

Engineering Cryptographic Software

Multiprecision Arithmetic

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- ▶ Example: ARMv7E-M supports up to 32-bit integers, multiplication produces 64-bit result, but not bigger than that.
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- ▶ Example: ARMv7E-M supports up to 32-bit integers, multiplication produces 64-bit result, but not bigger than that.
- ▶ We call arithmetic on such “big integers” *multiprecision arithmetic*
- ▶ For now mainly interested in 160-bit and 256-bit arithmetic

The first year of primary school



Available numbers (digits): (0), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9



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$3 + 5 = ?$

$2 + 7 = ?$

$4 + 3 = ?$



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Subtraction

$7 - 5 = ?$

$5 - 1 = ?$

$9 - 3 = ?$



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- ▶ All results are in the set of available numbers
- ▶ No confusion for first-year school kids

Programming today



Available numbers: $0, 1, \dots, 2^{32} - 1$



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Addition

```
u32 a b r;  
a = 23842;  
b = 12390;  
r = a + b;
```



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u32 a b r;  
a = 874157;  
b = 622301;  
r = a - b;
```



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- ▶ All results are in the set of available numbers
- ▶ On other architectures, may also have `u64` available, or maybe only `u16` or `u8`
- ▶ On Cortex-M4 (ARMv7E-M), working with register-size `u32` is natural



Crossing the ten barrier

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$9 + 7 = ?$



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- ▶ Results are allowed to be larger than 9
- ▶ Addition is allowed to produce a *carry*

What happens with the carry?

- ▶ Introduce the decimal positional system
- ▶ Write an integer A in two digits a_1a_0 with

$$A = 10 \cdot a_1 + a_0$$

- ▶ Note that at the moment $a_1 \in \{0, 1\}$



```
reg u32 a b r;  
a = 3348129313;  
b = 3810627668;  
r = a + b;
```



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- ▶ The result **r** now has the value of 2 863 789 685



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- ▶ $2\,863\,789\,685 = 7\,158\,756\,981 - 2^{32}$
- ▶ Addition result produced a carry, which is lost. What do we do?



```
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```

- ▶ Result of integer addition is 7 158 756 981
- ▶ The result **r** now has the value of 2 863 789 685
- ▶ $2\,863\,789\,685 = 7\,158\,756\,981 - 2^{32}$
- ▶ Addition result produced a carry, which is lost. What do we do?
- ▶ Idea: obtain the carry, and put it into another **u32**

$$3348129313 + 3810627668$$



```
u32 a = 3348129313;
u32 b = 3810627668;

fn addab() -> reg u32[2] {
    reg u32[2] r;
    reg bool c;
    c, r[0] = a + b;
    r[1] = 0;
    _, r[1] += r[1] + c;
    return r;
}
```



Addition

$42 + 78 = ?$

$789 + 543 = ?$

$7862 + 5275 = ?$



Addition

$42 + 78 = ?$

$789 + 543 = ?$

$7862 + 5275 = ?$

$$\begin{array}{r} 7862 \\ + 5275 \\ \hline + \quad 7 \end{array}$$



Addition

$42 + 78 = ?$

$789 + 543 = ?$

$7862 + 5275 = ?$

$$\begin{array}{r} 7862 \\ + 5275 \\ \hline + 37 \end{array}$$



Addition

$42 + 78 = ?$

$789 + 543 = ?$

$7862 + 5275 = ?$

$$\begin{array}{r} 7862 \\ + 5275 \\ \hline + 137 \end{array}$$



Addition

$42 + 78 = ?$

$789 + 543 = ?$

$7862 + 5275 = ?$

$$\begin{array}{r} 7862 \\ + 5275 \\ \hline + 13137 \end{array}$$



Addition

$$42 + 78 = ?$$

$$789 + 543 = ?$$

$$7862 + 5275 = ?$$

- ▶ Once school kids can add beyond 1000, they can add arbitrary numbers

$$\begin{array}{r} 7862 \\ + 5275 \\ \hline + 13137 \end{array}$$

Multiprecision addition is old



*"Oh *Līlāvatī*, intelligent girl, if you understand addition and subtraction, tell me the sum of the amounts 2, 5, 32, 193, 18, 10, and 100, as well as [the remainder of] those when subtracted from 10000."*

—“*Līlāvatī*” by *Bhāskara* (1150)

Multiprecision addition in Jasmin



```
fn bigint_add(reg ptr u32[N+1] r, reg ptr u32[N] a b) -> reg ptr u32[N+1] {
    reg u32 t, u;
    reg bool c;
    inline int i;

    t = a[0];
    u = b[0];
    c, t += u;
    r[0] = t;
    for i = 1 to N {
        t = a[i];
        u = b[i];
        c, t += u + c;
        r[i] = t;
    }
    t = 0;
    _, t += t + c;
    r[N] = t;

    return r;
}
```

... and subtraction



```
fn bigint_sub(reg ptr u32[N+1] r, reg ptr u32[N] a b) -> reg ptr u32[N+1] {
    reg u32 t, u;
    reg bool c;
    inline int i;

    t = a[0];
    u = b[0];
    c, t -= u;
    r[0] = t;
    for i = 1 to N {
        t = a[i];
        u = b[i];
        c, t -= u - c;
        r[i] = t;
    }
    t = 0;
    _, t -= t - c;
    r[N] = t;

    return r;
}
```

How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 6 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 06 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 106 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 11106 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 11106 \\ 9872 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 11106 \\ 9872 \\ 8638 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 11106 \\ + \quad 9872 \\ + \quad 8638 \\ \hline 973626 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 11106 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 11106 \\ + \quad 9872 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 20978 \end{array}$$

How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 20978 \\ + \quad 8638 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

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How about multiplication?



- ▶ Consider multiplication of 1234 by 789

$$\begin{array}{r} 1234 \cdot 789 \\ \hline 973626 \end{array}$$

- ▶ This is also an old technique
- ▶ Earliest reference I could find is again the *Līlāvatī* (1150)

Let's do that in Jasmin



```
export fn bigint_mul(reg mut ptr u32[6] rp, reg ptr u32[3] ap bp) -> reg ptr u32[6] {
```

Let's do that in Jasmin



```
reg u32 r0 r1 r2 r3 r4 r5;
reg u32 a0 a1 a2;
reg u32 b0 b1 b2;
reg u32 t0 t1 t2 t3 hi lo z;
reg bool c;
z = 0;

a0 = ap[0];
a1 = ap[1];
a2 = ap[2];

b0 = bp[0];
t1, r0 = a0 * b0;
rp[0] = r0;

hi, r1 = a1 * b0;
c, r1 += t1;
c, hi += z + c;

r3, r2 = a2 * b0;
c, r2 += hi + c;
_, r3 += z + c;

b1 = bp[1];
t1, t0 = a0 * b1;
hi, lo = a1 * b1;
c, t1 += lo;
r4, t2 = a2 * b1;
c, t2 += hi + c;
c, r4 += z + c;

c, r1 += t0;
c, r2 += t1 + c;
c, r3 += t2 + c;
_, r4 += z + c;
rp[1] = r1;

c, r2 += t0;
c, r3 += t1 + c;
c, r4 += t2 + c;
_, r5 += z + c;

c, r2 += t0;
c, r3 += t1 + c;
c, r4 += t2 + c;
_, r5 += z + c;

rp[2] = r2;
rp[3] = r3;
rp[4] = r4;
rp[5] = r5;

return rp;
}
```



- ▶ n^2 multiplication instructions to multiply two n -limb big integers
- ▶ About 2 additions per multiplication



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- ▶ n^2 multiplication instructions to multiply two n -limb big integers
- ▶ About 2 additions per multiplication
- ▶ Problem: Need $3n + c$ registers for $n \times n$ -word multiplication
- ▶ Can add on the fly, get down to $2n + c$, but more carry handling

Can we do better?



"Again as the information is understood, the multiplication of 2345 by 6789 is proposed; therefore the numbers are written down; the 5 is multiplied by the 9, there will be 45; the 5 is put, the 4 is kept; and the 5 is multiplied by the 8, and the 9 by the 4 and the products are added to the kept 4; there will be 80; the 0 is put and the 8 is kept; and the 5 is multiplied by the 7 and the 9 by the 3 and the 4 by the 8, and the products are added to the kept 8; there will be 102; the 2 is put and the 10 is kept in hand..."


From "Fibonacci's Liber Abaci" (1202) Chapter 2
(English translation by Sigler)

Product scanning in Jasmin



```
z = 0;                                hi, lo = a0 * b2;          hi, lo = a1 * b2;  
a0 = ap[0];                            c, r2 += lo;              c, r3 += lo;  
a1 = ap[1];                            c, r3 += hi + c;          c, r4 += hi + c;  
a2 = ap[2];                            _, r4 = z + z + c;        _, r5 = z + z + c;  
  
b0 = bp[0];                            hi, lo = a1 * b1;          hi, lo = a2 * b1;  
b1 = bp[1];                            c, r2 += lo;              c, r3 += lo;  
b2 = bp[2];                            c, r3 += hi + c;          c, r4 += hi + c;  
                                      _, r4 += z + c;          _, r5 += z + c;  
                                      rp[3] = r3;  
  
r1, r0 = a0 * b0;                      hi, lo = a2 * b0;          hi, lo = a2 * b2;  
rp[0] = r0;                            c, r2 += lo;              c, r4 += lo;  
  
r2, lo = a0 * b1;                      c, r3 += hi + c;          _, r5 += hi + c;  
c, r1 += lo;                            _, r4 += z + c;          rp[4] = r4;  
_, r2 += z + c;                          rp[2] = r2;              rp[5] = r5;  
  
hi, lo = a1 * b0;                      c, r1 += lo;              return rp;  
c, r1 += lo;                            c, r2 += hi + c;          }  
c, r2 += hi + c;                        _, r3 = z + z + c;  
_, r3 = z + z + c;                      rp[1] = r1;
```

Even better...?



5	6	2	8	9		
0	4	8	2	6		
2	2	2	3	3	4	6
5	0	1	4	2		
1	1	2	2	2	3	2
0	2	4	6	0		
1	1	1	1	1	2	6
5	6	7	8	9		
0	0	0	0	0	1	7
Sūma						
2	0	0	0	2		

From the Treviso Arithmetic, 1478



Radix- 2^{32} representation

- ▶ Currently, represent 256-bit integer A as (a_0, \dots, a_7) with

$$A = \sum_{i=0}^7 a_i \cdot 2^{32i}$$



Radix- 2^{32} representation

- ▶ Currently, represent 256-bit integer A as (a_0, \dots, a_7) with

$$A = \sum_{i=0}^7 a_i \cdot 2^{32i}$$

- ▶ Very compact, also computationally efficient
- ▶ Unique representation for every 256-bit integer
- ▶ Every addition may generate carries
- ▶ Carry handling may get involved



Radix-2⁸ representation

- ▶ Idea: use “unsaturated” representation (a_0, \dots, a_{31}) with

$$A = \sum_{i=0}^{31} a_i \cdot 2^{8i}$$



Radix- 2^8 representation

- ▶ Idea: use “unsaturated” representation (a_0, \dots, a_{31}) with

$$A = \sum_{i=0}^{31} a_i \cdot 2^{8i}$$

- ▶ More computations per big-integer operation
- ▶ Various ways to represent the same 256-bit integer, e.g., $512 = 2^9$
 - ▶ $(512, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$
 - ▶ $(0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$
- ▶ Needs more space in memory
- ▶ Can ignore carries for quite a while



- ▶ On Cortex-M4, saturated representation is most efficient
 - ▶ Carries are annoying, but cheap
 - ▶ Minimize arithmetic and load/stores instructions
 - ▶ Setting flags is optional, carries aren't overwritten



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 - ▶ RISC-V does not have a carry flag
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- ▶ More efficient unsaturated code, e.g., radix- 2^{26}
- ▶ Unsaturated representation often used for first reference code
- ▶ Code in `assignment2-ecdh25519` uses radix- 2^8 representation

Addition in radix 2^8



```
fn bigint_add(reg ptr u32[N] r, reg ptr u32[N] a b) -> reg ptr u32[N] {  
    reg u32 t, u;  
    inline int i;  
  
    for i = 0 to N {  
        t = a[i];  
        u = b[i];  
        t += u;  
        r[i] = t;  
    }  
  
    return r;  
}
```

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        u = b[i];  
        t += u;  
        r[i] = t;  
    }  
  
    return r;  
}
```

- ▶ This works as long as all coefficients are in $[0, \dots, 2^{31} - 1]$

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    for i = 0 to N {  
        t = a[i];  
        u = b[i];  
        t += u;  
        r[i] = t;  
    }  
  
    return r;  
}
```

- ▶ This works as long as all coefficients are in $[0, \dots, 2^{31} - 1]$
- ▶ We can do quite a few additions before we have to carry (reduce)

Subtraction in radix 2⁸



```
fn bigint_sub(reg ptr u32[N] r, reg ptr u32[N] a b) -> reg ptr u32[N] {  
    reg u32 t, u;  
    inline int i;  
  
    for i = 0 to N {  
        t = a[i];  
        u = b[i];  
        t -= u;  
        r[i] = t;  
    }  
  
    return r;  
}
```

- ▶ Use signed coefficients to represent our big integers
- ▶ No need to worry about borrows

Carrying in radix- 2^8



- ▶ With many additions, coefficients may grow larger than 31 bits
- ▶ They grow even faster with multiplication

Carrying in radix-2⁸



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- ▶ They grow even faster with multiplication
- ▶ Eventually we have to *carry en bloc*:

```
t = r[0];  
u = r[1];  
t = t >>s 8;  
u += t;  
t = t << 8;  
t -= t;  
r[0] = t;  
r[1] = u;
```

Carrying in radix-2⁸



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- ▶ They grow even faster with multiplication
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```
t = r[0];  
u = r[1];  
t = t >> 8;  
u += t;  
t = t << 8;  
t -= t;  
r[0] = t;  
r[1] = u;
```

- ▶ Continue by carrying from **r1** to **r2**, from **r2** to **r3**, etc.
- ▶ For the highest limb **r[N-1]**, need to create a new limb to carry to



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- ▶ Nice thing about arithmetic in $\mathbb{Z}[x]$: no carries!
- ▶ To go from $\mathbb{Z}[x]$ to \mathbb{Z} , evaluate at the radix (this is a ring homomorphism)
- ▶ Carrying means evaluating at the radix



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- ▶ To go from $\mathbb{Z}[x]$ to \mathbb{Z} , evaluate at the radix (this is a ring homomorphism)
- ▶ Carrying means evaluating at the radix
- ▶ Thinking of multiprecision integers as polynomials is very powerful for efficient arithmetic

How about squaring?



```
inline fn bigint_square(reg ptr u32[N] r a) -> reg ptr u32[N] {  
    r = bigint_mul(a, a);  
}
```

How about squaring?



- ▶ What squaring will compute is the following:

$$r_0 = a_0 a_0$$

$$r_1 = a_1 a_0 + a_0 a_1$$

$$r_2 = a_2 a_0 + a_1 a_1 + a_0 a_2$$

...

$$r_{61} = a_{30} a_{31} + a_{31} a_{30}$$

$$r_{62} = a_{31} a_{31}$$

How about squaring?



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$$r_1 = a_1 a_0 + a_0 a_1$$

$$r_2 = a_2 a_0 + a_1 a_1 + a_0 a_2$$

...

$$r_{61} = a_{30} a_{31} + a_{31} a_{30}$$

$$r_{62} = a_{31} a_{31}$$

- ▶ Many partial products are computed twice!

How about squaring?



- ▶ Idea: compute them only once!
- ▶ Precompute $2a_1, 2a_2, \dots, 2a_{31}$, then

$$r_0 = a_0 a_0$$

$$r_1 = 2a_1 a_0$$

$$r_2 = 2a_2 a_0 + a_1 a_1$$

...

$$r_{61} = 2a_{30} a_{31}$$

$$r_{62} = a_{31} a_{31}$$

How about squaring?



- ▶ Idea: compute them only once!
- ▶ Precompute $2a_1, 2a_2, \dots, 2a_{31}$, then

$$r_0 = a_0 a_0$$

$$r_1 = 2a_1 a_0$$

$$r_2 = 2a_2 a_0 + a_1 a_1$$

...

$$r_{61} = 2a_{30} a_{31}$$

$$r_{62} = a_{31} a_{31}$$

- ▶ Eliminate almost half of the multiplications (and additions)
- ▶ Precomputation can use addition, shift, or multiplication by 2



For 32 input limbs, multiplication needs

- ▶ $32^2 = 1024$ multiplications
- ▶ $31^2 = 961$ additions

Squaring needs

- ▶ 528 multiplications
- ▶ 465 additions
- ▶ 31 additions or shifts or multiplications by 2 for precomputation



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- ▶ Recursive application yields $\Theta(n^{\log_2 3})$ runtime



- ▶ For small multiplication numbers, Karatsuba is typically not faster
- ▶ Cutoff between quadratic-complexity and Karatsuba depends on
 - ▶ Size of registers and radix used to represent big integers
 - ▶ Relative cost of multiplications, additions, and load/stores
 - ▶ Cost of carry handling



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- ▶ Very rough rule of thumb: consider Karatsuba from ≈ 10 limbs
- ▶ Lower complexity is also possible (for even larger inputs):
 - ▶ $\Theta(n^{\log_3 5})$ for Toom-3 multiplication
 - ▶ $\Theta(n^{\log_4 7})$ for Toom-4 multiplication
 - ▶ $\Theta(n \log n \log \log n)$ for Schönhage-Strassen
 - ▶ $\Theta(n \log n)$ for Harvey and van-der-Hoeven (2019)
- ▶ For cryptography, we care about Karatsuba and Toom, but nothing beyond



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/* 256-bit integers in radix 2^8 */  
stack u32[32] a;
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- ▶ Integer A is obtained as $\sum_{i=0}^{31} a_i 2^{8i}$
- ▶ Lot of space in top of limbs to accumulate carries



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- ▶ Lot of space in top of limbs to accumulate carries
- ▶ Multiplication produces `stack u32[63] r`
- ▶ For "carried" inputs, each limb in `r` has at most 21 bits

Modular reduction



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- ▶ Reduce 31-word intermediate result \mathbf{r} as follows:

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for i = 0 to 31 {  
    u = r[i];  
    t = r[i+32];  
    t = 38 * t;  
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- ▶ Result is in $\mathbf{r}[0], \dots, \mathbf{r}[31]$

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- ▶ Examples:
 - ▶ $2^{192} - 2^{64} - 1$ ("NIST-P192", FIPS186-2, 2000)
 - ▶ $2^{224} - 2^{96} + 1$ ("NIST-P224", FIPS186-2, 2000)
 - ▶ $2^{256} - 2^{224} + 2^{192} + 2^{96} - 1$ ("NIST-P256", FIPS186-2, 2000)
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 - ▶ $2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$ (Hamburg, 2015)



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 - ▶ $2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$ (Hamburg, 2015)
- ▶ All these primes come with (more or less) fast reduction algorithms

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$$\begin{aligned}p_{224} = & 2272162293245435278755253799591092807334073 \backslash \\& 2145944992304435472941311 \\= & 0xD7C134AA264366862A18302575D1D787B09F07579 \backslash \\& 7DA89F57EC8C0FF\end{aligned}$$

or

$$\begin{aligned}p_{256} = & 7688495639704534422080974662900164909303795 \backslash \\& 0200943055203735601445031516197751 \\= & 0xA9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D726E3BF623D \backslash \\& 52620282013481D1F6E5377\end{aligned}$$

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- ▶ Another example: Pairing-friendly curves are typically defined over fields \mathbb{F}_p where p has some structure, but hard to exploit for fast arithmetic



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- ▶ Idea: Perform big-integer division with remainder (expensive!)
- ▶ Better idea (Montgomery, 1985):
 - ▶ Let R be such that $\gcd(R, p) = 1$ and $t < p \cdot R$
 - ▶ Represent an element a of \mathbb{F}_p as $aR \bmod p$
 - ▶ Multiplication of aR and bR yields $t = abR^2$ ($2n$ limbs)
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 - ▶ Now compute *Montgomery reduction*: $tR^{-1} \bmod p$
 - ▶ For some choices of R this is more efficient than division
 - ▶ Typical choice for radix- b representation: $R = b^n$

Montgomery reduction (pseudocode)



Require: $p = (p_{n-1}, \dots, p_0)_b$ with $\gcd(p, b) = 1$, $R = b^n$,
 $p' = -p^{-1} \pmod{b}$ and $t = (t_{2n-1}, \dots, t_0)_b$

Ensure: $tR^{-1} \pmod{p}$

```
 $A \leftarrow t$ 
for  $i$  from 0 to  $n - 1$  do
     $u \leftarrow a_i p' \pmod{b}$ 
     $A \leftarrow A + u \cdot p \cdot b^i$ 
end for
 $A \leftarrow A/b^n$ 
if  $A \geq p$  then
     $A \leftarrow A - p$ 
end if
return  $A$ 
```

Some notes about Montgomery reduction



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- ▶ One can merge schoolbook multiplication with Montgomery reduction: “Montgomery multiplication”

Still missing: inversion



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- ▶ We need inversion, but we do (usually) not need it often
- ▶ Two approaches to inversion:
 1. Extended Euclidean algorithm
 2. Fermat's little theorem



- ▶ Given two integers a, b , the Extended Euclidean algorithm finds
 - ▶ The greatest common divisor of a and b
 - ▶ Integers u and v , such that $a \cdot u + b \cdot v = \gcd(a, b)$



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$$\gcd(a, b) = \gcd(b, a - qb) \quad \forall q \in \mathbb{Z}$$

- ▶ To compute $a^{-1} \pmod{p}$, use the algorithm to compute

$$a \cdot u + p \cdot v = \gcd(a, p) = 1$$

- ▶ Now it holds that $u \equiv a^{-1} \pmod{p}$

Extended Euclidean algorithm (pseudocode)



Require: Integers a and b .

Ensure: An integer tuple (u, v, d) satisfying $a \cdot u + b \cdot v = d = \gcd(a, b)$

```
u ← 1
v ← 0
d ← a
v1 ← 0
v3 ← b
while (v3 ≠ 0) do
    q ← ⌊  $\frac{d}{v_3}$  ⌋
    t3 ← d mod v3
    t1 ← u - qv1
    u ← v1
    d ← v3
    v1 ← t1
    v3 ← t3
end while
v ←  $\frac{d - au}{b}$ 
return (u, v, d)
```

Some notes about the Extended Euclidean algorithm



- ▶ Core operation are divisions with remainder
- ▶ This lecture: no details about big-integer division
- ▶ Version without divisions: **binary extended gcd**:
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- ▶ Other option: constant-time EEA, Bernstein-Yang, 2019:
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/266.pdf>



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Let p be prime. Then for any integer a it holds that $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$



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- ▶ Obvious algorithm for inversion: Exponentiation with $p - 2$
- ▶ The exponent is quite large (e.g., 255 bits), is that efficient?
- ▶ Yes, fairly:
 - ▶ Exponent is fixed and known at compile time
 - ▶ Can spend quite some time on finding an efficient addition chain (next week)
 - ▶ Inversion modulo $2^{255} - 19$ needs 254 squarings and 11 multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{255}-19}$



```
fn invert(reg ptr u32[N] r x) -> reg ptr u32[N] {
    stack u32[N] z2 z9 z11 z2_5_0 z2_10_0 z2_20_0 z2_50_0 z2_100_0 t;
    inline int i;

    /* 2 */           z2      = gfe_square(z2,x);
    /* 4 */           t       = gfe_square(t,z2);
    /* 8 */           t       = gfe_square_inline(t);
    /* 9 */           z9      = gfe_mul(z9,t,x);
    /* 11 */          z11     = gfe_mul(z11,z9,z2);
    /* 22 */          t       = gfe_square(t,z11);
    /* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */ z2_5_0  = gfe_mul(z2_5_0,t,z9);
    /* 2^6 - 2^1 */    t       = gfe_square(t,z2_5_0);
    /* 2^10 - 2^5 */   for i = 1 to 5 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
    /* 2^10 - 2^0 */   z2_10_0 = gfe_mul(z2_10_0,t,z2_5_0);
    /* 2^11 - 2^1 */   t       = gfe_square(t,z2_10_0);
    /* 2^20 - 2^10 */  for i = 1 to 10 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
    /* 2^20 - 2^0 */   z2_20_0 = gfe_mul(z2_20_0,t,z2_10_0);
    /* 2^21 - 2^1 */   t       = gfe_square(t,z2_20_0);
    /* 2^40 - 2^20 */  for i = 1 to 20 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
    /* 2^40 - 2^0 */   t       = gfe_mul_inline(t,z2_20_0);
```

Inversion in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{255}-19}$



```
/* 2^41 - 2^1 */    t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^50 - 2^10 */   for i = 1 to 10 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
/* 2^50 - 2^0 */    z2_50_0 = gfe_mul(z2_50_0,t,z2_10_0);
/* 2^51 - 2^1 */    t      = gfe_square(t,z2_50_0);
/* 2^100 - 2^50 */  for i = 1 to 50 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
/* 2^100 - 2^0 */  z2_100_0 = gfe_mul(z2_100_0,t,z2_50_0);
/* 2^101 - 2^1 */  t      = gfe_square(t,z2_100_0);
/* 2^200 - 2^100 */ for i = 1 to 100 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
/* 2^200 - 2^0 */   t      = gfe_mul_inline(t,z2_100_0);
/* 2^201 - 2^1 */   t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^250 - 2^50 */  for i = 1 to 50 { t = gfe_square_inline(t); }
/* 2^250 - 2^0 */   t      = gfe_mul_inline(t,z2_50_0);
/* 2^251 - 2^1 */   t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^252 - 2^2 */   t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^253 - 2^3 */   t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^254 - 2^4 */   t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^255 - 2^5 */   t      = gfe_square_inline(t);
/* 2^255 - 21 */    r      = gfe_mul(r,t,z11);

return r;
}
```



- ▶ We can compress a point (x, y) before sending
- ▶ Usually send only x and one bit of y
- ▶ When receiving such a compressed point we need to solve recompute y as $\sqrt{x^3 + ax + b}$ (Weierstrass curve)
- ▶ Similar for twisted Edwards curves (see <https://cryptojedi.org/papers/#ed25519>)



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While we're at it: square roots



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- ▶ If $\beta^2 = -a$: multiply by $\sqrt{-1}$
- ▶ Computing square roots is (typically) about as expensive as an inversion



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 - ▶ Saturated representation often most efficient
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- ▶ Two main options for inversion:
 - ▶ Extended Euclidean algorithm (careful about timing attacks!)
 - ▶ Fermat's little theorem (less efficient, but trivially constant-time)