

Engineering Cryptographic Software

Multiprecision Arithmetic

Peter Schwabe

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- ▶ For now mainly interested in 160-bit and 256-bit arithmetic

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Addition

$$3 + 5 = ?$$

$$2 + 7 = ?$$

$$4 + 3 = ?$$

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$$5 - 1 = ?$$

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Addition

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Subtraction

$$7 - 5 = ?$$

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$$9 - 3 = ?$$

- ▶ All results are in the set of available numbers
- ▶ No confusion for first-year school kids



Available numbers: $0, 1, \dots, 2^{32} - 1$



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Addition

```
u32 a b r;  
a = 23842;  
b = 12390;  
r = a + b;
```



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- ▶ All results are in the set of available numbers
- ▶ On other architectures, may also have `u64` available, or maybe only `u16` or `u8`
- ▶ On Cortex-M4 (ARMv7E-M), working with register-size `u32` is natural



Crossing the ten barrier

$$6 + 5 = ?$$

$$9 + 7 = ?$$



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- ▶ Results are allowed to be larger than 9
- ▶ Addition is allowed to produce a *carry*

What happens with the carry?

- ▶ Introduce the decimal positional system
- ▶ Write an integer A in two digits a_1a_0 with

$$A = 10 \cdot a_1 + a_0$$

- ▶ Note that at the moment $a_1 \in \{0, 1\}$



```
reg u32 a b r;  
a = 3348129313;  
b = 3810627668;  
r = a + b;
```



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- ▶ Addition result produced a carry, which is lost. What do we do?

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- ▶ Result of integer addition is 7 158 756 981
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- ▶ $2\,863\,789\,685 = 7\,158\,756\,981 - 2^{32}$
- ▶ Addition result produced a carry, which is lost. What do we do?
- ▶ Idea: obtain the carry, and put it into another `u32`



```
u32 a = 3348129313;
```

```
u32 b = 3810627668;
```

```
fn addab() -> reg u32[2] {
```

```
    reg u32[2] r;
```

```
    reg bool c;
```

```
    c, r[0] = a + b;
```

```
    r[1] = 0;
```

```
    _, r[1] += r[1] + c;
```

```
    return r;
```

```
}
```



Addition

$$42 + 78 = ?$$

$$789 + 543 = ?$$

$$7862 + 5275 = ?$$



Addition

$$42 + 78 = ?$$

$$789 + 543 = ?$$

$$7862 + 5275 = ?$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 7862 \\ + 5275 \\ \hline + \quad 7 \end{array}$$



Addition

$$42 + 78 = ?$$

$$789 + 543 = ?$$

$$7862 + 5275 = ?$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 7862 \\ + 5275 \\ \hline + 37 \end{array}$$



Addition

$$42 + 78 = ?$$

$$789 + 543 = ?$$

$$7862 + 5275 = ?$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 7862 \\ + 5275 \\ \hline + 137 \end{array}$$



Addition

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$$7862 + 5275 = ?$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 7862 \\ + 5275 \\ \hline + 13137 \end{array}$$



Addition

$$42 + 78 = ?$$

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$$\begin{array}{r} 7862 \\ + 5275 \\ \hline + 13137 \end{array}$$

- Once school kids can add beyond 1000, they can add arbitrary numbers



"Oh Līlāvatī, intelligent girl, if you understand addition and subtraction, tell me the sum of the amounts 2, 5, 32, 193, 18, 10, and 100, as well as [the remainder of] those when subtracted from 10000."

—"Līlāvatī" by Bhāskara (1150)

Multiprecision addition in Jasmin



```
fn bigint_add(reg ptr u32[N+1] r, reg ptr u32[N] a b) -> reg ptr u32[N+1] {
    reg u32 t, u;
    reg bool c;
    inline int i;

    t = a[0];
    u = b[0];
    c, t += u;
    r[0] = t;
    for i = 1 to N {
        t = a[i];
        u = b[i];
        c, t += u + c;
        r[i] = t;
    }
    t = 0;
    _, t += t + c;
    r[N] = t;

    return r;
}
```



```
fn bigint_sub(reg ptr u32[N+1] r, reg ptr u32[N] a b) -> reg ptr u32[N+1] {
    reg u32 t, u;
    reg bool c;
    inline int i;

    t = a[0];
    u = b[0];
    c, t -= u;
    r[0] = t;
    for i = 1 to N {
        t = a[i];
        u = b[i];
        c, t -= u - c;
        r[i] = t;
    }
    t = 0;
    _, t -= t - c;
    r[N] = t;

    return r;
}
```


How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

How about multiplication?



- Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 6 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 06 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 106 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 11106 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 11106 \\ 9872 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 11106 \\ 9872 \\ 8638 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 11106 \\ + 9872 \\ + 8638 \\ \hline 973626 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 11106 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

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How about multiplication?



- Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 20978 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 20978 \\ + \quad 8638 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 973626 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

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- This is also an old technique
- Earliest reference I could find is again the *Līlāvātī* (1150)



```
export fn bigint_mul(reg mut ptr u32[6] rp, reg ptr u32[3] ap bp) -> reg ptr u32[6] {
```

Let's do that in Jasmin



```
reg u32 r0 r1 r2 r3 r4 r5;
reg u32 a0 a1 a2;
reg u32 b0 b1 b2;
reg u32 t0 t1 t2 t3 hi lo z;
reg bool c;
z = 0;
```

```
a0 = ap[0];
a1 = ap[1];
a2 = ap[2];
```

```
b0 = bp[0];
t1, r0 = a0 * b0;
rp[0] = r0;
```

```
hi, r1 = a1 * b0;
c, r1 += t1;
c, hi += z + c;
```

```
r3, r2 = a2 * b0;
c, r2 += hi + c;
_, r3 += z + c;
```

```
b1 = bp[1];
t1, t0 = a0 * b1;
```

```
hi, lo = a1 * b1;
c, t1 += lo;
```

```
r4, t2 = a2 * b1;
c, t2 += hi + c;
c, r4 += z + c;
```

```
c, r1 += t0;
c, r2 += t1 + c;
c, r3 += t2 + c;
_, r4 += z + c;
rp[1] = r1;
```

```
b2 = bp[2];
t1, t0 = a0 * b2;
```

```
hi, lo = a1 * b2;
c, t1 += lo;
```

```
r5, t2 = a2 * b2;
c, t2 += hi + c;
_, r5 += z + c;
```

```
c, r2 += t0;
c, r3 += t1 + c;
c, r4 += t2 + c;
_, r5 += z + c;
```

```
rp[2] = r2;
rp[3] = r3;
rp[4] = r4;
rp[5] = r5;
```

```
return rp;
```

```
}
```


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- ▶ n^2 multiplication instructions to multiply two n -limb big integers
- ▶ About 2 additions per multiplication
- ▶ Problem: Need $3n + c$ registers for $n \times n$ -word multiplication
- ▶ Can add on the fly, get down to $2n + c$, but more carry handling

"Again as the information is understood, the multiplication of 2345 by 6789 is proposed; therefore the numbers are written down; the 5 is multiplied by the 9, there will be 45; the 5 is put, the 4 is kept; and the 5 is multiplied by the 8, and the 9 by the 4 and the products are added to the kept 4; there will be 80; the 0 is put and the 8 is kept; and the 5 is multiplied by the 7 and the 9 by the 3 and the 4 by the 8, and the products are added to the kept 8; there will be 102; the 2 is put and the 10 is kept in hand. . ."

From "Fibonacci's Liber Abaci" (1202) Chapter 2
(English translation by Sigler)

Product scanning in Jasmin



```
z = 0;

a0 = ap[0];
a1 = ap[1];
a2 = ap[2];

b0 = bp[0];
b1 = bp[1];
b2 = bp[2];

r1, r0 = a0 * b0;
rp[0] = r0;

r2, lo = a0 * b1;
c, r1 += lo;
_, r2 += z + c;

hi, lo = a1 * b0;
c, r1 += lo;
c, r2 += hi + c;
_, r3 = z + z + c;
rp[1] = r1;
```

```
hi, lo = a0 * b2;
c, r2 += lo;
c, r3 += hi + c;
_, r4 = z + z + c;

hi, lo = a1 * b1;
c, r2 += lo;
c, r3 += hi + c;
_, r4 += z + c;

hi, lo = a2 * b0;
c, r2 += lo;
c, r3 += hi + c;
_, r4 += z + c;
rp[2] = r2;
```

```
hi, lo = a1 * b2;
c, r3 += lo;
c, r4 += hi + c;
_, r5 = z + z + c;

hi, lo = a2 * b1;
c, r3 += lo;
c, r4 += hi + c;
_, r5 += z + c;
rp[3] = r3;

hi, lo = a2 * b2;
c, r4 += lo;
_, r5 += hi + c;

rp[4] = r4;
rp[5] = r5;

return rp;
}
```

Even better...?



	5	6	7	8	9		
	0	4	8	2	6		
2	2	2	2	3	3	4	6
	5	6	1	4	7		
i	i	i	2	2	2	3	2
	0	2	4	6	0		
i	i	i	1	i	i	2	6
	5	6	7	8	9		
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7
Suma	7	0	0	7			

From the Treviso Arithmetic, 1478

Radix- 2^{32} representation

- Currently, represent 256-bit integer A as (a_0, \dots, a_7) with

$$A = \sum_{i=0}^7 a_i \cdot 2^{32i}$$

Radix- 2^{32} representation

- ▶ Currently, represent 256-bit integer A as (a_0, \dots, a_7) with

$$A = \sum_{i=0}^7 a_i \cdot 2^{32i}$$

- ▶ Very compact, also computationally efficient
- ▶ Unique representation for every 256-bit integer
- ▶ Every addition may generate carries
- ▶ Carry handling may get involved

Radix-2⁸ representation

- Idea: use “unsaturated” representation (a_0, \dots, a_{31}) with

$$A = \sum_{i=0}^{31} a_i \cdot 2^{8i}$$

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$$A = \sum_{i=0}^{31} a_i \cdot 2^{8i}$$

- ▶ More computations per big-integer operation
- ▶ Various ways to represent the same 256-bit integer, e.g., $512 = 2^9$
 - ▶ $(512, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$
 - ▶ $(0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$
- ▶ Needs more space in memory
- ▶ Can ignore carries for quite a while

Some remarks about saturated vs. unsaturated representation



- ▶ On Cortex-M4, saturated representation is most efficient
 - ▶ Carries are annoying, but cheap
 - ▶ Minimize arithmetic and load/stores instructions
 - ▶ Setting flags is optional, carries aren't overwritten

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- ▶ This is different on other (micro-)architectures
 - ▶ RISC-V does not have a carry flag
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- ▶ More efficient unsaturated code, e.g., radix- 2^{26}
- ▶ Unsaturated representation often used for first reference code
- ▶ Code in `assignment2-ecdh25519` uses radix- 2^8 representation



```
fn bigint_add(reg ptr u32[N] r, reg ptr u32[N] a b) -> reg ptr u32[N] {  
    reg u32 t, u;  
    inline int i;  
  
    for i = 0 to N {  
        t = a[i];  
        u = b[i];  
        t += u;  
        r[i] = t;  
    }  
  
    return r;  
}
```

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    inline int i;  
  
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        t = a[i];  
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        t += u;  
        r[i] = t;  
    }  
  
    return r;  
}
```

- This works as long as all coefficients are in $[0, \dots, 2^{31} - 1]$


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    for i = 0 to N {  
        t = a[i];  
        u = b[i];  
        t += u;  
        r[i] = t;  
    }  
  
    return r;  
}
```

- ▶ This works as long as all coefficients are in $[0, \dots, 2^{31} - 1]$
- ▶ We can do quite a few additions before we have to carry (reduce)



```
fn bigint_sub(reg ptr u32[N] r, reg ptr u32[N] a b) -> reg ptr u32[N] {  
    reg u32 t, u;  
    inline int i;  
  
    for i = 0 to N {  
        t = a[i];  
        u = b[i];  
        t -= u;  
        r[i] = t;  
    }  
  
    return r;  
}
```

- ▶ Use signed coefficients to represent our big integers
- ▶ No need to worry about borrows

Carrying in radix-2⁸



- ▶ With many additions, coefficients may grow larger than 31 bits
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- ▶ They grow even faster with multiplication
- ▶ Eventually we have to *carry en bloc*:

```
t = r[0];  
u = r[1];  
t = t >>s 8;  
u += t;  
t = t << 8;  
t -= t;  
r[0] = t;  
r[1] = u;
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u += t;  
t = t << 8;  
t -= t;  
r[0] = t;  
r[1] = u;
```

- ▶ Continue by carrying from **r1** to **r2**, from **r2** to **r3**, etc.
- ▶ For the highest limb **r[N-1]**, need to create a new limb to carry to

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- ▶ To go from $\mathbb{Z}[x]$ to \mathbb{Z} , evaluate at the radix (this is a ring homomorphism)
- ▶ Carrying means evaluating at the radix
- ▶ Thinking of multiprecision integers as polynomials is very powerful for efficient arithmetic

How about squaring?



```
inline fn bigint_square(reg ptr u32[N] r a) -> reg ptr u32[N] {  
    r = bigint_mul(a, a);  
}
```

- What squaring will compute is the following:

$$r_0 = a_0 a_0$$

$$r_1 = a_1 a_0 + a_0 a_1$$

$$r_2 = a_2 a_0 + a_1 a_1 + a_0 a_2$$

...

$$r_{61} = a_{30} a_{31} + a_{31} a_{30}$$

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...

$$r_{61} = a_{30} a_{31} + a_{31} a_{30}$$

$$r_{62} = a_{31} a_{31}$$

- Many partial products are computed twice!

How about squaring?



- ▶ Idea: compute them only once!
- ▶ Precompute $2a_1, 2a_2, \dots, 2a_{31}$, then

$$r_0 = a_0 a_0$$

$$r_1 = 2a_1 a_0$$

$$r_2 = 2a_2 a_0 + a_1 a_1$$

...

$$r_{61} = 2a_{30} a_{31}$$

$$r_{62} = a_{31} a_{31}$$

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$$r_0 = a_0 a_0$$

$$r_1 = 2a_1 a_0$$

$$r_2 = 2a_2 a_0 + a_1 a_1$$

...

$$r_{61} = 2a_{30} a_{31}$$

$$r_{62} = a_{31} a_{31}$$

- ▶ Eliminate almost half of the multiplications (and additions)
- ▶ Precomputation can use addition, shift, or multiplication by 2

For 32 input limbs, multiplication needs

- ▶ $32^2 = 1024$ multiplications
- ▶ $31^2 = 961$ additions

Squaring needs

- ▶ 528 multiplications
- ▶ 465 additions
- ▶ 31 additions or shifts or multiplications by 2 for precomputation



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$$\begin{aligned} & A_0 B_0 + 2^m (A_0 B_1 + B_0 A_1) + 2^{2m} A_1 B_1 \\ = & A_0 B_0 + 2^m ((A_0 + A_1)(B_0 + B_1) - A_0 B_0 - A_1 B_1) + 2^{2m} A_1 B_1 \end{aligned}$$

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- ▶ Recursive application yields $\Theta(n^{\log_2 3})$ runtime

- ▶ For small multiplication numbers, Karatsuba is typically not faster
- ▶ Cutoff between quadratic-complexity and Karatsuba depends on
 - ▶ Size of registers and radix used to represent big integers
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- ▶ Very rough rule of thumb: consider Karatsuba from ≈ 10 limbs
- ▶ Lower complexity is also possible (for even larger inputs):
 - ▶ $\Theta(n^{\log_3 5})$ for Toom-3 multiplication
 - ▶ $\Theta(n^{\log_4 7})$ for Toom-4 multiplication
 - ▶ $\Theta(n \log n \log \log n)$ for Schönhage-Strassen
 - ▶ $\Theta(n \log n)$ for Harvey and van-der-Hoeven (2019)
- ▶ For cryptography, we care about Karatsuba and Toom, but nothing beyond



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/* 256-bit integers in radix 2^8 */  
stack u32[32] a;
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- ▶ Integer A is obtained as $\sum_{i=0}^{31} a_i 2^{8i}$
- ▶ Lot of space in top of limbs to accumulate carries
- ▶ Multiplication produces `stack u32[63] r`
- ▶ For “carried” inputs, each limb in `r` has at most 21 bits



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- ▶ Reduce 31-word intermediate result \mathbf{r} as follows:

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for i = 0 to 31 {  
    u = r[i];  
    t = r[i+32];  
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    u += t;  
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- ▶ Result is in $\mathbf{r}[0], \dots, \mathbf{r}[31]$



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- ▶ Examples:
 - ▶ $2^{192} - 2^{64} - 1$ (“NIST-P192”, FIPS186-2, 2000)
 - ▶ $2^{224} - 2^{96} + 1$ (“NIST-P224”, FIPS186-2, 2000)
 - ▶ $2^{256} - 2^{224} + 2^{192} + 2^{96} - 1$ (“NIST-P256”, FIPS186-2, 2000)
 - ▶ $2^{255} - 19$ (Bernstein, 2006)
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 - ▶ $2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$ (Hamburg, 2015)
- ▶ All these primes come with (more or less) fast reduction algorithms

How about other prime fields?



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- ▶ Example: German BSI is pushing the “Brainpool curves”, over fields \mathbb{F}_p with

$$\begin{aligned} p_{224} &= 2272162293245435278755253799591092807334073 \backslash \\ &\quad 2145944992304435472941311 \\ &= 0xD7C134AA264366862A18302575D1D787B09F07579 \backslash \\ &\quad 7DA89F57EC8C0FF \end{aligned}$$

or

$$\begin{aligned} p_{256} &= 7688495639704534422080974662900164909303795 \backslash \\ &\quad 0200943055203735601445031516197751 \\ &= 0xA9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D726E3BF623D \backslash \\ &\quad 52620282013481D1F6E5377 \end{aligned}$$

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- ▶ Another example: Pairing-friendly curves are typically defined over fields \mathbb{F}_p where p has some structure, but hard to exploit for fast arithmetic

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- ▶ Idea: Perform big-integer division with remainder (expensive!)
- ▶ Better idea (Montgomery, 1985):
 - ▶ Let R be such that $\gcd(R, p) = 1$ and $t < p \cdot R$
 - ▶ Represent an element a of \mathbb{F}_p as $aR \bmod p$
 - ▶ Multiplication of aR and bR yields $t = abR^2$ ($2n$ limbs)
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 - ▶ Now compute *Montgomery reduction*: $tR^{-1} \bmod p$
 - ▶ For *some* choices of R this is more efficient than division
 - ▶ Typical choice for radix- b representation: $R = b^n$

Montgomery reduction (pseudocode)



Require: $p = (p_{n-1}, \dots, p_0)_b$ with $\gcd(p, b) = 1$, $R = b^n$,
 $p' = -p^{-1} \pmod{b}$ and $t = (t_{2n-1}, \dots, t_0)_b$

Ensure: $tR^{-1} \pmod{p}$

$A \leftarrow t$

for i from 0 to $n - 1$ **do**

$u \leftarrow a_i p' \pmod{b}$

$A \leftarrow A + u \cdot p \cdot b^i$

end for

$A \leftarrow A / b^n$

if $A \geq p$ **then**

$A \leftarrow A - p$

end if

return A

Some notes about Montgomery reduction



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- ▶ One can merge schoolbook multiplication with Montgomery reduction: “Montgomery multiplication”



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- ▶ We need inversion, but we do (usually) not need it often
- ▶ Two approaches to inversion:
 1. Extended Euclidean algorithm
 2. Fermat's little theorem



- ▶ Given two integers a, b , the Extended Euclidean algorithm finds
 - ▶ The greatest common divisor of a and b
 - ▶ Integers u and v , such that $a \cdot u + b \cdot v = \gcd(a, b)$



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$$\gcd(a, b) = \gcd(b, a - qb) \quad \forall q \in \mathbb{Z}$$

- ▶ To compute $a^{-1} \pmod{p}$, use the algorithm to compute

$$a \cdot u + p \cdot v = \gcd(a, p) = 1$$

- ▶ Now it holds that $u \equiv a^{-1} \pmod{p}$

Extended Euclidean algorithm (pseudocode)



Require: Integers a and b .

Ensure: An integer tuple (u, v, d) satisfying $a \cdot u + b \cdot v = d = \gcd(a, b)$

$u \leftarrow 1$

$v \leftarrow 0$

$d \leftarrow a$

$v_1 \leftarrow 0$

$v_3 \leftarrow b$

while ($v_3 \neq 0$) **do**

$q \leftarrow \lfloor \frac{d}{v_3} \rfloor$

$t_3 \leftarrow d \bmod v_3$

$t_1 \leftarrow u - qv_1$

$u \leftarrow v_1$

$d \leftarrow v_3$

$v_1 \leftarrow t_1$

$v_3 \leftarrow t_3$

end while

$v \leftarrow \frac{d-au}{b}$

return (u, v, d)

Some notes about the Extended Euclidean algorithm



- ▶ Core operation are divisions with remainder
- ▶ This lecture: no details about big-integer division
- ▶ Version without divisions: **binary extended gcd**:
[Handbook of applied cryptography](#), Alg. 14.61



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 - ▶ Multiply a by random integer r
 - ▶ Invert, obtain $r^{-1}a^{-1}$
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- ▶ Other option: constant-time EEA, Bernstein-Yang, 2019:
 <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/266.pdf>



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- ▶ Obvious algorithm for inversion: Exponentiation with $p - 2$
- ▶ The exponent is quite large (e.g., 255 bits), is that efficient?
- ▶ Yes, fairly:
 - ▶ Exponent is fixed and known at compile time
 - ▶ Can spend quite some time on finding an efficient addition chain (next week)
 - ▶ Inversion modulo $2^{255} - 19$ needs 254 squarings and 11 multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{255}-19}$

```
fn invert(reg ptr u32[N] r x) -> reg ptr u32[N] {
  stack u32[N] z2 z9 z11 z2_5_0 z2_10_0 z2_20_0 z2_50_0 z2_100_0 t;
  inline int i;

  /* 2 */      z2      = gfe_square(z2,x);
  /* 4 */      t       = gfe_square(t,z2);
  /* 8 */      t       = gfe_square_inline(t);
  /* 9 */      z9      = gfe_mul(z9,t,x);
  /* 11 */     z11     = gfe_mul(z11,z9,z2);
  /* 22 */     t       = gfe_square(t,z11);
  /* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */ z2_5_0 = gfe_mul(z2_5_0,t,z9);
  /* 2^6 - 2^1 */     t       = gfe_square(t,z2_5_0);
  /* 2^10 - 2^5 */    for i = 1 to 5 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
  /* 2^10 - 2^0 */    z2_10_0 = gfe_mul(z2_10_0,t,z2_5_0);
  /* 2^11 - 2^1 */    t       = gfe_square(t,z2_10_0);
  /* 2^20 - 2^10 */   for i = 1 to 10 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
  /* 2^20 - 2^0 */    z2_20_0 = gfe_mul(z2_20_0,t,z2_10_0);
  /* 2^21 - 2^1 */    t       = gfe_square(t,z2_20_0);
  /* 2^40 - 2^20 */   for i = 1 to 20 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
  /* 2^40 - 2^0 */    t       = gfe_mul_inline(t,z2_20_0);
```

```
/* 2^41 - 2^1 */      t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^50 - 2^10 */     for i = 1 to 10 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
/* 2^50 - 2^0 */      z2_50_0 = gfe_mul(z2_50_0,t,z2_10_0);
/* 2^51 - 2^1 */      t      = gfe_square(t,z2_50_0);
/* 2^100 - 2^50 */    for i = 1 to 50 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
/* 2^100 - 2^0 */     z2_100_0 = gfe_mul(z2_100_0,t,z2_50_0);
/* 2^101 - 2^1 */     t      = gfe_square(t,z2_100_0);
/* 2^200 - 2^100 */   for i = 1 to 100 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
/* 2^200 - 2^0 */     t      = gfe_mul_inline(t,z2_100_0);
/* 2^201 - 2^1 */     t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^250 - 2^50 */    for i = 1 to 50 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
/* 2^250 - 2^0 */     t      = gfe_mul_inline(t,z2_50_0);
/* 2^251 - 2^1 */     t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^252 - 2^2 */     t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^253 - 2^3 */     t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^254 - 2^4 */     t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^255 - 2^5 */     t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^255 - 21 */      r      = gfe_mul(r,t,z11);

return r;
}
```

- ▶ We can *compress* a point (x, y) before sending
- ▶ Usually send only x and one bit of y
- ▶ When receiving such a compressed point we need to solve/recompute y as $\sqrt{x^3 + ax + b}$ (Weierstrass curve)
- ▶ Similar for twisted Edwards curves (see <https://cryptojedi.org/papers/#ed25519>)



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- ▶ If $\beta^2 = -a$: multiply by $\sqrt{-1}$
- ▶ Computing square roots is (typically) about as expensive as an inversion

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 - ▶ Karatsuba (or Toom) may be worth considering

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 - ▶ Karatsuba (or Toom) may be worth considering
- ▶ Modular reduction often for special primes
- ▶ For General primes typically use Montgomery reduction

- ▶ Multiprecision integers are represented as tuples of smaller integers
- ▶ Different representations possible
 - ▶ Saturated representation often most efficient
 - ▶ Unsaturated representation have easier carry handling
- ▶ Multiprecision arithmetic is similar to polynomial arithmetic
- ▶ Difference is carries
- ▶ For ECC, dominating cost is typically multiplications
 - ▶ Different approaches with quadratic complexity
 - ▶ Karatsuba (or Toom) may be worth considering
- ▶ Modular reduction often for special primes
- ▶ For General primes typically use Montgomery reduction
- ▶ Two main options for inversion:
 - ▶ Extended Euclidean algorithm (careful about timing attacks!)
 - ▶ Fermat's little theorem (less efficient, but trivially constant-time)