

Implementing post-quantum crypto

Peter Schwabe
peter@cryptojedi.org
https://cryptojedi.org
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- Vectorize!

Vector computations

Scalar computation

- Load 32-bit integer a
- Load 32-bit integer b
- Perform addition $c \leftarrow a + b$
- Store 32-bit integer c

- Load 4 consecutive 32-bit integers (a₀, a₁, a₂, a₃)
- Load 4 consecutive 32-bit integers (b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3)
- Perform addition $(c_0, c_1, c_2, c_3) \leftarrow (a_0 + b_0, a_1 + b_1, a_2 + b_2, a_3 + b_3)$
- Store 128-bit vector (*c*₀, *c*₁, *c*₂, *c*₃)

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- Vector instructions are almost as fast as scalar instructions but do 8 \times the work
- Situation on other architectures/microarchitectures is similar
- Reason: cheap way to increase arithmetic throughput (less decoding, address computation, etc.)

"Big multipliers are pre-quantum, vectorization is post-quantum"

- Standard-lattices operate on matrices over \mathbb{Z}_q , for "small" q
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- Reason: reuse coefficients of $\boldsymbol{\mathsf{A}}$ in cache

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- Can easily load (f_0, f_1, f_2, f_3) and (g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)
- Multiply, obtain $(f_0g_0, f_1g_1, f_2g_2, f_3g_3)$

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- Multiply, obtain $(f_0g_0, f_1g_1, f_2g_2, f_3g_3)$
- And now what?
- Looks like we need to *shuffle* a lot!

Karatsuba and Toom

- Our polynomials have many more coefficients (say, 256-1024)
- Idea: use Karatsuba's trick:
 - consider n = 2k-coefficient polynomials f and g
 - Split multiplication $f \cdot g$ into 3 half-size multiplications

$$(a_{\ell} + X^{k}a_{h}) \cdot (b_{\ell} + X^{k}b_{h})$$

= $a_{\ell}b_{\ell} + X^{k}(a_{\ell}b_{h} + a_{h}b_{\ell}) + X^{n}a_{h}b_{h}$
= $a_{\ell}b_{\ell} + X^{k}((a_{\ell} + a_{h})(b_{\ell} + b_{h}) - a_{\ell}b\ell - a_{h}b_{h}) + X^{n}a_{h}b_{h}$

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- Apply recursively to obtain 9 quarter-size multiplications, 27 eighth-size multiplications etc.
- Generalization: Toom-Cook. Obtain, e.g., 5 third-size multiplications
- Split into sufficiently many "small" multiplications, vectorize across those

- Small example: compute $a \cdot b$, $c \cdot d$, $e \cdot f$, $g \cdot h$
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- Problem:
 - Vector loads will yield

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• Solution: transpose data matrix (or interleave words):

a0, c0, e0, h0, a1, c1, e1,..., f2, g2

Two applications of Karatsuba/Toom

Streamlined NTRU Prime 4591⁷⁶¹

- Multiply in the ring $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}_{4591}[X]/(X^{761}-X-1)$
- Pad input polynomial to 768 coefficients
- 5 levels of Karatsuba: 243 multiplications of 24-coefficient polynomials
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NTRU-HRSS-KEM

- Multiply in the ring $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}_{8192}[X]/(X^{701}-1)$
- Use Toom-Cook to split into 7 quarter-size, then 2 levels of Karatsuba
- Obtain 63 multiplications of 44-coefficient polynomials
- 11722 Haswell cycles for multiplication in $\ensuremath{\mathcal{R}}$

- Many LWE/MLWE systems use very specific parameters:
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- Big advantage: fast *negacyclic number-theoretic transform*
- Given $g \in \mathcal{R}$, *n*-th primitive root of unity ω and $\psi = \sqrt{\omega}$, compute

$$egin{aligned} \mathsf{NTT}(g) &= \hat{g} = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \hat{g}_i X^i, ext{ with} \ \hat{g}_i &= \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \psi^j g_j \omega^{ij}, \end{aligned}$$

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- Compute $f \cdot g$ as $NTT^{-1}(NTT(f) \circ NTT(g))$
- NTT⁻¹ is essentially the same computation as NTT

- FFT in a finite field
- Evaluate polynomial $f = f_0 + f_1 X + \dots + f_{n-1} X^{n-1}$ at all *n*-th roots of unity
- Divide-and-conquer approach
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- Same for f₁
- Apply recursively through log *n* levels

- First thing to do: replace recursion by iteration
- Loop over log n levels with n/2 "butterflies" each
- Butterfly on level k:
 - Pick up f_i and f_{i+2^k}
 - Multiply f_{i+2^k} by a power of ω to obtain t
 - Compute $f_{i+2^k} \leftarrow a_i t$
 - Compute $f_i \leftarrow a_i + t$
- All n/2 butterflies on one level are independent
- Vectorize across those butterflies



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- Seiler, 2018:
 - 2784 Haswell cycles (*n* = 1024, 14-bit *q*)
 - 460 Haswell cycles (*n* = 256, 13-bit *q*)
 - Uses vectorized integer arithmetic



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- Consequence: consider designing with parallel hash/XOF calls!

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- Traditional approach: use lookups (log tables)
- Obvious question: can vector operations help?

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- Perform arithmetic on those vectors using XOR, AND, OR
- "Simulate hardware implemenations in software"

- So far: vectors of bytes, 32-bit words, floats,...
- Consider now vectors of bits
- Perform arithmetic on those vectors using XOR, AND, OR
- "Simulate hardware implemenations in software"
- Technique was introduced by Biham in 1997 for DES
- Bitslicing works for every algorithm
- Efficient bitslicing needs a huge amount of data-level parallelism

Bitslicing binary polynomials

4-coefficient binary polynomials

 $(a_3x^3 + a_2x^2 + a_1x + a_0)$, with $a_i \in \{0, 1\}$

4-coefficient bitsliced binary polynomials

typedef unsigned char poly4; /* 4 coefficients in the low 4 bits */ typedef unsigned long long poly4x64[4];

```
void poly4_bitslice(poly4x64 r, const poly4 x[64])
{
    int i,j;
    for(i=0;i<4;i++)
    {
        r[i] = 0;
        for(j=0;j<64;j++)
        r[i] |= (unsigned long long)(1 & (x[j] >> i))<<j;
    }
}</pre>
```

```
typedef unsigned long long poly4x64[4];
typedef unsigned long long poly7x64[7];
```

```
void poly4x64_mul(poly7x64 r, const poly4x64 a, const poly4x64 b)
{
```

```
 r[0] = a[0] \& b[0]; 
r[1] = (a[0] \& b[1]) \land (a[1] \& b[0]); 
r[2] = (a[0] \& b[2]) \land (a[1] \& b[1]) \land (a[2] \& b[0]); 
r[3] = (a[0] \& b[3]) \land (a[1] \& b[2]) \land (a[2] \& b[1]) \land (a[3] \& b[0]); 
r[4] = (a[1] \& b[3]) \land (a[2] \& b[2]) \land (a[3] \& b[1]); 
r[5] = (a[2] \& b[3]) \land (a[3] \& b[2]); 
r[6] = (a[3] \& b[3]);
```

}

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- Chou, CHES 2017: use internal parallelism
 - Target even higher security (297 bits pre-quantum)
 - Does not require independent decryptions
 - Even faster, even when considering throughput

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- $\mathbb{F}_2/\mathbb{F}_4$: Use bitslicing (see Joost's talk)
- $\mathbb{F}_{16}/\mathbb{F}_{256}:$ Use vector-permute instructions for table lookups
- For \mathbb{F}_{256} use tower-field arithmetic on top of \mathbb{F}_{16}

Chen, Hülsing, Rijneveld, Samardjiska, Schwabe, 2016:
 64 eqns in 64 vars over 𝑘₃₁: 6616 Haswell cycles



Recent $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{Q}$ results

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- Chen, Li, Peng, Yang, Cheng, 2017:
 - 256 eqns in 256 vars over $\mathbb{F}_2:$ 92800 Haswell cycles
 - 128 eqns in 128 vars over $\mathbb{F}_4\colon$ 32300 Haswell cycles
 - 64 eqns in 64 vars over \mathbb{F}_{16} : 9600 Haswell cycles
 - 64 eqns in 64 vars over \mathbb{F}_{31} : 8700 Haswell cycles
 - 64 eqns in 64 vars over \mathbb{F}_{256} : 16200 Haswell cycles
 - $\bullet\,$ In particular for \mathbb{F}_2 speedups for public inputs

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 - In particular for \mathbb{F}_2 speedups for public inputs
- Chen, Hülsing, Rijneveld, Samardjiska, Schwabe, 2017: 128 eqns in 128 vars over 𝔽₄: 17 558 Haswell cycles (batched)

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 - Bernstein, Hopwood, Hülsing, Lange, Niederhagen, Papachristodoulou, Schneider, Schwabe, Wilcox-O'Hearn, 2015: Optimize SPHINCS
 - Vectorize also Merkle-tree hashes inside HORST computation
 - $\bullet~\approx 52\,{\rm Mio}$ cycles for signing on Haswell

Two things very inefficient to vectorize

1. Variably indexed lookups:

 $v \leftarrow (m[i], m[j], m[k], m[\ell])$



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- Different approach to thinking algorithms: a lot of fun!
- More importantly: eliminates most notorious timing side channels!
- Efficient vectorized implementations are often also "constant-time"

- Alkim, Bindel, Buchmann, Dagdelen, Schwabe: TESLA: Tightly-Secure Efficient Signatures from Standard Lattices. https://cryptojedi.org/papers/#tesla (superseded by https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/755)
- Bernstein, Chuengsatiansup, Lange, van Vredendaal: NTRU Prime: reducing attack surface at low cost. http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#ntruprime
- Hülsing, Rijneveld, Schanck, Schwabe: *High-speed key encapsulation* from NTRU. https://cryptojedi.org/papers/#ntrukem

- Güneysu, Oder, Pöppelmann, Schwabe: Software speed records for lattice-based signatures. https://cryptojedi.org/papers/#lattisigns
- Alkim, Ducas, Pöppelmann, Schwabe: Post-quantum key exchange

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- Longa, Naehrig: Speeding up the Number Theoretic Transform for Faster Ideal Lattice-Based Cryptography. https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/504
- Seiler: Faster AVX2 optimized NTT multiplication for Ring-LWE lattice cryptography https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/039

- Bernstein, Chou, Schwabe: *McBits: fast constant-time code-based cryptography.* https://cryptojedi.org/papers/#mcbits
- Chou: McBits revisited. https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/793

- Chen, Hülsing, Rijneveld, Samardjiska, Schwabe: From 5-pass MQ-based identification to MQ-based signatures. https://cryptojedi.org/papers/#mqdss
- Chen, Li, Peng, Yang, Cheng: *Implementing 128-bit Secure MPKC* Signatures. https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/636
- Chen, Hülsing, Rijneveld, Samardjiska, Schwabe: SOFIA: MQ-based signatures in the QROM.

https://cryptojedi.org/papers/#sofia

- Oliveira, López, Cabral: High Performance of Hash-based Signature Schemes http://thesai.org/Publications/ViewPaper? Volume=8&Issue=3&Code=IJACSA&SerialNo=58
- Bernstein, Hopwood, Hülsing, Lange, Niederhagen, Papachristodoulou, Schneider, Schwabe, Wilcox-O'Hearn: SPHINCS: practical stateless hash-based signatures. https://cryptojedi.org/papers/#sphincs