the session  $\pi_i^s$  during protocol execution. We say that  $\pi_j^t$  is a *contributive keyshare session* for  $\pi_i^s$  if  $\pi_j^t.kid$  is a substring of  $\pi_i^s.m_r$ .

This definition is protocol specific: in WireGuard  $\pi_i^s.kid$  consists only of the long-term public Diffie-Hellman value and the ephemeral public Diffie-Hellman value provided by the initiator and responder; in TLS 1.3 (for example) it would consist of the long-term public keys, the ephemeral public Diffie-Hellman values and any pre-shared key identifiers provided by the client and selected by the server.

4) *Cleanness Predicates*: We now define the exact combinations of secrets that an adversary is allowed to leak without trivially breaking the protocol. The original cleanness predicate of Cremers and Feltz [75] allows the reveal of long-term secrets for the test session’s party  $P_i$  at any time, which places us firmly in the setting where the adversary has key-compromise-impersonation abilities, but only allowed the reveal of long-term secrets of the intended peer after the test session has established a secure session, which captures perfect forward secrecy.

We now turn to modifying the cleanness predicate  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  for the pre-shared secret setting.

*Definition 5 (clean<sub>eCK-PFS-PSK</sub>)*: A session  $\pi_i^s$  such that  $\pi_i^s.\alpha = \text{accept}$  in the security experiment defined in Figure 1 is  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  if all of the following conditions hold:

- 1) The query  $\text{Reveal}(i, s)$  has not been issued.
- 2) For all  $(j, t) \in n_P \times n_S$  such that  $\pi_i^s$  matches  $\pi_j^t$ , the query  $\text{Reveal}(j, t)$  has not been issued.
- 3) If  $\text{PSK}\vec{\text{flag}}_i[\pi_i^s.pid] = \text{corrupt}$  or  $\pi_i^s.psk = \perp$ , the queries  $\text{CorruptASK}(i)$  and  $\text{CorruptEPK}(i, s)$  have not *both* been issued.
- 4) If  $\text{PSK}\vec{\text{flag}}_i[\pi_i^s.pid] = \text{corrupt}$  or  $\pi_i^s.psk = \perp$ , and for all  $(j, t) \in n_P \times n_S$  such that  $\pi_j^t$  is a *contributive keyshare session* for  $\pi_i^s$ , then  $\text{CorruptASK}(j, t)$  and  $\text{CorruptEPK}(j, t)$  have not *both* been issued.
- 5) If there exists no  $(j, t) \in n_P \times n_S$  such that  $\pi_j^t$  is a contributive keyshare session for  $\pi_i^s$ ,  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$  has not been issued before  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{accept}$ .

We specifically forbid the adversary from revealing the long-term and ephemeral secrets if the pre-shared secret between the test session and its intended partner has already been revealed. Since pre-shared keys are optional in our framework, we also must consider the scenario where a pre-shared secret does not exist between the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its intended partner. Similarly, we forbid the adversary from revealing the long-term and ephemeral secrets if there exists no pre-shared secret between the two parties. Finally, since WireGuard does not authenticate the full transcript, but relies instead on implicit authentication of derived session keys based on secret information, we must use our contributive keyshare partnering definition instead of the origin sessions of [75]. Like eCK-PFS, we capture perfect forward secrecy under key-compromise-impersonation attack in condition 5, where the long-term secret of the test session’s intended partner is allowed to be revealed only after the test session has accepted. Additionally, we allow for the optional incorporation of pre-shared secrets in conditions 3 and 4, where the adversary falls back to eCK-PFS leakage paradigm if the pre-shared secret between the test session and its peer either does not already exist, or has been already revealed.

## F. Full Proof

In this section we present the full security-proof of our scheme. Most of it is taken verbatim from the WireGuard-proof[9] by Benjamin Dowling and Kenneth G. Paterson whom we thank for kindly providing us with their  $\LaTeX$ -sources; the highlighted parts (such as this one) are our own modifications to that proof so that it also works with PQ-WireGuard. This was done with the intention of allowing readers who are already familiar with the older proof to concentrate on our changes to it. For the same reason we also tried to keep the style of our additions as close to the original paper as possible.

One thing that we would like to point out concerns the game-hops that use the  $\text{prf-}$  and the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  assumptions: One might intuitively assume that keys or messages could potentially collide and result in a tightness-loss (like the ones that actually occur in **Game 5a of Case 1**, **Game 5a of Case 2** and **Game 3a of Case 3.5**). This is not the case however: Since

the key is random and independent from any other key in all these cases, any potential collision of the key is already part of the adversarial advantage against the prf/prf<sup>swap</sup>-security. As any (non-colliding) key is furthermore only used once (except for the aforementioned cases), there cannot be any colliding messages. The later part actually strengthens the real security of the protocol, since it massively reduces the kinds of attacks against the KDF that can be converted into attacks against PQ-WireGuard.

While Dowling and Paterson don't make this statement as explicitly (possibly because they considered it obvious), it applies to their proof just as well.

*Theorem 1:* The modified WireGuard handshake protocol pqWG is eCK-PFS-PSK-secure with cleanness predicate  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  (capturing forward secrecy and resilience to KCI attacks). That is, for any (potentially quantum) algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  against the eCK-PFS-PSK key-indistinguishability game (defined in Figure 1) the adversarial advantage  $\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, \text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}(\lambda)$  is bounded by a polynomial factor of  $\mathcal{A}$ 's advantage in the dual-prf, IND-CCA, IND-CPA and auth-aead games. Specifically:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, \text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}} \\ & \leq n_P^2 n_S \left( \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} + \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEYM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) + 6 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \right. \\ & \quad \left. + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{auth-aead}}(\lambda) \right) \\ & + n_P^2 n_S \left( \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} + \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEYM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) + 3 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \right. \\ & \quad \left. + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{auth-aead}}(\lambda) \right) \\ & + \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left( n_P^2 n_S^2 \left( \begin{array}{l} 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \end{array} \right) \right), \\ \left( n_P^2 n_S^2 \left( \begin{array}{l} \text{Adv}_{\text{CPAKEYM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) \\ + 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \end{array} \right) \right), \\ \left( n_P^2 n_S^2 \left( \begin{array}{l} \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEYM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \\ + 7 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \end{array} \right) \right), \\ \left( n_P^2 n_S^2 \left( \begin{array}{l} \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEYM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \\ + 3 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \end{array} \right) \right), \\ \left( n_P^2 n_S^2 \left( \begin{array}{l} \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} + \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEYM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \\ + 7 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \end{array} \right) \right) \end{array} \right\} \end{aligned}$$

By combining some terms we can simplify this equation to the following, simpler one:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, \text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}} \\ & \leq \left( \begin{array}{l} 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEYM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) + 9 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{auth-aead}}(\lambda) \\ + 2 \cdot \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} \end{array} \right) \\ & + n_P^2 n_S \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left( \begin{array}{l} \text{Adv}_{\text{CPAKEYM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) \\ + 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \end{array} \right), \\ \left( \begin{array}{l} \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEYM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \\ + 7 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \end{array} \right), \\ \left( \begin{array}{l} \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEYM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \\ + 7 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \\ + \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} \end{array} \right) \end{array} \right\} \end{aligned}$$

At the cost of a (remarkably small) loss in tightness, we can further simplify this to the following:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, \text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}} \\ & \leq n_P^2 n_S \left( \begin{array}{l} (7n_S + 9) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + (2n_S + 4) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \\ + (n_S + 2) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEYM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \\ + n_S \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{CPAKEYM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) \\ + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{auth-aead}}(\lambda) \\ + (n_S + 2) \cdot \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} \end{array} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Note that for readability reasons, we drop the convention of including the cleanness predicate  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  in the advantage notation in what follows. We begin by dividing the proof into three separate cases (and denote with  $\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_i}(\lambda)$  the advantage of the adversary in winning the key-indistinguishability game in Case  $i$ ) where the query  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  has been issued:

- 1) The session  $\pi_i^s$  (where  $\pi_i^s \cdot \rho = \text{init}$ ) has no contributive keyshare session.
- 2) The session  $\pi_i^s$  (where  $\pi_i^s \cdot \rho = \text{resp}$ ) has no contributive keyshare session.
- 3) The session  $\pi_i^s$  has a contributive keyshare session.

It follows then that  $\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}} \leq (\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_1}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_2}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_3}(\lambda))$ . We then bound the probability of each case, and show that under certain assumptions, the probability of the adversary winning in the key-indistinguishability game is negligible.

In the first two cases, we show that the adversary's probability in getting the session  $\pi_i^s$  to reach an "accept" state (and thus generate keys used in the real-or-random key indistinguishability game) is negligible, and since the adversary cannot cause the test session  $\pi_i^s$  to reach the accept state, the experiment will act identically regardless of whether the test

bit  $b$  is 0 or 1, and thus the adversary's probability in winning the key indistinguishability game is negligible.

In the third case, we show that under certain assumptions, replacing the session keys with uniformly random, independent keys from the same distribution has a negligible chance of being detected and thus, the adversary's advantage in distinguishing the real-or-random key-indistinguishability game is also negligible. We begin with the first case.

1) *Case 1: Test init session without contributive keyshare session:* In this case we bound the probability that a test initiator session will accept when there exists no contributive keyshare session. Recall that a contributive keyshare session  $\pi_j^t$  exists for a session  $\pi_i^s$  when  $\pi_j^t.kid$  is a substring of  $\pi_i^s.m_r$ . Informally, the test session  $\pi_i^s$  has not received keying material from an honest partner session, having either been modified or injected wholesale by the adversary.

a) **Proof Sketch:** We begin first by adding an abort rule that triggers if there is ever a hash collision during the challenger's execution of any honest session. We follow by guessing the index of the test session, and adding an abort event that occurs if a Test query is directed to a session that does not have the index of the guessed session, and similarly, guess the party index of the intended partner session. Afterwards, we add another abort event that occurs if the guessed test session  $\pi_i^s$  reaches the reject status. Since we already abort if the guessed session is not the session indicated by the Test query, and if the session  $\pi_i^s$  has reached the reject status, the Test( $i, s$ ) query will always respond with  $\perp$ , there is no difference in the adversary's advantage in the two games - any further queries that the adversary makes is responded to identically regardless of the sampling of the random test bit  $b$ .

We define an abort event  $abort_{\text{accept}}$  that will occur if  $\pi_i^s \leftarrow \text{accept}$ . The following games then are designed to bound the probability of  $abort_{\text{accept}}$  occurring to be negligibly close to zero. Note that from this game onwards, the adversary is unable to make a CorruptASK( $j$ ) query, since we now abort the game when the session  $\pi_i^s$  reaches a status that is not active, and by the Case 1 definition (a test session without a contributive keyshare session) and the cleanliness predicate  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$ , the adversary can only win by not issuing a CorruptASK( $j$ ) query before the test session completes. We can now (cleverly) embed CCAKEM challenge values from the IND-CCA challenger into the long-term asymmetric keys of the party  $P_j$  without needing to address the adversary's ability to issue a CorruptASK( $j$ ) query.

We then replace the values  $C_3, \kappa_3$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3$ , and argue that any adversary capable of distinguishing this change would be able to break either the prf or the IND-CCA assumption. In the next game we replace the values  $C_4, \kappa_4$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_4, \widetilde{\kappa}_4$ , and argue that any adversary capable of distinguishing this change would be able to break the prf security of KDF.

In a similar fashion, we use a chain of prf challengers to replace  $C_6, C_7, C_8$  and finally  $C_9, tmp, \kappa_9$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_6, \widetilde{C}_7, \widetilde{C}_8$  and  $\widetilde{C}_9, tmp,$

$\widetilde{\kappa}_9$ . We argue that any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing these changes can be turned into a successful distinguishing adversary against the prf security of KDF.

In the final game hop, we use the fact that  $\widetilde{\kappa}_9$  is a uniformly random and independent value to embed  $\widetilde{\kappa}_9$  within an aead challenger, and add an abort rule  $abort_{\text{dec}}$  that triggers when the test session  $\pi_i^s$  decrypts a zero ciphertext received in the RespHello message. To do so, we use the aead decryption oracle to replace concrete decryptions performed in the test session. Logically then, since the  $\widetilde{\kappa}_9$  value is internal to the aead challenger, if zero decrypts correctly, then  $\mathcal{A}$  has managed to produce a ciphertext  $\text{AEAD.Enc}(\widetilde{\kappa}_9, 0, \emptyset, H_9)$  that has not been the result of an encryption oracle query on  $(\emptyset, H_9)$ , and we can use zero, to break the aead security of the AEAD scheme. We note that since  $\widetilde{\kappa}_9$  is already a uniformly random and independent value, that this change is sound, and that the probability of  $abort_{\text{dec}}$  triggering is bound by the probability of adversary breaking the aead security of AEAD.

Since a session with role  $\pi_i^s.\rho = \text{init}$  will only accept if it receives a ciphertext zero that decrypts correctly, and  $abort_{\text{dec}}$  triggers if such a ciphertext decrypts correctly, then the probability of  $\pi_i^s$  reaching an accept state is 0 in the final game, and the adversary cannot force a session  $\pi_i^s$  to accept without an honest partner  $\pi_j^t$ . We show this using the following sequence of games: **Game 0** This is a standard eCK-PFS-PSK game. Thus we have

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_1}(\lambda) = \Pr(\text{break}_0).$$

**Game 1** In this game, we guess the index ( $i, s$ ) of the session  $\pi_i^s$ , and abort if during the execution of the experiment, a query Test( $i^*, s^*$ ) is received and  $(i^*, s^*) \neq (i, s)$ . Thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_0) \leq n_P n_S \cdot \Pr(\text{break}_1)$$

**Game 2** In this game, we guess the party of the intended partner of the test session  $\pi_i^s$ , and abort if  $\pi_i^s.pid \neq j$ . Thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_1) \leq n_P \cdot \Pr(\text{break}_2).$$

**Game 3** In this game, we abort if the session  $\pi_i^s$  sets the status  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{reject}$ . Note that by **Game 2** we abort if the Test query is ever issued to a session that is not  $\pi_i^s$ . If the session  $\pi_i^s$  ever reaches the status  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{reject}$ , then the Test( $i, s$ ) query will be rejected by the challenger as specified in Figure 1. Note that the difference between the adversary's advantage in **Game 2** and **Game 3** is 0: The sampling of the test bit  $b$  by the challenger only affects the response to the Test( $i, s$ ) query, which is always rejected if  $\pi_i^s.\alpha = \text{reject}$ . Thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_2) = \Pr(\text{break}_3).$$

**Game 4** In this game we define an abort event  $abort_{\text{accept}}$  that triggers if the status of the test session  $\pi_i^s \leftarrow \text{accept}$ . It is clear then that

$$\Pr(\text{break}_3) = \Pr(\text{abort}_{\text{accept}}) + 1/2.$$

In the following sequence of games, we show that the probability of the abort event triggering (i.e.  $\Pr(\text{abort}_{\text{accept}})$ ) is negligibly close to zero.

**Game 5** In this game we replace the computation of  $C_3, \kappa_3$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3$ . We note that the replacement of the sym-ms-PRFODH assumptions with the more standard IND-CCA assumption for KEMs forces us to split the original hybrid into three. This is necessary because of the more convoluted combination of the static keys with both the other parties static and ephemeral keys and because the application of the KDF to the shared-secret is not part of the IND-CCA game while it was part of the PRFODH game. As such we first replace the pseudo-random value used for key-encapsulation with CCAKEM with a truly random value (**Game 5a**) and then replace  $\text{ct1}$  with a random value  $\kappa^*$  (**Game 5b**). After that we replace the output of the KDF that this value is passed to with a random one (**Game 5c**). The reason for why we split the hybrid instead of inserting new ones is that we want to stay consistent with the numbering of the hybrids in the original proof.

The one case where we will deviate from the original numbering-scheme is in the labels for the “break”-events in **Case 1**: The original proof numbers these such that  $\Pr(\text{break}_4)$  is the probability that the fifth hybrid is broken; in all other cases the numbers coincide however. Because we believe that skipping  $\text{break}_4$  and increasing all following indices by one is more readable and since this is what we do in the full version, the indices in our proof don’t match the ones from the original proof by Dowling and Paterson. (Again: This does not affect cases 2 and 3.)

In **Game 5a** we replace the value  $\hat{r} := \text{KDF}(\sigma_i, r_i)$  passed to  $\text{CCAEM.Enc}$  for the computation of  $\text{ct1}$  and  $\text{shk1}$  with a random bitstring  $\hat{r}'$ .

By the definition of this case, we know that at least one of  $r_i$  and  $\sigma_i$  is random and uncorrupted.

In the first case ( $r_i$  is unknown to the adversary), we initialize a  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger, query  $\sigma_i$ , and use the output  $\tilde{r}$  from the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger to replace the computation of  $\hat{r}$ . By the definition of this case  $r_i$  is a uniformly random and independent value, therefore this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 0, then  $\hat{r} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\sigma_i, r_i)$  and we are in **Game 4**. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 1, then  $\hat{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is a truly random value and we are in **Game 5a**.

For the second case we first establish that  $r_i$ , while being (potentially) known to the adversary is still fresh in the sense that  $\text{KDF}(\sigma_i, r_i)$  has never been evaluated: Since  $r_i$  is a random value, there is a chance that it could be sampled in another session. This probability can be upper-bounded by the total number of sessions divided by the number of possible values, namely  $\frac{n_S}{2^\lambda}$  (which when multiplied by the number of sessions results in the famous approximation of the birthday-bound  $\frac{2}{2^\lambda}$ ).

Given that, we initialize a  $\text{prf}$  challenger and replace all computations of  $\text{KDF}(\sigma_i, \cdot)$  with queries to the challenger. By the definition of this case  $\sigma_i$  is a uniformly random and independent value, therefore this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 0, then  $\hat{r} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\sigma_i, r_i)$  and we are in **Game 4**. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}$

challenger is 1, then  $\hat{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is a truly random value. Since we established furthermore that  $r_i$  is not used with  $\sigma_i$  in any other session,  $\hat{r}$  is furthermore independent of all other  $\hat{r}$  in other sessions, therefore we are in **Game 5a**.

Thus any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the  $\text{prf}$  security or the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  security of KDF, and we find:

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr(\text{abort}_{\text{accept}}) \\ & \leq \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{5a}) \end{aligned}$$

In **Game 5b** we replace the computation of  $\text{shk1}$  by sampling the value uniformly at random from the space of shared secrets of the KEM and ignoring the second output of  $\text{CCAEM.Enc}(\text{spk}_r)$ . To show that this is undetectable under the IND-CCA-assumption of the used KEM, we interact with an IND-CCA challenger in the following way: Note that by **Game 1**, we know at the beginning of the experiment the index of session  $\pi_i^s$  such that  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  is issued by the adversary. Similarly, by **Game 2**, we know at the beginning of the experiment the index of the intended partner  $P_j$  of the session  $\pi_i^s$ . Thus, we initialize an IND-CCA challenger and use the received public-key  $\text{pk}^*$  as long-term public-key of party  $P_j$  and give it with all other (honestly generated) public keys to the adversary. Note that by **Game 4** and the definition of this case,  $\mathcal{A}$  is not able to issue a  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$  query, as we abort if  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{reject}$  and abort if  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{accept}$ . Thus we will not need to reveal the private key  $\text{sk}^*$  of the challenge public-key to  $\mathcal{A}$ . However we must account for all sessions  $t$  such that  $\pi_j^t$  must use the private key for computations. In our version of WireGuard, the long-term private keys are used to compute the following:

- In sessions where  $P_j$  acts as the initiator:  
 $C_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_6, \text{CCAEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_i, \text{ct3}))$
- In sessions where  $P_j$  acts as the responder:  
 $C_3, \kappa_3 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_2, \text{CCAEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{ct1}))$

(Note that these are fewer cases than in the original proof because we don’t combine static and ephemeral keys directly.) Dealing with the challenger’s computation of these values will be done in two ways:

- The encapsulation was created by another honest party. The challenger can then use its own internal knowledge of the encapsulated value to complete the computations.
- The encapsulation was not created by another honest party, but by the adversary and the challenger is therefore unaware of the encapsulated value.

In the second case, the challenger can instead use the decapsulation-oracle provided by the CCA-challenger, specifically querying  $\text{CCAEM.Dec}(\text{ctX})$ , (where  $\text{ctX}$  is the relevant encapsulation) which will output  $\text{shkX}$  using the CCA challenger’s internal knowledge of  $\text{sk}^*$ .

During session  $i$  we request a challenge consisting of a ciphertext and a candidate shared secret  $(c^*, k^*)$  from the IND-CCA challenger and use those values in place of  $\text{ct1}$  and  $\text{shk1}$ . Given the definition of the IND-CCA game, there are two cases:

- If the test bit sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 0, then  $k^*$  is indeed the shared secret encapsulated in  $c^*$  and we are in **Game 5a**.
- If the test bit sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 1, then  $k^*$  is not the shared secret encapsulated in  $c^*$  but sampled uniformly at random from the space of shared secrets and we are in **Game 5b**.

Thus, any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the IND-CCA security of the used KEM and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{5a}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{5b})$$

In **Game 5c** we replace the values of  $C_3, \kappa_3$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  (where  $\{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is the output space of the KDF) used in the protocol execution of the test session. Specifically, we initialize a  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger and query  $\text{shk1}$ , and use the output  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3$  from the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger to replace the computation of  $C_3, \kappa_3$ . Since by **Game 5b**,  $\text{shk1}$  is a uniformly random and independent value, this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_2, \text{shk1})$  and we are in **Game 5b**. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 5c**.

Thus any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  security of KDF, and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{5b}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{5c})$$

**Game 6** In this game we replace the values  $C_4, \kappa_4$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_4, \widetilde{\kappa}_4 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\text{KDF}}$  (where  $\{0, 1\}^{\text{KDF}}$  is the output space of the KDF) used in the protocol execution of the test session. Specifically, we initialize a prf challenger and query  $\text{psk}$ , and use the output  $\widetilde{C}_4, \widetilde{\kappa}_4$  from the prf challenger to replace the computation of  $C_4, \kappa_4$ . Since by **Game 5c**,  $\widetilde{C}_3$  is a uniformly random and independent value, this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_4, \widetilde{\kappa}_4 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_3, \text{psk})$  and we are in **Game 5c**. If the test bit sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_4, \widetilde{\kappa}_4 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 6**. Thus any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the prf security of KDF, and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{5c}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_6)$$

**Game 7** In this game we replace the value  $C_6$  with a uniformly random and independent value  $\widetilde{C}_6 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  (where  $\{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is the output space of KDF) used in the protocol execution of the test session. Specifically, we initialize a prf challenger, query it with  $\text{ct2}$ , and use the output  $\widetilde{C}_6$  from the prf challenger to replace the computation of  $C_6$ . Since by **Game 6**,  $C_4$  is a uniformly random and independent value, this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by

the prf challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_6 \leftarrow \text{prf}(C_4, \text{ct2})$  and we are in **Game 6**. If the test bit sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_6 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 7**. Thus any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the prf security of KDF, and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_6) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_7)$$

**Game 8** As in previous games, we replace the computation of  $C_7$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_7$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_7 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_6, \text{shk2})$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with  $\text{shk2}$ . We note that by **Game 7** that  $\widetilde{C}_6$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_7 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_6, \text{shk2})$  and we are in **Game 7**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_7 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 8**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF, and thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_7) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_8)$$

**Game 9** As in previous games, we replace the computation of  $C_8$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_8$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_7, \text{shk3})$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with  $\text{shk3}$ . We note that by **Game 8** that  $\widetilde{C}_7$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then  $C_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_7, \text{shk3})$  and we are in **Game 8**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_8 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 9**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF, and thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_8) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_9)$$

**Game 10** As in previous games, we replace the computation of  $C_9, \text{tmp}, \kappa_9$  with uniformly random values  $\widetilde{C}_9, \widetilde{\text{tmp}}, \widetilde{\kappa}_9$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a KDF challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_9, \text{tmp}, \kappa_9 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_8, \text{psk})$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with  $\text{psk}$ . We note that by **Game 9** that  $\widetilde{C}_8$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 9**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 10**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing

this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF, and thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_9) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{10}).$$

**Game 11** In this game, the test session  $\pi_i^s$  will only set  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{accept}$  if the adversary is able to produce a value  $\text{zero} = \text{AEAD}(\widetilde{\kappa}_9, 0, H_9, \emptyset)$  that decrypts correctly. In this game, we now initialize an aead challenger to decrypt  $\text{RespHello.zero}$  ciphertexts in the test session  $\pi_i^s$ . By **Game 10** that  $\widetilde{\kappa}_9$  is a uniformly random and independent value, and thus this change is undetectable. Since the  $\widetilde{\kappa}_9$  is internal to the aead challenger, then it follows that the adversary capable of forging such a zero ciphertext breaks the security of the AEAD scheme. We find that

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{10}) = \text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{auth-aead}}(\lambda).$$

Thus

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\text{abort}_{\text{accept}}) &\leq \left( \frac{n_S}{2\lambda} + \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \right) \\ &\quad + 6 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \\ &\quad + \text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{auth-aead}}(\lambda) \end{aligned}$$

It follows then

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{pqVG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_1}(\lambda) &\leq n_P^2 n_S \left( \frac{n_S}{2\lambda} \right. \\ &\quad + \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \\ &\quad + 6 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ &\quad + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \\ &\quad \left. + \text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{aead}}(\lambda) \right). \end{aligned}$$

2) *Case 2: Test resp session without contributive keyshare partner:* In this case we bound the probability that a session  $\pi_i^s$  such that  $\pi_i^s.\rho = \text{resp}$  will accept when there exists no contributive keyshare partner. Recall that a contributive keyshare partner exists for a session  $\pi_i^s$  when for some session  $\pi_j^t$ ,  $\pi_j^t.kid$  is a substring of  $\pi_i^s.m_r$ . Informally, the test session  $\pi_i^s$  has not received the keyshares that were honestly generated by another session, having either been modified or injected wholesale by the adversary.

a) **Proof sketch:** We begin by guessing the index of the test session, and adding an abort event that occurs if a Test query is directed to a session that does not have the index of the guessed session, and similarly, guess the party index of the intended partner session. Afterwards, we add another abort event that occurs if the guessed test session  $\pi_i^s$  reaches the reject status. Since we already abort if the guessed session is not the session indicated by the Test query, and if the session  $\pi_i^s$  has reached the reject status, the  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  query will always respond with  $\perp$ , there is no difference in the adversary's advantage in the two games - any further queries that the adversary makes is responded to identically regardless of the sampling of the random test bit  $b$ .

We define an abort event  $\text{abort}_{\text{accept}}$  that will occur if  $\pi_i^s \leftarrow \text{accept}$ . The following games then are designed to

bound the probability of  $\text{abort}_{\text{accept}}$  occurring to be negligibly close to zero. Note that from this game onwards, the adversary is unable to make a  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$  query, since we now abort the game when the session  $\pi_i^s$  reaches a status that is not active, and by the Case 1 definition (a test session without a contributive keyshare session) and the cleanness predicate  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$ , the adversary can only win by not issuing a  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$  query before the test session completes. We can now (cleverly) embed **CCAKEM** challenge values from the IND-CCA challenger into the long-term asymmetric keys of the party  $P_j$  without needing to address the adversary's ability to issue a  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$  query.

We then replace the value  $C_8$  with a uniformly random and independent value  $\widetilde{C}_8$ , and argue that any adversary capable of distinguishing this change would be able to break either the prf or the IND-CCA assumption. In the next game we replace the values  $C_9, tmp, \kappa_4$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_9, tmp, \widetilde{\kappa}_4$ , and argue that any adversary capable of distinguishing this change would be able to break the PRF assumption. In a similar fashion, we replace the values  $C_{10}, \kappa_{10}$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_{10}, \widetilde{\kappa}_{10}$  and again argue that any distinguishing adversary can be turned into an adversary against the PRF assumption. Finally, we argue that the test session  $\pi_i^s$  will only reach an accept state (and trigger the  $\text{abort}_{\text{accept}}$  event) if it receives a value  $\text{conf} = \text{AEAD}.\text{Enc}(\widetilde{\kappa}_{10}, 0, \emptyset, H_{10})$ . We use the fact that  $\widetilde{\kappa}_{10}$  is a uniformly random and independent value to embed  $\widetilde{\kappa}_{10}$  within an aead-auth challenger, and add an abort rule  $\text{abort}_{\text{dec}}$  that triggers if the  $\text{conf}$  ciphertext received in the  $\text{SenderConf}$  message would decrypt without error. Logically then, since the  $\widetilde{\kappa}_{10}$  value is internal to the aead challenger, if  $\text{conf}$  would decrypt correctly, then  $\mathcal{A}$  has managed to produce a ciphertext  $\text{AEAD}.\text{Enc}(\widetilde{\kappa}_{10}, 0, \emptyset, H_{10})$  that has not been the result of an encryption oracle query on  $(0, \emptyset, H_{10})$ , and we can use zero to break the aead-auth security of the AEAD scheme. We note that since  $\widetilde{\kappa}_{10}$  is already a uniformly random and independent value, that this change is sound, and that the probability of  $\text{abort}_{\text{dec}}$  triggering is bound by the probability of adversary breaking the aead-auth security of AEAD.

Since a session with role  $\pi_i^s.\rho = \text{resp}$  will only accept if it receives a ciphertext  $\text{conf}$  that decrypts correctly, and  $\text{abort}_{\text{dec}}$  triggers if such a ciphertext decrypts correctly, then the probability of  $\pi_i^s$  reaching an accept state is 0 in the final game, and the adversary cannot force a session  $\pi_i^s$  to accept without a contributive keyshare partner  $\pi_j^t$ . **Game 0** This is a standard eCK-PFS-PSK game. Thus we have:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{pqVG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_2}(\lambda) = \Pr(\text{break}_0)$$

**Game 1** In this game, we guess the index  $(i, s)$  of the session  $\pi_i^s$ , and abort if during the execution of the experiment, a query  $\text{Test}(i^*, s^*)$  is received and  $(i^*, s^*) \neq (i, s)$ . Thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_0) \leq n_P n_S \cdot \Pr(\text{break}_1)$$

**Game 2** In this game, we guess the party of the intended partner of the test session  $\pi_i^s$ , and abort if  $\pi_i^s.pid \neq j$ . Thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_1) \leq n_P \cdot \Pr(\text{break}_2)$$

**Game 3** In this game, we abort if the session  $\pi_i^s$  sets the status  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{reject}$ . Note that by **Game 1** we abort if the Test query is ever issued to a session that is not  $\pi_i^s$ . If the session  $\pi_i^s$  ever reaches the status  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{reject}$ , then the  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  query will be rejected by the challenger as specified in Figure 1. Note that the difference between the adversary’s advantage in **Game 2** and **Game 3** is 0 as the sampling of the test bit  $b$  by the challenger only affects the response to the  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  query, which is always rejected if  $\pi_i^s.\alpha = \text{reject}$ . Thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_2) = \Pr(\text{break}_3)$$

**Game 4** In this game we define an abort event  $\text{abort}_{\text{accept}}$  that triggers if the status of the test session  $\pi_i^s \leftarrow \text{accept}$ . It is clear then that

$$\Pr(\text{break}_3) \leq \Pr(\text{abort}_{\text{accept}}) + \Pr(\text{break}_4)$$

and additionally that  $\Pr(\text{break}_4) = 1/2$ , since all responses to the adversary are identical regardless of the sampling of the test bit  $b$ . In the following sequence of games, we show that the probability of the abort event triggering (i.e.  $\Pr(\text{abort}_{\text{accept}})$ ) is negligibly close to zero.

**Game 5** In this game we replace the computation of  $C_8$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\tilde{C}_8$ . This works very similar to **Game 5** of **Case 1** and mostly changes labels. For the same reason as back then, we also split this game into three subhybrids numbered 5a, 5b and 5c.

In **Game 5a** we replace the value  $\hat{r} := \text{KDF}(\sigma_r, r_r)$  passed to  $\text{CCAEM.Enc}$  for the computation of  $\text{ct1}$  and  $\text{shk1}$  with a random bitstring  $\hat{r}'$ .

By the definition of this case, we know that at least one of  $r_r$  and  $\sigma_r$  is random and uncorrupted.

In the first case ( $r_r$  is unknown to the adversary), we initialize a  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger, query  $\sigma_r$ , and use the output  $\tilde{r}$  from the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger to replace the computation of  $\hat{r}$ . By the definition of this case  $r_r$  is a uniformly random and independent value, therefore this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 0, then  $\hat{r} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\sigma_r, r_r)$  and we are in **Game 4**. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 1, then  $\hat{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is a truly random value and we are in **Game 5a**.

For the second case we first establish that  $r_r$ , while being (potentially) known to the adversary is still fresh in the sense that  $\text{KDF}(\sigma_r, r_r)$  has never been evaluated: Since  $r_r$  is a random value, there is a chance that it could be sampled in another session. This probability can be upper-bounded by the total number of sessions divided by the number of possible values, namely  $\frac{n_S}{2^\lambda}$  (which when multiplied by the number of sessions results in the famous approximation of the birthday-bound  $\frac{n_S^2}{2^\lambda}$ ).

Given that, we initialize a  $\text{prf}$  challenger and replace all computations of  $\text{KDF}(\sigma_r, \cdot)$  with queries to the challenger. By the definition of this case  $\sigma_r$  is a uniformly random and independent value, therefore this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 0, then  $\hat{r} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\sigma_r, r_r)$  and we are in **Game 4**. If the test bit

sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 1, then  $\hat{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is a truly random value. Since we established furthermore that  $r_r$  is not used with  $\sigma_r$  in any other session,  $\hat{r}$  is furthermore independent of all other  $\hat{r}$  in other sessions, therefore we are in **Game 5a**.

Thus any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the  $\text{prf}$  security or the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  security of KDF, and we find:

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr(\text{abort}_{\text{accept}}) \\ & \leq \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{5a}) \end{aligned}$$

In **Game 5b** we replace the computation of  $\text{shk3}$  by sampling the value uniformly at random from the space of shared secrets of the KEM and ignoring the second output of  $\text{CCAEM.Enc}(\text{spk}_r)$ . To show that this is undetectable under the IND-CCA assumption of the used KEM, we interact with an IND-CCA challenger in the following way: Note that by **Game 2**, we know at the beginning of the experiment the index of session  $\pi_i^s$  such that  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  is issued by the adversary. Similarly, by **Game 3**, we know at the beginning of the experiment the index of the intended partner  $P_j$  of the session  $\pi_i^s$ . Thus, we initialize an IND-CCA challenger and use the received public-key  $\text{pk}^*$  as long-term public-key of party  $P_j$  and give it with all other (honestly generated) public keys to the adversary. Note that by **Game 4** and the definition of this case,  $\mathcal{A}$  is not able to issue a  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$  query, as we abort if  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{reject}$  and abort if  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{accept}$ . Thus we will not need to reveal the private key  $\text{sk}^*$  of the challenge public-key to  $\mathcal{A}$ . However we must account for all sessions  $t$  such that  $\pi_j^t$  must use the private key for computations. In our version of WireGuard, the long-term private keys are used to compute the following:

- In sessions where  $P_j$  acts as the initiator:  
 $C_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_6, \text{CCAEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_i, \text{ct3}))$
- In sessions where  $P_j$  acts as the responder:  
 $C_3, \kappa_3 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_2, \text{CCAEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{ct1}))$

(Note that these are fewer cases than in the original proof because we don’t combine static and ephemeral keys directly.) Dealing with the challenger’s computation of these values will be done in two ways:

- The encapsulation was created by another honest party. The challenger can then use its own internal knowledge of the encapsulated value to complete the computations.
- The encapsulation was not created by another honest party, but by the adversary and the challenger is therefore unaware of the encapsulated value.

In the second case, the challenger can instead use the decapsulation-oracle provided by the CCA-challenger, specifically querying  $\text{CCAEM.Dec}(\text{ctX})$ , (where  $\text{ctX}$  is the relevant encapsulation) which will output  $\text{shkX}$  using the CCA challenger’s internal knowledge of  $\text{sk}^*$ .

During session  $i$  we request a challenge consisting of a ciphertext and a candidate shared secret ( $c^*, k^*$ ) from the IND-CCA challenger and use those values in place of  $\text{ct3}$

and `shk3`. Given the definition of the IND-CCA game, there are two cases:

- If the test bit sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 0, then  $k^*$  is indeed the shared secret encapsulated in  $c^*$  and we are in **Game 5a**.
- If the test bit sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 1, then  $k^*$  is not the shared secret encapsulated in  $c^*$  but sampled uniformly at random from the space of shared secrets and we are in **Game 5b**.

Thus, any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the IND-CCA security of the used KEM and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{5a}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{5b})$$

In **Game 5c** we replace the values of  $C_8$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_8 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  (where  $\{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is the output space of the KDF) used in the protocol execution of the test session. Specifically, we initialize a  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger and query `shk3`, and use the output  $\widetilde{C}_8$  from the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger to replace the computation of  $C_8$ . Since by **Game 5b**, `shk3` is a uniformly random and independent value, this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_7, \text{shk3})$  and we are in **Game 5b**. If the test bit sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_8 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 5c**.

Thus any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  security of KDF, and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{5b}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{5c})$$

**Game 6** In this game we replace the values  $C_9, \text{tmp}, \kappa_9$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_9, \widetilde{\text{tmp}}, \widetilde{\kappa}_9 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  (where  $\{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is the output space of KDF) used in the protocol execution of the test session. Specifically, we initialize a PRF challenger and issue the challenge  $\text{psk}$  to it, and use the output  $\widetilde{C}_9, \widetilde{\text{tmp}}, \widetilde{\kappa}_9$  from the PRF challenger to replace the computation of  $C_9, \text{tmp}, \kappa_9$ . Since by **Game 5c**,  $C_8$  is a uniformly random and independent value, this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_9, \widetilde{\text{tmp}}, \widetilde{\kappa}_9 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_8, \text{psk})$  and we are in **Game 5c**. If the test bit sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_9, \widetilde{\text{tmp}}, \widetilde{\kappa}_9 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 6**. Thus any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the PRF assumption, and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{5c}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_6)$$

**Game 7** In this game we replace the values  $C_{10}, \kappa_{10} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_9, \emptyset)$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_{10}, \widetilde{\kappa}_{10} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  (where  $\{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is the output space of the KDF) used in the protocol execution of the test session. Specifically, we initialize a PRF challenger and issue the challenge query  $\emptyset$  to it, and use the output  $\widetilde{C}_{10}, \widetilde{\kappa}_{10}$  from the

prf challenger to replace the computation of  $C_{10}, \kappa_{10}$ . Since by **Game 6**,  $\widetilde{C}_9$  is a uniformly random and independent value, this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the PRF challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_{10}, \widetilde{\kappa}_{10} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_9, \emptyset)$  and we are in **Game 6**. If the test bit sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_{10}, \widetilde{\kappa}_{10} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 7**. Thus any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the prf assumption, and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_6) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_7)$$

**Game 8** In this game, we add an abort event  $\text{abort}_{\text{decrypt}}$  that triggers if the test session  $\pi_i^s$  receives a ciphertext `conf` in the `SenderConf` message that decrypts correctly. Since the test session  $\pi_i^s$  will only reach an accept status if `conf` decrypts correctly, it follows that

$$\Pr(\text{break}_7) \leq \Pr(\text{abort}_{\text{decrypt}}).$$

Now we show that the probability of  $\text{abort}_{\text{decrypt}}$  is negligibly close to zero. We do so by initializing an aead-auth challenger to decrypt `SenderConf.conf` ciphertexts in the test session  $\pi_i^s$ . We note that by **Game 7** that  $\widetilde{\kappa}_9$  is a uniformly random and independent value, and since the aead challenger samples the internal aead key from the same distribution thus this change is undetectable. If  $\pi_i^s$  receives a ciphertext `conf` in the `SenderConf` message that decrypts correctly and the aead encryption oracle has not been queried, then it follows that this ciphertext `conf` is a forged ciphertext, breaking the auth security of the AEAD scheme. Thus, we find that:

$$\Pr(\text{abort}_{\text{decrypt}}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{auth-aead}}(\lambda).$$

Thus we find that the probability of  $\mathcal{A}$  in causing a session  $\pi_i^s$  with  $\rho = \text{resp}$  to reach  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{accept}$  and triggering  $\text{break}_{\text{accept}}$  to be:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\text{abort}_{\text{accept}}) &\leq \left( \frac{n_S}{2\lambda} + \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \right) \\ &\quad + 3 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ &\quad + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \\ &\quad + \text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{auth-aead}}(\lambda). \end{aligned}$$

We can finally show that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_2}(\lambda) &\leq n_P^2 n_S \left( \frac{n_S}{2\lambda} + \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \right) \\ &\quad + 3 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ &\quad + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \\ &\quad + \text{Adv}_{\text{AEAD}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{auth-aead}}(\lambda). \end{aligned}$$

3) *Case 3: Test session with contributive keyshare partner:* By the case definition and the definition of the cleanness predicate  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  there are five ways that the cleanness



predicate could potentially be upheld<sup>5</sup>:  $\mathcal{A}$  has issued  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  where  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}(\pi_i^s)$  is upheld and has a contributive keyshare session  $\pi_j^t$  and either:

- 1) A pre-shared key exists between party  $P_i$  and the test session's intended partner, and  $\mathcal{A}$  did not issue  $\text{CorruptPSK}(i, j)$ , or  $\text{CorruptPSK}(j, i)$ . We denote with  $\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.1}}(\lambda)$  the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  in winning in this case and refer to this as the *pre-shared subcase*.
- 2)  $\mathcal{A}$  did not issue  $\text{CorruptEPK}(i, s)$  or  $\text{CorruptEPK}(j, t)$ . We denote with  $\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.2}}(\lambda)$  the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  and refer to this as the *ephemerals subcase*.
- 3)  $\mathcal{A}$  did not issue  $\text{CorruptEPK}(i, s)$  or  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$ . We denote with  $\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.3}}(\lambda)$  the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  and refer to this as the *ephemeral/long-term subcase*.
- 4)  $\mathcal{A}$  did not issue  $\text{CorruptASK}(i)$  or  $\text{CorruptEPK}(j, t)$ . We denote with  $\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.4}}(\lambda)$  the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  and refer to this as the *long-term/ephemeral subcase*.
- 5)  $\mathcal{A}$  did not issue  $\text{CorruptASK}(i)$  or  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$ . We denote with  $\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.5}}(\lambda)$  the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  and refer to this as the *long-terms subcase*.

Since at least one of these subcases must apply, then:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_3}(\lambda) = \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.1}}(\lambda), \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.2}}(\lambda), \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.3}}(\lambda), \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.4}}(\lambda), \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.5}}(\lambda) \end{array} \right\}$$

We now turn to bounding the advantage of the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  in each of the subcases, and show that if the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  in each subcase is negligible, then so too is the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  in Case 3.

*Case 3.1: The Preshared Subcase:* In this subcase we assume that the cleanness predicate is upheld such that a pre-shared secret between the test session and its honest contributive keyshare session exists, and has not been corrupted. Due to the definition of Case 3, we know that such an honest contributive keyshare session exists. In what follows, we show that the probability of  $\mathcal{A}$  in winning the key-indistinguishability game is negligible.

*a) Proof sketch:* We begin by guessing the index of the test session, and add an abort event that occurs if a Test query is directed to a session that does not have the index of the guessed session, and similarly, guess the index of the contributive keyshare partner. We then replace the value of  $C_9, tmp, \kappa_9$  with uniformly random values  $\widetilde{C}_9, \widetilde{tmp}, \widetilde{\kappa}_9$ , and note that by the subcase definition and the  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$ , that the adversary cannot issue either a  $\text{CorruptPSK}(i, j)$  or  $\text{CorruptPSK}(j, i)$  query. Since the  $psk$  shared between the two parties is a uniformly random and independent value, we argue that any adversary capable of distinguishing this replacement would be able to break the PRF assumption. In a similar fashion, we replace the values  $C_{10}, \kappa_{10}$  with uniformly

<sup>5</sup>Note that we do not make explicit in each condition that  $\mathcal{A}$  has not issued either a  $\text{Reveal}(i, s)$  or  $\text{Reveal}(j, t)$  query

random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_{10}, \widetilde{\kappa}_{10}$ , and argue that since  $\widetilde{C}_9$  was already independent from the protocol execution that this replacement was sound and that any adversary capable of distinguishing this change would be able to be turned into an adversary against PRF security. In the final game and with a similar argument, we replace  $tk_i, tk_r$  with uniformly random and independent values, based on the PRF security of KDF. Since the session keys are now uniformly random and independent of the test bit  $b$  sampled by the challenger, the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  against the eCK-PFS-PSK-security of the modified WireGuard protocol in the pre-shared key subcase is negligible. **Game 0** This is a standard eCK-PFS-PSK with cleanness predicate  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  upheld as in Definition 5. Thus

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.1}}(\lambda) = \Pr(\text{break}_0).$$

**Game 1** In this game, we guess the index  $(i, s)$  of the Test session  $\pi_i^s$  and abort if, during the experiment, a query  $\text{Test}(i^*, s^*)$  is issued such that  $(i^*, s^*) \neq (i, s)$ . Thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_0) \leq n_P n_S \cdot \Pr(\text{break}_1).$$

**Game 2** In this game, we guess the index  $(j, t)$  of the contributive keyshare session  $\pi_j^t$  (which exists by the Case 3 definition) and abort if during the experiment, a query  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  is issued when the contributive keyshare session  $\pi_{t^*}^{j^*}$  exists such that  $(j^*, t^*) \neq (j, t)$ . Thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_1) \leq n_P n_S \cdot \Pr(\text{break}_2).$$

**Game 3** In this game, we replace the computation of  $C_9, tmp, \kappa_9$  with uniformly random values  $\widetilde{C}_9, \widetilde{tmp}, \widetilde{\kappa}_9$  in the execution of session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_9, tmp, \kappa_9 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_8, psk)$  we instead initialize a  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger and query  $C_8$ . We note that by the cleanness predicate and the preconditions of this subcase that  $psk$  is a uniformly random value that will not be revealed by  $\mathcal{A}$  through a  $\text{CorruptPSK}(i, j)$  query, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 2**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 3**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  security of KDF and thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_2) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_3).$$

**Game 4** Similarly to the previous game, we replace the computation of  $C_{10}$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_{10}$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_{10} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_9, \emptyset)$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with the empty string  $\emptyset$ . We note that by **Game 3** that  $C_9$  is a uniformly random value independent from the protocol execution, and as such the replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0,

then we are in **Game 3**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 4**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF, and thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_3) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{prf}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_4).$$

**Game 5** As in previous games, we replace the values  $tk_i, tk_r \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_{10}, \emptyset)$  computed by the challenger in the execution of the test session and its honest contributive keyshare session partner  $\pi_j^t$  with uniformly random values  $\widetilde{tk}_i, \widetilde{tk}_r$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $tk_i, tk_r$  in the appropriate sessions, we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with the empty string  $\emptyset$ . We note that by **Game 4** that  $\widetilde{C}_{10}$  is a uniformly random value independent from the protocol execution, and as such the replacement is sound. If the random bit sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 4**, but otherwise the output of the prf challenger  $\widetilde{tk}_i, \widetilde{tk}_r$  is uniformly random and independent and we are in **Game 5**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF, and thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_4) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_5).$$

Since the response to the  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  query is (in **Game 5**) uniformly random and independent regardless of the value of the test bit  $b$ , then the adversary's success in winning the key-indistinguishability game is reduced to simply guessing and thus:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.1}}(\lambda) \leq n_P^2 n_S^2 \left( \begin{array}{l} 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \end{array} \right).$$

*Case 3.2: The Ephemerals Subcase:* In this subcase we know that (by the definition of  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  and the subcase preconditions) that the session  $\pi_i^s$  such that the  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  session will be queried has an honest contributive keyshare session  $\pi_j^t$  and that  $\text{CorruptEPK}(i, s)$  and  $\text{CorruptEPK}(j, t)$  queries have not been issued during the execution of the experiment. We now show that in this subcase, the adversary's probability in winning the key-indistinguishability game is negligible.

**Game 0** This is a standard eCK-PFS-PSK game with cleanness predicate  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  upheld. Thus we have

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}(\lambda) = \Pr(\text{break}_0).$$

**Game 1** In this game, we guess the index  $(i, s)$  of the  $\text{Test}$  session  $\pi_i^s$  and abort if, during the experiment, a query  $\text{Test}(i^*, s^*)$  is issued such that  $(i^*, s^*) \neq (i, s)$ . Thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_0) \leq n_P n_S \cdot \Pr(\text{break}_1).$$

**Game 2** In this game, we guess the index  $(j, t)$  of the honest partner session  $\pi_j^t$  (which we know exists by the Case

3 definition) and abort if, during the experiment, a query  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  is issued if the contributive keyshare session  $\pi_{t^*}^{j^*}$  exists such that  $(j^*, t^*) \neq (i, s)$ . Thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_1) \leq n_P n_S \cdot \Pr(\text{break}_2).$$

**Game 3** is somewhat special in that both ephemeral keys are assumed to be uncorrupted. In the original version this meant that only the DDH-assumption was necessary, whereas our version is fine with an IND-CPA-secure KEM. We again follow the original proof as closely as possible:

In this game, we replace the value  $\text{ct}2$  computed in the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its honest contributive keyshare session with a random element from the same key space. Note that since the initiator session and the responder session both get key confirmation messages that include derivations based on the encapsulated shared key, both know that the key was received by the other session without modification. We explicitly interact with an IND-CPA challenger, and replace the ephemeral  $\text{epk}_i$  and  $\text{ct}2$  values sent in the InitiatorHello and ResponderHello messages with the challenge public-key and ciphertext from the IND-CPA challenger. We only require the encapsulated key in one computation (as opposed to three in the original proof):

- $C_7 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(c_2, \text{shk}2)$

Here we can replace  $\text{shk}2$  with the supposed shared key  $k^*$  from the IND-CPA-challenger. When the test bit sampled by the IND-CPA challenger is 0, then  $k^*$  is the actually encapsulated shared key and we are in **Game 2**. When the test bit sampled by the IND-CPA challenger is 1, then  $k^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}_{\text{CPAKEM}}$  and we are in **Game 3**. Any adversary that can detect that change can be turned into an adversary against the IND-CPA problem and thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_2) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{CPAKEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_3).$$

**Game 4** In this game, we replace the computation of  $C_7$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_7$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_7 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_6, \text{shk}2)$  we instead initialize a KDF challenger and query it with  $C_6$ . We note that by **Game 3** that  $\text{shk}2$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_7 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_6, \text{shk}2)$  and we are in **Game 3**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_7 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 4**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF and thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_3) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_4).$$

**Game 5** Similarly to the previous game, we replace the computation of  $C_8$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_8$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test

session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_7, \text{shk3})$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with  $\text{shk3}$ . We note that by **Game 4** that  $\widetilde{C}_7$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then  $C_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_7, \text{shk3})$  and we are in **Game 4**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_8 \xleftarrow{s} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 5**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF, and thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_4) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_5).$$

**Game 6** As in previous games, we replace the computation of  $C_9, \text{tmp}, \kappa_9$  with uniformly random values  $\widetilde{C}_9, \widetilde{\text{tmp}}, \widetilde{\kappa}_9$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_9, \text{tmp}, \kappa_9 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_8, \text{psk})$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with  $\text{psk}$ . We note that by **Game 5** that  $\widetilde{C}_8$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 5**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 6**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF, and thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_5) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_6).$$

**Game 7** As in previous games, we replace the computation of  $C_{10}$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_{10}$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_{10} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_9, \emptyset)$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with the empty string  $\emptyset$ . We note that by **Game 6** that  $C_9$  is a uniformly random value independent from the protocol execution, and as such the replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 6**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 7**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF, and thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_6) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_7)$$

**Game 8** As in previous games, we replace the values  $tk_i, tk_r \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_{10}, \emptyset)$  computed by the challenger in the execution of the test session and its honest contributive keyshare session partner  $\pi_j^t$  with uniformly random values  $\widetilde{tk}_i, \widetilde{tk}_r$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $tk_i, tk_r$  in the appropriate sessions, we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with the empty string  $\emptyset$ . We note that by **Game 4** that  $\widetilde{C}_{10}$  is a uniformly random value independent from the

protocol execution, and as such the replacement is sound. If the random bit sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 7**, but otherwise the output of the prf challenger  $\widetilde{tk}_i, \widetilde{tk}_r$  is uniformly random and independent and we are in **Game 8**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF, and thus

$$\Pr(\text{break}_7) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_8)$$

Since the response to the  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  query issued by the adversary is, in **Game 8**, uniformly random and independent of the test bit  $b$  sampled by the challenger, then the adversary's success in winning the key-indistinguishability game is reduced to simply guessing and thus:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.2}}(\lambda) &\leq n_P^2 n_S^2 \left( \text{Adv}_{\text{CPAKEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prfswap}}(\lambda) \right) \end{aligned}$$

*Case 3.3: The Ephemeral/Long-term Subcase:* In this subcase we know that (by the definition of  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  and the subcase preconditions) that the session  $\pi_i^s$  such that the  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  session will be queried has an honest contributive keyshare session  $\pi_j^t$  and that  $\text{CorruptEPK}(i, s)$  and  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$  queries have not been issued during the execution of the experiment. Note that in our proof we set that the test session has role `init` and the partner session has role `resp`, but the case where the test session has role `resp` and the partner session has role `init` follows analogously. In what follows, we show that in this subcase, the adversary's probability in winning the key-indistinguishability game is negligible under certain security assumptions. **Game 0** This is a standard  $\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}$  game with cleanliness predicate  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  upheld. Thus we have:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}(\lambda) = \Pr(\text{break}_0)$$

**Game 1** In this game, we guess the index  $(i, s)$  of the  $\text{Test}$  session  $\pi_i^s$  and abort if, during the experiment, a query  $\text{Test}(i^*, s^*)$  is issued such that  $(i^*, s^*) \neq (i, s)$ . Thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_0) \leq n_P n_S \cdot (\Pr(\text{break}_1))$$

**Game 2** In this game, we guess the index  $(j, t)$  of the honest partner session  $\pi_j^t$  (which we know exists by the Case 3 definition) and abort if, during the experiment, a query  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  is issued if the contributive keyshare session  $\pi_{t^*}^{j^*}$  exists such that  $(j^*, t^*) \neq (j, t)$ . Thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_1) \leq n_P n_S \cdot (\Pr(\text{break}_2))$$

**Game 3** In this game we replace the computation of  $C_3, \kappa_3$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3$ . This is practically identical to the **Game 5** of case1, including the subhybrids.

In **Game 3a** we replace the value  $\hat{r} := \text{KDF}(\sigma_i, r_i)$  passed to  $\text{CCAEM}.Enc$  for the computation of `ct1` and `shk1` with a random bitstring  $\hat{r}'$ .

To show that this replacement is sound, we replace the value of  $\hat{r}$  with a uniformly random and independent value  $\hat{r}' \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  used in the protocol execution of the test session. Specifically, we initialize a  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger and query  $\sigma_i$ , and use the output  $\tilde{r}$  from the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger to replace the computation of  $\hat{r}$ . By the definition of this case  $r_i$  is a uniformly random and independent value, therefore this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 0, then  $\hat{r} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\sigma_i, r_i)$  and we are in **Game 2**. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 1, then  $\hat{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is a truly random value and we are in **Game 3a**.

Thus any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  security of KDF, and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_2) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{3a})$$

In **Game 3b** we replace the computation of  $\text{shk1}$  by sampling the value uniformly at random from the space of shared secrets of the KEM and ignoring the second output of  $\text{CCAEM}.\text{Enc}(\text{spk}_r)$ . To show that this is undetectable under the IND-CCA-assumption of the used KEM, we interact with an IND-CCA challenger in the following way: Note that by **Game 2**, we know at the beginning of the experiment the index of session  $\pi_i^s$  such that  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  is issued by the adversary. Similarly, by **Game 1**, we know at the beginning of the experiment the index of the intended partner  $P_j$  of the session  $\pi_i^s$ . Thus, we initialize an IND-CCA challenger and use the received public-key  $\text{pk}^*$  as long-term public-key of party  $P_j$  and give it with all other (honestly generated) public keys to the adversary. Note that by the definition of this case,  $\mathcal{A}$  is not able to issue a  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$  query, as we abort if  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{reject}$  and abort if  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{accept}$ . Thus we will not need to reveal the private key  $\text{sk}^*$  of the challenge public-key to  $\mathcal{A}$ . However we must account for all sessions  $t$  such that  $\pi_j^t$  must use the private key for computations. In our version of WireGuard, the long-term private keys are used to compute the following:

- In sessions where  $P_j$  acts as the initiator:  
 $C_3 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_6, \text{CCAEM}.\text{Dec}(\text{ssk}_i, \text{ct3}))$
- In sessions where  $P_j$  acts as the responder:  
 $C_3, \kappa_3 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_2, \text{CCAEM}.\text{Dec}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{ct1}))$

(Note that these are fewer cases than in the original proof because we don't combine static and ephemeral keys directly.) Dealing with the challenger's computation of these values will be done in two ways:

- The encapsulation was created by another honest party. The challenger can then use its own internal knowledge of the encapsulated value to complete the computations.
- The encapsulation was not created by another honest party, but by the adversary and the challenger is therefore unaware of the encapsulated value.

In the second case, the challenger can instead use the decapsulation-oracle provided by the CCA-challenger, specifically querying  $\text{CCAEM}.\text{Dec}(\text{ctX})$ , (where  $\text{ctX}$  is the rele-

vant encapsulation) which will output  $\text{shkX}$  using the CCA challenger's internal knowledge of  $\text{sk}^*$ .

During session  $i$  we request a challenge consisting of a ciphertext and a candidate shared secret  $(c^*, k^*)$  from the IND-CCA challenger and use those values in place of  $\text{ct1}$  and  $\text{shk1}$ . Given the definition of the IND-CCA game, there are two cases:

- If the test bit sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 0, then  $k^*$  is indeed the shared secret encapsulated in  $c^*$  and we are in **Game 3a**.
- If the test bit sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 1, then  $k^*$  is not the shared secret encapsulated in  $c^*$  but sampled uniformly at random from the space of shared secrets and we are in **Game 3b**.

Thus, any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the IND-CCA security of the used KEM and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{3a}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{3b})$$

In **Game 3c** we replace the values of  $C_3, \kappa_3$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  (where  $\{0,1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is the output space of the KDF) used in the protocol execution of the test session. Specifically, we initialize a  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger and query  $\text{shk1}$ , and use the output  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3$  from the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger to replace the computation of  $C_3, \kappa_3$ . Since by **Game 3b**,  $\text{shk1}$  is a uniformly random and independent value, this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_2, \text{shk1})$  and we are in **Game 3b**. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 3c**.

Thus any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  security of KDF, and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{3b}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{3c})$$

**Game 4** In this game, we replace the computation of  $C_4, \kappa_4$  with uniformly random values  $\widetilde{C}_4, \widetilde{\kappa}_4$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a  $\text{prf}$  challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_4, \kappa_4 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_3, \text{psk})$  we instead initialize a  $\text{prf}$  challenger and query it with  $\text{psk}$ . We note that by **Game 3c** that  $\widetilde{C}_3$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 3c**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 4**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the  $\text{prf}$  security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{3c}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_4)$$

**Game 5** In this game, we replace the computation of  $C_6$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_6$  from the same distribution,

in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_6 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_4, \text{ct2})$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with  $\text{ct2}$ . We note that by **Game 4** that  $\widetilde{C}_4$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 4**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 5**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_4) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_5)$$

**Game 6** In this game, we replace the computation of  $C_7$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_7$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_7 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_6, \text{shk2})$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with  $\text{shk2}$ . We note that by **Game 5** that  $\widetilde{C}_6$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_7 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_6, \text{shk2})$  and we are in **Game 5**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_7 \xleftarrow{s} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 6**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_5) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_6)$$

**Game 7** Similarly to the previous game, we replace the computation of  $C_8$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_8$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_7, \text{shk3})$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with  $\text{shk3}$ . We note that by **Game 6** that  $\widetilde{C}_7$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then  $C_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_7, \text{shk3})$  and we are in **Game 6**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_8 \xleftarrow{s} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 7**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_6) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_7)$$

**Game 8** In this game, we replace the computation of  $C_9, \text{tmp}, \kappa_9$  with uniformly random values  $\widetilde{C}_9, \text{tmp}, \widetilde{\kappa}_9$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_9, \text{tmp}, \kappa_9 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_8, \text{psk})$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with  $\text{psk}$ . We note that by **Game 7**

that  $\widetilde{C}_8$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 7**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 8**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_7) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_8)$$

**Game 9** Similarly to the previous game, we replace the computation of  $C_{10}$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_{10}$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_{10} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_9, \emptyset)$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with the empty string  $\emptyset$ . We note that by **Game 8** that  $\widetilde{C}_9$  is a uniformly random value independent from the protocol execution, and as such the replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 8**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 9**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_8) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_9)$$

**Game 10** Similarly to the previous games, we replace the values  $tk_i, tk_r \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_{10}, \emptyset)$  computed by the challenger in the execution of the test session and its honest contributive keyshare session partner  $\pi_j^t$  with uniformly random values  $\widetilde{tk}_i, \widetilde{tk}_r$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $tk_i, tk_r$  in the appropriate sessions, we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with the empty string  $\emptyset$ . We note that by **Game 9** that  $\widetilde{C}_{10}$  is a uniformly random value independent from the protocol execution, and as such the replacement is sound. If the random bit sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 9**, but otherwise the output of the prf challenger  $\widetilde{tk}_i, \widetilde{tk}_r$  is uniformly random and independent and we are in **Game 10**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_9) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{10})$$

Since the response to the  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  query issued by the adversary is, in **Game 10**, uniformly random and independent of the test bit  $b$  sampled by the challenger, then the adversary's success in winning the key-indistinguishability game is reduced to simply guessing and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{10}) = 1/2$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.3}}(\lambda) &\leq n_P^2 n_S^2 \left( \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEYEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + 7 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \right) \end{aligned}$$

*Case 3.4: The Long-term/Ephemeral Subcase:* In this subcase we know that (by the definition of the cleanness predicate  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  and the subcase preconditions) that the session  $\pi_i^s$  such that the  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  session will be queried has an honest contributive keyshare session  $\pi_j^t$  and that  $\text{CorruptASK}(i)$  and  $\text{CorruptEPK}(j, t)$  queries have not been issued during the execution of the experiment. Note that in our proof we set that the test session has role `init` and the partner session has role `resp`, but the case where the test session has role `resp` and the partner session has role `init` follows analogously. In what follows, we show that in this subcase, the adversary's probability in winning the key-indistinguishability game is negligible under certain security assumptions. **Game 0** This is a standard eCK-PFS-PSK game with cleanness predicate  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  upheld. Thus we have:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}(\lambda) = \Pr(\text{break}_0)$$

**Game 1** In this game, we guess the index  $(i, s)$  of the  $\text{Test}$  session  $\pi_i^s$  and abort if, during the experiment, a query  $\text{Test}(i^*, s^*)$  is issued such that  $(i^*, s^*) \neq (i, s)$ . Thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_0) \leq n_P n_S \cdot (\Pr(\text{break}_1))$$

**Game 2** In this game, we guess the index  $(j, t)$  of the honest partner session  $\pi_j^t$  (which we know exists by the Case 3 definition) and abort if, during the experiment, a query  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  is issued if the contributive keyshare session  $\pi_{t^*}^{j^*}$  exists such that  $(j^*, t^*) \neq (j, t)$ . Thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_1) \leq n_P n_S \cdot (\Pr(\text{break}_2))$$

**Game 3** In this game we replace the computation of  $C_8$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\tilde{C}_8$ . This works almost identical to **Game 5** of **Case 2** and mostly changes labels.

In **Game 3a** we replace the value  $\hat{r} := \text{KDF}(\sigma_r, r_r)$  passed to  $\text{CCAKEYEM.Enc}$  for the computation of `ct1` and `shk1` with a random bitstring  $\hat{r}'$ .

To show that this replacement is sound, we replace the value of  $\hat{r}$  with a uniformly random and independent value  $\hat{r}' \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  used in the protocol execution of the test session. Specifically, we initialize a  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger and query  $\sigma_i$ , and use the output  $\tilde{r}$  from the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger to replace the computation of  $\hat{r}$ . By the definition of this case  $r_r$  is a uniformly random and independent value, therefore this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 0, then  $\hat{r} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\sigma_r, r_r)$  and we are in **Game 2**. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 1, then  $\hat{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is a truly random value and we are in **Game 3a**.

Thus any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  security of KDF, and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_2) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{3a})$$

In **Game 3b** we replace the computation of `shk3` by sampling the value uniformly at random from the space of shared secrets of the KEM and ignoring the second output of  $\text{CCAKEYEM.Enc}(\text{spk}_r)$ . To show that this is undetectable under the IND-CCA-assumption of the used KEM, we interact with an IND-CCA challenger in the following way: Note that by **Game 2**, we know at the beginning of the experiment the index of session  $\pi_i^s$  such that  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  is issued by the adversary. Similarly, by **Game 1**, we know at the beginning of the experiment the index of the intended partner  $P_j$  of the session  $\pi_i^s$ . Thus, we initialize an IND-CCA challenger and use the received public-key  $\text{pk}^*$  as long-term public-key of party  $P_j$  and give it with all other (honestly generated) public keys to the adversary. Note that by the definition of this case,  $\mathcal{A}$  is not able to issue a  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$  query, as we abort if  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{reject}$  and abort if  $\pi_i^s.\alpha \leftarrow \text{accept}$ . Thus we will not need to reveal the private key  $\text{sk}^*$  of the challenge public-key to  $\mathcal{A}$ . However we must account for all sessions  $t$  such that  $\pi_j^t$  must use the private key for computations. In our version of WireGuard, the long-term private keys are used to compute the following:

- In sessions where  $P_j$  acts as the initiator:  
 $C_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_6, \text{CCAKEYEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_i, \text{ct3}))$
- In sessions where  $P_j$  acts as the responder:  
 $C_3, \kappa_3 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_2, \text{CCAKEYEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{ct1}))$

(Note that these are fewer cases than in the original proof because we don't combine static and ephemeral keys directly.) Dealing with the challenger's computation of these values will be done in two ways:

- The encapsulation was created by another honest party. The challenger can then use its own internal knowledge of the encapsulated value to complete the computations.
- The encapsulation was not created by another honest party, but by the adversary and the challenger is therefore unaware of the encapsulated value.

In the second case, the challenger can instead use the decapsulation-oracle provided by the CCA-challenger, specifically querying  $\text{CCAKEYEM.Dec}(\text{ctX})$ , (where `ctX` is the relevant encapsulation) which will output `shkX` using the CCA challenger's internal knowledge of  $\text{sk}^*$ .

During session  $i$  we request a challenge consisting of a ciphertext and a candidate shared secret  $(c^*, k^*)$  from the IND-CCA challenger and use those values in place of `ct3` and `shk3`. Given the definition of the IND-CCA game, there are two cases:

- If the test bit sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 0, then  $k^*$  is indeed the shared secret encapsulated in  $c^*$  and we are in **Game 3a**.
- If the test bit sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 1, then  $k^*$  is not the shared secret encapsulated in  $c^*$  but

sampled uniformly at random from the space of shared secrets and we are in **Game 3b**.

Thus, any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the IND-CCA security of the used KEM and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{3a}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{CCA}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{3b})$$

In **Game 3c** we replace the values of  $C_8$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_8 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  (where  $\{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is the output space of the KDF) used in the protocol execution of the test session. Specifically, we initialize a  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger and query  $\text{shk}_3$ , and use the output  $\widetilde{C}_8$  from the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger to replace the computation of  $C_8$ . Since by **Game 3b**,  $\text{shk}_3$  is a uniformly random and independent value, this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_7, \text{shk}_3)$  and we are in **Game 3b**. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_8 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 3c**.

Thus any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  security of KDF, and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{3b}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{3c})$$

**Game 4** In this game, we replace the computation of  $C_9, \text{tmp}, \kappa_9$  with uniformly random values  $\widetilde{C}_9, \widetilde{\text{tmp}}, \widetilde{\kappa}_9$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_9, \text{tmp}, \kappa_9 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_8, \text{psk})$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with  $\text{psk}$ . We note that by **Game 3c** that  $\widetilde{C}_8$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 3c**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 4**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{3c}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_4)$$

**Game 5** Similarly to the previous game, we replace the computation of  $C_{10}$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_{10}$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_{10} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_9, \emptyset)$  we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with the empty string  $\emptyset$ . We note that by **Game 4** that  $\widetilde{C}_9$  is a uniformly random value independent from the protocol execution, and as such the replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 4**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 5**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can

be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_4) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_5)$$

**Game 6** Similarly to the previous games, we replace the values  $tk_i, tk_r \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_{10}, \emptyset)$  computed by the challenger in the execution of the test session and its honest contributive keyshare session partner  $\pi_j^t$  with uniformly random values  $\widetilde{tk}_i, \widetilde{tk}_r$ . We do so by interacting with a prf challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $tk_i, tk_r$  in the appropriate sessions, we instead initialize a prf challenger and query it with the empty string  $\emptyset$ . We note that by **Game 5** that  $\widetilde{C}_{10}$  is a uniformly random value independent from the protocol execution, and as such the replacement is sound. If the random bit sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 5**, but otherwise the output of the prf challenger  $tk_i, tk_r$  is uniformly random and independent and we are in **Game 6**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_5) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_6)$$

Since the response to the  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  query issued by the adversary is, in **Game 6**, uniformly random and independent regardless of the test bit  $b$  sampled by the challenger, then the adversary's success in winning the key-indistinguishability game is reduced to simply guessing and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_6) = 1/2$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.4}}(\lambda) &\leq n_P^2 n_S^2 \left( \text{Adv}_{\text{CCA}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + 3 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \right) \end{aligned}$$

*Case 3.5: The Long-terms Subcase:* In this subcase we know that (by the definition of  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  and the subcase preconditions) that the session  $\pi_i^s$  such that the  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  session will be queried has an honest contributive keyshare session  $\pi_j^t$  and that  $\text{CorruptASK}(i)$  and  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$  queries have not been issued during the execution of the experiment. In what follows, we show that in this subcase, the adversary's probability in winning the key-indistinguishability game is negligible under certain security assumptions. **Game 0** This is a standard eCK-PFS-PSK game with cleanliness predicate  $\text{clean}_{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}$  upheld. Thus we have:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}}(\lambda) = \Pr(\text{break}_0)$$

**Game 1** In this game, we guess the index  $(i, s)$  of the Test session  $\pi_i^s$  and abort if, during the experiment, a query  $\text{Test}(i^*, s^*)$  is issued such that  $(i^*, s^*) \neq (i, s)$ . Thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_0) \leq n_P n_S \cdot (\Pr(\text{break}_1))$$

**Game 2** In this game, we guess the index  $(j, t)$  of the honest partner session  $\pi_j^t$  (which we know exists by the Case

3 definition) and abort if, during the experiment, a query  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  is issued if the contributive keyshare session  $\pi_{i^*}^{j^*}$  exists such that  $(j^*, t^*) \neq (i, s)$ . Thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_1) \leq n_{pn_S} \cdot (\Pr(\text{break}_2))$$

**Game 3** In this game we replace the computation of  $C_3, \kappa_3$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3$ . This is mostly identical to **Game 5** of case1 and **Game 3** of **Case 3.3**, except that the first subhybrid **Game 3a** differs slightly because we have to assume that  $\sigma_i$  is uncorrupted instead of  $r_i$ .

The case is also special because there exists an alternative way to prove it secure: Instead of basing the security on the security of  $\text{shk1}$ , it would also be possible to base it on  $\text{shk3}$ , in which case the proof would resemble those of **Case 2** and **Case 3.4**. For brevity and because there is little to be gained from describing them here in detail as well, we will refrain from doing so.

In **Game 3a** we replace the values  $\hat{r} := \text{KDF}(\sigma_i, r_i)$  passed to  $\text{CCAEM.Enc}$  for the computation of  $\text{ct1}$  and  $\text{shk1}$  with random bitstrings  $\hat{r}'$  in all games of the responder.

We first establish that  $r_i$ , while being (potentially) known to the adversary is still fresh in the sense that  $\text{KDF}(\sigma_i, r_i)$  has never been evaluated: Since  $r_i$  is a random value, there is a chance that it could be sampled in another session. This probability can be upper-bounded by the total number of sessions divided by the number of possible values, namely  $\frac{n_S}{2^\lambda}$  (which when multiplied by the number of sessions results in the famous approximation of the birthday-bound  $\frac{n_S^2}{2^\lambda}$ ).

We do so by interacting with a prf-challenger in the following way: Whenever it is time to compute to compute  $\text{KDF}(\sigma_r, X)$  for some value  $X$ , we instead query the prf-challenger with  $X$  and use the output  $\tilde{r}$  from the prf-challenger to replace the computation of  $\hat{r}$ . By the definition of this case  $\sigma_i$  is a uniformly random and independent value, therefore this replacement is sound.

If the test bit sampled by the prf challenger is 0, then  $\hat{r} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\sigma_i, r_i)$  and we are in **Game 2**. If the test bit sampled by the prf challenger is 1, then  $\hat{r} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is a truly random value. Since we established furthermore that  $r_i$  is not used with  $\sigma_i$  in any other session,  $\hat{r}$  is furthermore independent of all other  $\hat{r}$  in other sessions, therefore we are in **Game 3a**.

Thus any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the prf security of  $\text{KDF}$ , and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_2) \leq \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{3a})$$

Note that this case slightly differs from the previous ones in the same place in that we replace more than just one value with randomness. This is because unlike  $r_i$  and  $r_r$ ,  $\sigma_i$  is used in multiple interactions and thus it becomes necessary to deal with all of them.

In **Game 3b** we replace the computation of  $\text{shk1}$  by sampling the value uniformly at random from the space of shared secrets of the KEM and ignoring the second output

of  $\text{CCAEM.Enc}(\text{spk}_r)$ . To show that this is undetectable under the IND-CCA-assumption of the used KEM, we interact with an IND-CCA challenger in the following way: Note that by **Game 2**, we know at the beginning of the experiment the index of session  $\pi_i^s$  such that  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  is issued by the adversary. Similarly, by **Game 1**, we know at the beginning of the experiment the index of the intended partner  $P_j$  of the session  $\pi_i^s$ . Thus, we initialize an IND-CCA challenger and use the received public-key  $\text{pk}^*$  as long-term public-key of party  $P_j$  and give it with all other (honestly generated) public keys to the adversary. Note that by the definition of this case,  $\mathcal{A}$  is not able to issue a  $\text{CorruptASK}(j)$  query, as we abort if  $\pi_i^s \cdot \alpha \leftarrow \text{reject}$  and abort if  $\pi_i^s \cdot \alpha \leftarrow \text{accept}$ . Thus we will not need to reveal the private key  $\text{sk}^*$  of the challenge public-key to  $\mathcal{A}$ . However we must account for all sessions  $t$  such that  $\pi_j^t$  must use the private key for computations. In our version of WireGuard, the long-term private keys are used to compute the following:

- In sessions where  $P_j$  acts as the initiator:  
 $C_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_6, \text{CCAEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_i, \text{ct3}))$
- In sessions where  $P_j$  acts as the responder:  
 $C_3, \kappa_3 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_2, \text{CCAEM.Dec}(\text{ssk}_r, \text{ct1}))$

(Note that these are fewer cases than in the original proof because we don't combine static and ephemeral keys directly.) Dealing with the challenger's computation of these values will be done in two ways:

- The encapsulation was created by another honest party. The challenger can then use its own internal knowledge of the encapsulated value to complete the computations.
- The encapsulation was not created by another honest party, but by the adversary and the challenger is therefore unaware of the encapsulated value.

In the second case, the challenger can instead use the decapsulation-oracle provided by the CCA-challenger, specifically querying  $\text{CCAEM.Dec}(\text{ctX})$ , (where  $\text{ctX}$  is the relevant encapsulation) which will output  $\text{shkX}$  using the CCA challenger's internal knowledge of  $\text{sk}^*$ .

During session  $i$  we request a challenge consisting of a ciphertext and a candidate shared secret  $(c^*, k^*)$  from the IND-CCA challenger and use those values in place of  $\text{ct1}$  and  $\text{shk1}$ . Given the definition of the IND-CCA game, there are two cases:

- If the test bit sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 0, then  $k^*$  is indeed the shared secret encapsulated in  $c^*$  and we are in **Game 3a**.
- If the test bit sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 1, then  $k^*$  is not the shared secret encapsulated in  $c^*$  but sampled uniformly at random from the space of shared secrets and we are in **Game 3b**.

Thus, any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the IND-CCA security of the used KEM and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{3a}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAEM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{3b})$$



In **Game 3c** we replace the values of  $C_3, \kappa_3$  with uniformly random and independent values  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  (where  $\{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  is the output space of the KDF) used in the protocol execution of the test session. Specifically, we initialize a  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger and query  $\text{shk1}$ , and use the output  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3$  from the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger to replace the computation of  $C_3, \kappa_3$ . Since by **Game 3b**,  $\text{shk1}$  is a uniformly random and independent value, this replacement is sound. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_2, \text{shk1})$  and we are in **Game 3b**. If the test bit sampled by the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_3, \widetilde{\kappa}_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 3c**.

Thus any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into a successful adversary against the  $\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}$  security of KDF, and we find:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{3b}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_{3c})$$

**Game 4** In this game, we replace the computation of  $C_6$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_6$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a  $\text{prf}$  challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_6 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_4, \text{ct2})$  we instead initialize a  $\text{prf}$  challenger and query it with  $\text{ct2}$ . We note that by **Game 3c** that  $\widetilde{C}_4$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 4**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 4**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the  $\text{prf}$  security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_{3c}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_4)$$

**Game 5** In this game, we replace the computation of  $C_7$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_7$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a  $\text{prf}$  challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_7 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_6, \text{shk2})$  we instead initialize a  $\text{prf}$  challenger and query it with  $\text{shk2}$ . We note that by **Game 4** that  $\widetilde{C}_6$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 0, then  $\widetilde{C}_7 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_6, \text{shk2})$  and we are in **Game 4**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_7 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 5**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the  $\text{prf}$  security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_4) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_5)$$

**Game 6** Similarly to the previous game, we replace the computation of  $C_8$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_8$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a  $\text{prf}$  challenger in the following way: When it is time

to compute  $C_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_7, \text{shk3})$  we instead initialize a  $\text{prf}$  challenger and query it with  $\text{shk3}$ . We note that by **Game 5** that  $\widetilde{C}_7$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 0, then  $C_8 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_7, \text{shk3})$  and we are in **Game 5**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 1, then  $\widetilde{C}_8 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|\text{KDF}|}$  and we are in **Game 6**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the  $\text{prf}$  security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_5) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_6)$$

**Game 7** In this game, we replace the computation of  $C_9, \text{tmp}, \kappa_9$  with uniformly random values  $\widetilde{C}_9, \widetilde{\text{tmp}}, \widetilde{\kappa}_9$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a  $\text{prf}$  challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_9, \text{tmp}, \kappa_9 \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_8, \text{psk})$  we instead initialize a  $\text{prf}$  challenger and query it with  $\text{psk}$ . We note that by **Game 6** that  $\widetilde{C}_8$  is a uniformly random value and independent value, and thus this replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 6**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 7**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the  $\text{prf}$  security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_6) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_7)$$

**Game 8** Similarly to the previous game, we replace the computation of  $C_{10}$  with a uniformly random value  $\widetilde{C}_{10}$  from the same distribution, in the challenger's execution of the test session  $\pi_i^s$  and its partner session  $\pi_j^t$ . We do so by interacting with a  $\text{prf}$  challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $C_{10} \leftarrow \text{KDF}(C_9, \emptyset)$  we instead initialize a  $\text{prf}$  challenger and query it with the empty string  $\emptyset$ . We note that by **Game 7** that  $\widetilde{C}_9$  is a uniformly random value independent from the protocol execution, and as such the replacement is sound. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 0, then we are in **Game 7**. If the random bit  $b$  sampled by the  $\text{prf}$  challenger is 1, then we are in **Game 8**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the  $\text{prf}$  security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_7) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_8)$$

**Game 9** Similarly to the previous games, we replace the values  $tk_i, tk_r \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\widetilde{C}_{10}, \emptyset)$  computed by the challenger in the execution of the test session and its honest contributive keyshare session partner  $\pi_j^t$  with uniformly random values  $\widetilde{tk}_i, \widetilde{tk}_r$ . We do so by interacting with a  $\text{prf}$  challenger in the following way: When it is time to compute  $tk_i, tk_r$  in the appropriate sessions, we instead initialize a  $\text{prf}$  challenger and query it with the empty string  $\emptyset$ . We note that by **Game 8** that  $\widetilde{C}_{10}$  is a uniformly random value independent from the protocol execution, and as such the replacement is sound. If

the random bit sampled by the prf challenger if 0, then we are in **Game 8**, but otherwise the output of the prf challenger  $\widetilde{tk}_i, \widetilde{tk}_r$  is uniformly random and independent and we are in **Game 9**. Any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  capable of distinguishing this change in the experiment can be turned into an algorithm against the prf security of KDF and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_8) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) + \Pr(\text{break}_9)$$

Since the response to the  $\text{Test}(i, s)$  query issued by the adversary is, in **Game 9**, uniformly random and independent of the test bit  $b$  sampled by the challenger, then the adversary's success in winning the key-indistinguishability game is reduced to simply guessing and thus:

$$\Pr(\text{break}_9) = 1/2$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{pqWG}, n_P, n_S, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{eCK-PFS-PSK}, C_{3.5}}(\lambda) \leq & n_P^2 n_S^2 \left( \frac{n_S}{2^\lambda} \right. \\ & + \text{Adv}_{\text{CCAKEYM}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \\ & + 7 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) \\ & \left. + \text{Adv}_{\text{KDF}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{prf}^{\text{swap}}}(\lambda) \right) \end{aligned}$$