Scalar-multiplication algorithms

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The ECDLP

Definition

Given two points P and Q on an elliptic curve, such that $Q \in \langle P \rangle$, find an integer k such that kP = Q.

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- Typical setting for cryptosystems:
 - P is a fixed system parameter,
 - k is the secret (private) key,
 - Q is the public key.

• Key generation needs to compute Q = kP, given k and P

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- Alice computes joint key as $K = k_A Q_B$
- Bob computes joint key as $K = k_B Q_A$

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• Verify: compute $\overline{R} = SP + H(R, M)Q_A$ and check that

 $H(\overline{R},M)=H(R,M)$

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 - ▶ For secret *k* we need *constant-time* algorithms

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- Conclusion: we need algorithms that run in polynomial time (in the size of the scalar)

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- General algorithm: "Double and add"

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\begin{array}{l} R \leftarrow P \\ \text{for } i \leftarrow n-2 \text{ downto } 0 \text{ do} \\ R \leftarrow 2R \\ \text{if } (k)_2[i] = 1 \text{ then} \\ R \leftarrow R+P \\ \text{end if} \\ \text{end for} \\ \text{return } R \end{array}
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- ▶ P does not need to be known in advance, no precomputation depending on P
- Handles single-scalar multiplication
- Running time clearly depends on the scalar: insecure for secret scalars!

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 - Compute k_1P_1 ($n_1 1$ doublings, $m_1 1$ additions)
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 - Add the results (1 addition)

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 - Compute k_1P_1 $(n_1 1 \text{ doublings}, m_1 1 \text{ additions})$
 - ▶ Compute k₂P₂ (n₂ − 1 doublings, m₂ − 1 additions)
 - Add the results (1 addition)
- ▶ We can do better (*O* denotes the neutral element):

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\begin{array}{l} R \leftarrow \mathcal{O} \\ \text{for } i \leftarrow \max(n_1, n_2) - 1 \text{ downto } 0 \text{ do} \\ R \leftarrow 2R \\ \text{if } (k_1)_2[i] = 1 \text{ then} \\ R \leftarrow R + P_1 \\ \text{end if} \\ \text{if } (k_2)_2[i] = 1 \text{ then} \\ R \leftarrow R + P_2 \\ \text{end if} \\ \text{end for} \\ \text{return } R \end{array}
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          end if
      end for
      return R
• \max(n_1, n_2) doublings, m_1 + m_2 additions
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Some precomputation helps

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- ▶ Whenever k_1 and k_2 have a 1 bit at the same position, we first add P_1 and then P_2 (on average for 1/4 of the bits)
- Let's just precompute $T = P_1 + P_2$
- Modified algorithm (special case of Strauss' algorithm):

```
R \leftarrow \mathcal{O}
for i \leftarrow \max(n_1, n_2) - 1 downto 0 do
    R \leftarrow 2R
    if (k_1)_2[i] = 1 AND (k_2)_2[i] = 1 then
         R \leftarrow R + T
    else
         if (k_1)_2[i] = 1 then
             R \leftarrow R + P_1
         end if
         if (k_2)_2[i] = 1 then
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- ▶ How about, for example, precompute $P, 2P, 4P, 8P, \dots, 2^{n-1}P$
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Eliminated all doublings in fixed-basepoint scalar multiplication!

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Still not constant time, more later...

Let's rewrite that a bit ...

- We have a table $T = (\mathcal{O}, P)$
- ▶ Notation $T[0] = \mathcal{O}$, T[1] = P
- Scalar multiplication is

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- How about some nice numbers, like 4, 8, 16?

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\begin{split} R \leftarrow T[(k)_{2^w}[m-1]] \\ \text{for } i \leftarrow m-2 \text{ downto } 0 \text{ do} \\ \text{for } j \leftarrow 1 \text{ to } w \text{ do} \\ R \leftarrow 2R \\ \text{end for} \\ R \leftarrow R + T[(k)_{2^w}[i]] \\ \text{end for} \end{split}
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- \blacktriangleright For $\approx 256\text{-bit}$ scalars choose w=4 or w=5

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 - ▶ Are lookups from the table *T* running in constant time?
 - Usually not!

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- Problem 1: if-statements are not constant time
- ▶ Problem 2: Comparisons are not (guaranteed to be) constant time
A general if statement looks as follows:
 if s then *R* ← *A* else *R* ← *B* end if

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- Can replace multiplication and addition with bit-logical operations (AND and XOR)
- ► For very fast *A* and *B*, this can even be faster than the conditional branch

Constant-time comparison

```
static unsigned long long eq(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
{
    unsigned long long t = a ^ b;
    t = (-t) >> 63;
    return 1-t;
}
```

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```

- ▶ No doublings, only $\lceil b/w \rceil 1$ additions
- Can use huge w, but:
 - at some point the precomputed tables don't fit into cache anymore.
 - \blacktriangleright constant-time loads get slow for large w

• Consider the scalar $22 = (1\,01\,10)_2$ and window size 2

- Initialize R with P
- ► Double, double, add *P*
- Double, double, add 2P

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- Idea: "Slide" the window over the scalar

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- Perform scalar multiplication

```
\begin{array}{l} R \leftarrow \mathcal{O} \\ \text{for } i \leftarrow m \text{ to } 0 \text{ do} \\ R \leftarrow 2R \\ \text{ if } k_i \text{ then} \\ R \leftarrow R + k_i P \\ \text{ end if} \\ \text{end for} \end{array}
```

Analysis of sliding window

- We still do n-1 doublings for an n-bit scalar
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- But: It's not running in constant time!
- Still nice (in double-scalar version) for signature verification

- $\blacktriangleright\,$ So far everything we did works for any cyclic group $\langle P \rangle$
- Elliptic curves have so much more to offer
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- Similar scalar-negation speedup for sliding-window multiplication

Using other efficient endomorphisms

- Ben showed us before that there are efficient endomorphisms on elliptic curves
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 - Write scalar $k = k_1 + k_2 \lambda$ with k_1 and k_2 half the length of k
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- With two efficient endomorphisms we can do a 4-dimensional decomposition
- Perform quarter-size quad-scalar multiplication (save another 25% of doublings)

- Consider elliptic curves of the form $By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$.
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- Less efficient differential-addition formulas for other curve shapes
- ► Can be used for efficient computation of the *x*-coordinate of *kP* given only the *x*-coordinate of *P*
- ▶ For this, let's use projective representation (X : Z) with x = (X/Z)

One Montgomery "ladder step"

const a24 = (A+2)/4 (A from the curve equation) function ladderstep($X_{Q-P}, X_P, Z_P, X_Q, Z_Q$) $t_1 \leftarrow X_P + Z_P$ $t_6 \leftarrow t_1^2$ $t_2 \leftarrow X_P - Z_P$ $t_7 \leftarrow t_2^2$ $t_5 \leftarrow t_6 - t_7$ $t_3 \leftarrow X_O + Z_O$ $t_4 \leftarrow X_O - Z_O$ $t_8 \leftarrow t_4 \cdot t_1$ $t_0 \leftarrow t_3 \cdot t_2$ $X_{P+Q} \leftarrow (t_8 + t_0)^2$ $Z_{P+Q} \leftarrow X_{Q-P} \cdot (t_8 - t_9)^2$ $X_{[2]P} \leftarrow t_6 \cdot t_7$ $Z_{[2]P} \leftarrow t_5 \cdot (t_7 + a_24 \cdot t_5)$ return $(X_{[2]P}, Z_{[2]P}, X_{P+Q}, Z_{P+Q})$ end function

The Montgomery ladder

Require: A scalar $0 \le k \in \mathbb{Z}$ and the *x*-coordinate x_P of some point P **Ensure:** $(X_{[k]P}, Z_{[k]P})$ fulfilling $x_{[k]P} = X_{[k]P}/Z_{[k]P}$ $X_1 = x_P; X_2 = 1; Z_2 = 0; X_3 = x_P; Z_3 = 1$ for $i \leftarrow n - 1$ downto 0 do if bit *i* of *k* is 1 then $(X3, Z3, X2, Z2) \leftarrow \text{ladderstep}(X1, X3, Z3, X2, Z2)$ else $(X2, Z2, X3, Z3) \leftarrow \text{ladderstep}(X1, X2, Z2, X3, Z3)$ end if end for return (X_2, Z_2)

Advantages of the Montgomery ladder

Very regular structure, easy to protect against timing attacks

- Replace the if statement by conditional swap
- Be careful with constant-time swaps
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- Very fast (at least if we don't compare to curves with efficient endomorphisms)
- Point compression/decompression is free
- Easy to implement
- ▶ No ugly special cases (see Bernstein's "Curve25519" paper)

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- Can be very fast (but not constant-time)
- Requires fast access to the two largest scalars: put scalars into a heap
- Crucial for good performance: fast heap implementation

A fast heap

- Heap is a binary tree, each parent node is larger than the two child nodes
- Data structure is stored as a simple array, positions in the array determine positions in the tree
- Root is at position 0, left child node at position 1, right child node at position 2 etc.
- ▶ For node at position i, child nodes are at position $2 \cdot i + 1$ and $2 \cdot i + 2$, parent node is at position $\lfloor (i 1)/2 \rfloor$

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- Typical heap root replacement (pop operation): start at the root, swap down for a variable amount of times
- Floyd's heap: swap down to the bottom, swap up for a variable amount of times, advantages:
 - Each swap-down step needs only one comparison (instead of two)
 - Swap-down loop is more friendly to branch predictors

Coming back to finite-field inversion

- \blacktriangleright Inversion with Fermat's theorem uses exponentiation with p-2
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- Exponentiation is not really different from scalar multiplication (doublings become squarings, additions become multiplications)
- The prime p is public, so also p-2 is public
- First idea: use sliding window to compute exponentiation
- But wait, p is not only public, it's a fixed system parameter, can we do better?

Definition

Let k be a positive integer. A sequence s_1,s_2,\ldots,s_m is called an addition chain of length m for k if

- ▶ $s_1 = 1$
- $\blacktriangleright \ s_m = k$
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- Signed-scalar representations are "addition-subtraction chains"
- ▶ For inversion we know k at compile time, we can spend a lot of time to find a good addition chain.

Inversion in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{255}-19}$

```
void fe25519_invert(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x)
Ł
fe25519 z2, z9, z11, z2_5_0, z2_10_0, z2_20_0, z2_50_0, z2_100_0, t;
 int i:
/* 2 */
                  fe25519_square(&z2,x);
/* 4 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2);
/* 8 */
                  fe25519_square(&t,&t);
/* 9 */ fe25519_mul(&z9,&t,x);
/* 11 */ fe25519_mul(&z11,&z9,&z2);
/* 22 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z11);
/* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */fe25519_mul(&z2_5_0,&t,&z9);
/* 2^6 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_5_0);
/* 2^20 - 2^10 */ for (i = 1;i < 5;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }</pre>
/* 2^10 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_10_0,&t,&z2_5_0);
/* 2^11 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_10_0);
/* 2^20 - 2^10 */ for (i = 1;i < 10;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }</pre>
/* 2^20 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_20_0,&t,&z2_10_0);
/* 2^21 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_20_0);
/* 2^40 - 2^20 */ for (i = 1;i < 20;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }</pre>
/* 2^40 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t,&t,&z2_20_0);
```

Inversion in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{255}-19}$

/* 2^41 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); /* 2^50 - 2^10 */ for (i = 1;i < 10;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }</pre> /* 2^50 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_50_0,&t,&z2_10_0); /* 2^51 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_50_0); /* 2^100 - 2^50 */ for (i = 1;i < 50;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }</pre> /* 2^100 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_100_0,&t,&z2_50_0); /* 2^101 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_100_0); /* 2^200 - 2^100 */ for (i = 1;i < 100;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }</pre> /* 2^200 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t,&t,&z2_100_0); /* 2^201 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); for (i = 1;i < 50;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }</pre> /* 2^250 - 2^50 */ /* 2^250 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t,&t,&z2_50_0); /* 2^251 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); /* 2^252 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); /* 2^253 - 2^3 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); /* 2^254 - 2^4 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); /* 2^255 - 2^5 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); /* 2^255 - 21 */ fe25519_mul(r,&t,&z11); }



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- Remember not to use it (at least never with a secret scalar)

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Slides of both talks will be online at http://cryptojedi.org/